Category Players

WR Size: Is It Valid Analysis? By Chase Stuart and Matt Waldman

Photo by Dr. Clifford Choi.
If correlation were causation, this photo and others like it wouldn’t exist. Photo by Dr. Clifford Choi.

Chase Stuart of Football Perspective drops by to collaborate on the topic of wide receiver size and the limits of applying analytics to the subject.

Matt Waldman: Stats Ministers and Their Church

I’m a fan of applying analytics to football. Those who do it best possess rigorous statistical training or are disciplined about maintaining limits with its application. Brian Burke wrote that at its core, football analytics is no different than the classic scientific method. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are some bad scientists out there, who behave more like religious zealots than statisticians. I call them Stats Ministers. They claim objectivity when their methodology and fervor is anything but.

Stats Ministers scoff at the notion that anyone would see value in a wide receiver under a specific height and weight. They love to share how an overwhelming number of receivers above that specific height and weight mark make up the highest production tiers at the history of the position, but that narrow observation doesn’t prove the broader point that among top-tier prospects, taller wide receivers fare better than shorter ones. In fact, what the Stats Ministers ignore is that a disproportionately high number of the biggest busts were above a certain height and weight, too. Having a microphone does not mean one conducted thoughtful analysis: it could also mean one has a bully pulpit where a person with less knowledge and perspective of the subject will look at the correlation and come to the conclusion that it must be so.

However, correlation isn’t causation. Questioning why anyone would like a smaller wide receiver based on larger number of top wide receivers having size is an example of pointing to faulty ‘data backed’ points. Pointing to historical data can only get you so far: it’s not that different than the reasoning that led to Warren Moon going undrafted. That’s an extreme comparison, of course, but the structure of the argument is the same: there were very few black quarterbacks who had experienced any sort of success in the NFL, so why would Moon? Sometimes you have to shift eras to see in a clear light what “correlation isn’t causation” really looks like.

It was overwhelmingly obvious that Moon could play quarterback if you watched him. But if you’re prejudiced by past history rather than open to learning what to study on the field, then it isn’t overwhelmingly obvious. Data can help define the boundaries of risk, but when those wielding the data want to eliminate the search for the exceptional they’ve gone too far. Even as we see players get taller, stronger, and faster, wide receivers under 6’2″, 210 pounds aren’t the exception.

Analytics-minded individuals employed by NFL teams — who have backgrounds in statistics – don’t follow this line of thoughts. Those with whom I spoke acknowledged that there is an effective player archetype of the small, quick receiver. They recognize the large number of size of shorter/smaller receivers who have been impact players in the NFL that make the size argument moot: Isaac Bruce, Derrick Mason, Wes Welker, Marvin Harrison, DeSean Jackson, Torry Holt, Steve Smith, Jerry Rice, Tim Brown, Antonio Brown, Pierre Garcon, Victor Cruz, and Reggie Wayne are just a small sample of players who did not match this 6-2, 210-pound requirement.

This size/weight notion and discussion of “calibration” or what I think they actually mean–reverse regression–is also a classic statistical case of overfitting. There are too many variables and complexities to the game and the position to throw up two data points like height and weight and derive a predictive model on quality talent among receivers. The only fact about big/tall receivers is that they tend to have a large catch radius. Otherwise, there is no factual basis to assume that these players have more talent and skill.

The dangerous thing about this type of thinking is that many of these “Stats Ministers” were trained using perfect data sets in the classroom and their math is reliant on “high fit” equations. When they tackle a real world environment like football they still expect these lessons to help them when it won’t. However, there are plenty of people who are reading and buying into what they’re selling. I showed my argument above to Chase Stuart and asked him to share his thoughts. Here’s his analysis:

Chase Stuart: Analysis of the Big vs. Small WR Question

We should begin by first getting a sense of the distribution of height among wide receivers in the draft. The graph below shows the number of wide receivers selected in the first two rounds of each draft from 1970 to 2013 at each height (in inches):

 

wr draft ht

The distribution is somewhat like a bell curve, with the peak height being 6’1″, and the curve being slightly skewed thereafter towards shorter players (more 6’0 receivers than 6’2″, more 5’11″ receivers than 6’3″, and so on).

Now, let’s look at the number of WRs who have made three Pro Bowls since 1970:

wr pro bowl ht

The most common height for a wide receiver who has made three Pro Bowls since the AFL-NFL merger is 72 inches. And while Harold Jackson is the only wide receiver right at 5’10 to make the list, players at 71 and 69 inches are pretty well represented, too. I suppose it’s easy to forget smaller receivers, so here’s the list of wide receivers 6′0 or shorter with 3 pro bowls:

 

Mel Gray
Mark Duper
Mark Clayton
Gary Clark
Steve Smith
Wes Welker
Harold Jackson
Charlie Joiner
Cliff Branch
Lynn Swann
Steve Largent
Stanley Morgan
Henry Ellard
Anthony Carter
Anthony Miller
Paul Warfield
Drew Pearson
Wes Chandler
Irving Fryar
Tim Brown
Sterling Sharpe
Isaac Bruce
Rod Smith
Marvin Harrison
Hines Ward
Donald Driver
Torry Holt
Reggie Wayne
DeSean Jackson

Recent history

Now, let’s turn to players drafted since 2000. This next graph shows how many wide receivers were selected in the first two rounds of drafts from ’00 to ’13, based on height:

wr draft 2000 2013 ht

As you can see, the draft is skewing towards taller wide receivers in recent years. Part of that is because nearly all positions are getting bigger and taller (and faster), but the real question concerns whether this trend is overvaluing tall wide receivers.

It’s too early to grade receivers from the 2012 or 2013 classes, so let’s look at all receivers drafted in the first round between 2000 and 2011. There were 21 receivers drafted who were 6’3 or taller, compared to just 14 receivers drafted who stood six feet tall or shorter. On average, these taller receivers were drafted with the 13th pick in the draft, while the set of short receivers were selected, on average, with the 21st pick.

So we would expect the taller receivers to be better players, since they were drafted eight spots higher. But that wasn’t really the case. Both sets of players produced nearly identical receiving yards averages:

Type Rookie Year 2 Year 2
Short 535 669 709
Tall 567 676 720

Taller wide receivers have fared ever so slightly better than shorter receivers. But once you factor in draft position, that edge disappears. If you look at the ten highest drafted “short” receivers, they still were drafted later (on average, 17th overall) than the average “tall” receiver. But their three-year receiving yards line is better, reading 563-694-790. In other words, I don’t see evidence to indicate that shorter receivers, once taking draft position into account, are worse than taller receivers. If anything, the evidence points the other way, suggesting that talent evaluators are more comfortable “reaching” for a taller player who isn’t quite as good. Players like Santana Moss, Lee Evans, Percy Harvin, and Jeremy Maclin were very productive shorter picks; for some reason, it’s easy for some folks to forget the success of those shorter receivers, and also forget the failures of taller players like Charles Rogers, Mike Williams, Jonathan Baldwin, Sylvester Morris, David Terrell, Michael Jenkins, Reggie Williams, and Matt Jones.

But that’s just one way of answering the question. What I did next was run a regression using draft value using the values from my Draft Value Chart and height to predict success. If the draft was truly efficient — i.e., if height was properly being incorporated into a player’s draft position–then adding height to the regression would be useless. But if height was being improperly valued by NFL decision makers, the regression would tell us that, too.

To measure success, I used True Receiving Yards by players in their first five seasons.  I jointly developed True Receiving Yards with Neil Paine (now of 538 fame), and you can read the background about it here and here.

The basic explanation is that TRY adjusts receiver numbers for era and combines receptions, receiving yards, and receiving touchdowns into one number, and adjusts for the volume of each team’s passing attack.  The end result is one number that looks like receiving yards: Antonio Brown, AJ Green, Josh Gordon, Calvin Johnson, Anquan Boldin, and Demaryius Thomas all had between 1100 and 1200 TRY last year.

First, I had to isolate a sample of receivers to analyze.  I decided to take 20 years of NFL drafts, looking at all players drafted between 1990 and 2009 who played in an NFL game, and their number of TRYs in their first five seasons. (Note: As will become clear at the end of this post, I have little reason to think this is an issue.  But technically, I should note that I am only looking at drafted wide receivers who actually played in an NFL game.  So if, for example, height is disproportionately linked to players who are drafted but fail to make it to an NFL game, that would be important to know but would be ignored in this analysis.)

To give you a sense of what type of players TRY likes, here are the top 10 leaders (in order) in True Receiving Yards accumulated during their first five seasons among players drafted between 1990 and 2009:

  • Randy Moss
  • Torry Holt
  • Marvin Harrison
  • Larry Fitzgerald
  • Chad Johnson
  • Calvin Johnson
  • Keyshawn Johnson
  • Anquan Boldin
  • Herman Moore
  • Andre Johnson

First, I ran a regression using Draft Pick Value as my sole input and True Receiving Yards as my output.  The best-fit formula was:

TRY through five years = 348 + 131.3 * Draft Pick Value

That doesn’t mean much in the abstract, so let’s use an example.  Keyshawn Johnson was the first pick in the draft, which gives him a draft value of 34.6. This formula projected Johnson to have 4,890 TRY through five years.  In reality, he had 4,838.   The R^2 in the regression was 0.60, which is pretty strong: It means draft pick is pretty strongly tied to wide receiver production, a sign that the market is pretty efficient.

Then I re-ran the formula using draft pick value *and* height as my inputs.  As it turns out, the height variable was completely meaningless.  The R^2 remained at 0.60, and the coefficient on the height variable was not close to significant (p=0.53) despite a large sample of 543 players.

In other words, NFL GMs were properly valuing height in the draft during this period.

In case you’re curious, the 15 biggest “overachievers” as far as TRY relative to draft position were, in order: Marques Colston, Santana Moss, Brandon Marshall, Darrell Jackson, Terrell Owens, Anquan Boldin, Antonio Freeman, Chad Johnson, Coles, Mike Wallace, Greg Jennings, Chris Chambers, Marvin Harrison, Hines Ward, and Steve Johnson.

In this sample, about 50% of the players were taller than 6-0, and only about 30% of the receivers were 5-11 or shorter. We shouldn’t necessarily expect to see a bunch of short overachievers, but I’m convinced that height was properly valued by NFL teams in the draft at least over this 20-year period. There may be fewer star receivers who are short, but that’s only because there are fewer star receiver prospects who are short. Once an NFL team puts a high grade on a short prospect, that’s pretty much all we need to know.

Of the 33 players drafted in the top 15, just one-third of them were six feet or shorter.  As a group, there were a couple of big overachievers (Torry Holt, Lee Evans), some other players who did very well (Joey Galloway, Terry Glenn, and Donte Stallworth), and a few big busts (Desmond Howard, Ted Ginn, Troy Edwards, and Peter Warrick).  Ike Hilliard and Mike Pritchard round out the group.  But I see nothing to indicate that short receivers who are highly drafted do any worse than tall receivers who are highly drafted.  It’s just that usually, the taller receiver is drafted earlier.

Waldman: Why the Exceptional is Valuable

When a team finds a good player with exceptional qualities--like the too short/too slow UDFA Rod Smith--it has ancillary benefits for the organization. Photo by Jeffery Beall.
When a team finds a good player with exceptional qualities–like the too short/too slow UDFA Rod Smith–it has ancillary benefits for the organization. Photo by Jeffery Beall.

Chase’s analysis echoes what I have heard from those with NFL analytics backgrounds: There are too many variables to consider with raw stats to indicate that big receivers are inherently better than small receivers and there are viable archetypes of the effective small receiver.

What concerns me about the attempts to pigeonhole player evaluation into narrower physical parameters is that if taken too far one might as well replace the word “talent” in the phrase “talent evaluation” and use “athletic” or “physical” in its place. I may be wrong, but I get the sense that some of these Stats Ministers–intentionally or otherwise–dislike the exceptional when it comes to human nature. They’re seeking a way to make scouting a plain of square holes where the square pegs fit neatly into each place.

The problem with this philosophy is that once a concept, strategy, or view becomes the “right way” it evolves into the standard convention. Once it becomes conventional, it’s considered “safe.” However this is not true in the arena of competition. If you’re seeking the conventional, you’ve limited the possibilities of finding and creating environments for the exceptional to grow.

Many players who didn’t match the ideal size for their positions and had success were difference makers on winning teams–often Super Bowl Champions. I’d argue that exceptions to the rule that succeed are often drivers of excellence:

  • Russell Wilson didn’t meet the faulty “data backed” physical prototypes for quarterback and picking this exception to the rule in the third round earned them exceptional savings to acquire or keep other players for a Super Bowl run.
  • Rod Smith was too short, too slow, a rookie at 25, and not even drafted. But like a lot of his peers I mentioned above, his production was a huge factor for his team becoming a contender. The fact he was the exception to the rule freed Denver to acquire other pieces to the puzzle.
  • Joe Montana was too small, threw a wobbly ball, and was a third-round pick who was more of a point guard than full-fledged pocket passer, but he was just the type of player Bill Walsh was seeking in an offense that changed the entire course of the game. But at the time, the west coast offense was the exception to the rule that turned the league upside down.
  • Buddy Ryan the Bears drafted a bunch of defenders that didn’t meet physical prototypes for traditional roles in a 4-3, but the 46 defense took Chicago to Super Bowl dominance.
  • Drew Brees, Darren Sproles, and Marques Colston were exceptions to the rule. The Saints offense has been the driver for this team’s playoff and Super Bowl appearances.

I could name more, but the point isn’t to list every player. Why should I? Players who become top starters in the NFL are by very definition the exception to the rule. The only thing height gives a wide receiver is potential position on a target due to wing span, but it doesn’t help hand-eye coordination, body position, route running, comfort with physical contact, and understanding of a defense.

There are also smaller players with good arm length, leaping ability, quickness, and strength to earn similar, if not better position on a target. Even when the smaller receivers lack the same caliber of physical measurements as the bigger players, if  they possess all of the other traits of a good receiver that these big athletes lack then size doesn’t matter.

There are legitimate archetypes for smaller, quick receivers with change of direction. However, there are social biases with these correlations that filter out players from the earliest stages of the game. These biases include the idea that the vast majority of these types of players are in the highest levels of football so anything different should be discouraged at the high school and college level–think white wide receivers, running backs, and cornerbacks as examples.

Players who succeed in defying these social biases and also possess the skill and persistence to overcome them.  I’ve shown this video before, but physicist Neil deGrasse Tyson makes a strong point against “data backed” arguments of this nature when he answered a question posed about the small number of female and black scientists in the world. Harvard President Lawrence Summers hazarded a guess that it was genetics. Tyson’s answer is a great example why correlation isn’t causation.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/KEeBPSvcNZQ?start=3689]

The greatest irony about this specific crowd of data zealots is that they are often the first to complain about coaching tendencies that have same biases.

Maybe rookie receivers with the dimensions of Paul Richardson–or for that matter Jeremy Gallon or Odell Beckham–don’t become productive fantasy options or football players as often as bigger players based on correlating data. However, pointing to past history and scoffing at the wisdom of making an investment is like stating that it was a fact in the 15th century that dragons lie at the edge of the flat world we live in.

If you’re going to avoid investing in a player–or encourage others to do so–use good reasoning. Looking at the data is helpful, but the NFL isn’t a perfect data set. There are some data analysts writing about football that derive ideas reliant on a lot of highly fit equations that don’t work in a real world situation. However, they expect perfection and it’s not going to happen. They also behave as if data only tells the truth–and when that data lacks a fit, context, or proper application, it’s a little scary.

I want to see analytics succeed in the NFL, but like film study it’s not the answer. These two areas–when executed well–can contribute to the answer. However, the NFL–beyond some individual cases–hasn’t made significant advances in either area.

I suppose when you have a monopoly in the marketplace combined with a socialistic system for spreading the wealth owners don’t have significant motivation to become innovative with player evaluation. If they did, they’d be spending more money on making these processes rather than cycling through coaches and GMs every 3-5 years.

In case you’re new to the RSP blog, Chase Stuart runs the excellent blog Football Perspective. He also writes for Footballguys and Football Outsiders. I recommend you check out more of his work.

Chicago Bears RB Ka’Deem Carey: Substance Over Flash

 Ka'Deem Carey IIMany draftniks are lukewarm about Ka’Deem Carey’s prospects, but it’s the little things he does that generate big plays that get me excited about his future.

A scout told me this spring that Ka’Deem Carey is the type of runner that scouts like and coaches love, but makes personnel executives squint their eyes.  Carey’s off-field domestic violence charge early in his college career is a viable reason for scrutiny, but it’s not the reason the scout I spoke with says that some big wigs in NFL front offices weren’t jumping on board with their staffs.

Carey is a punishing runner for a back that weighed less than 210 pounds at the combine. He also ran a 4.7-40, which is by no means a death knell for a running back, but the front office sees the smaller stature, the average speed, and a career built on volume and the risk management hat comes on.

However, coaches love the intensity that a player like Carey brings to the game and the Bears have the kind of offense where I believe the rookie can develop into a feature back when Matt Forte’s contract expires. Carey’s 21-carry, 138-yard night against USC that included 10 first downs, 11 broken tackles, and 6 catches for 36 yards offers some quality moments that illustrate why I hold this view of the Bears’ fourth-round pick.

A quick suggestion: Set the speed to “0.5” on YouTube’s playback settings “the cog” icon on the bottom right of  the video player before viewing each highlight.

Turning Losses Into Gains

Quickness and agility are more important than speed to a running back and vision to identify and avoid trouble trumps all three. This third-down run from a 2×2 receiver, 10 personnel shotgun set with 13:47 in the third quarter is a not against a packed box, but it’s still a good demonstration of what I’m talking about. Carey’s offensive line slants left and the runner intends to split the tackle and guard on that end to the flat.

However, USC ‘s tackle gets strong penetration up the middle to cut off this gap as Carey is taking the exchange with the quarterback. By the time Carey has the ball and a step past his quarterback, this tackle is two yards deep in the backfield and is blocking the widest gap at the line of scrimmage.

Carey has already identified the penetration and taking action. His first step is a hard plant and dip inside, but it’s not enough to avoid the tackle’s angle and he knows it. Some running backs will try to cut off the inside foot and lose balance.

Not Carey. He completes the second step with a turn, but it’s a quick step so he can plant harder with the outside leg to maintain balance and generate burst. It’s a minor adjustment that gets him inside the penetration and downhill with balanced pad level.

Now Carey can attack the defense in the middle of the field while avoiding the outside gap protection of the defensive back. He’s also in position to keep his knees high to run through the defensive back’s wrap.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=167]

He finishes the play backing his way to the Arizona 43 for a gain of eight on what could have been a loss of three. As I said, quickness and agility are more important than speed to a running back and vision to identify and avoid trouble trumps all three. Wash. Rinse. Repeat.

High Knees

This 39-yard gain highlights Carey’s average speed, but what I like is the finish. Once again this is a run where USC is expecting pass, but I love how Cary pressed to the inside shoulder of the left tackle to force the defensive tackle inside and then cuts to his blocker’s outside shoulder to hit the smaller crease between the left tackle and H-Back.

This press and cut not only sets up the initial hole, but it baits the middle linebacker to slide outside and give the left guard the angle he needs to seal the edge at the second level. This is fine inside running by Carey, because if he tries to beat the defensive tackle inside, the linebacker is already in position to end this play early. Instead, Carey sets up the smaller crease and in turn sets up guard’s block.

The reward is a first down and another 29 yards. As Carey gets 20 yards into the run, note how high he lifts his knees as he anticipates and runs through contact.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=201]

Carey gains another 14 yards in part to running with his knees high. The Bears’ new runner may not break long touchdown runs, but he’ll have a lot of runs of 15-25 yards that matter.

Integrating Both Skills From Above

This is another third-down run early in the fourth quarter where Carey essentially faces a five-man front with six at the line of scrimmage. Again, these are favorable numbers for the ground game, but not when a defensive tackle swims past the center and beats the right guard assigned to him. The defensive tackle is a yard deep int the backfield with a good angle before Carey even takes the exchange.

Carey plants hard as he takes the exchange and turns his hips away from the reach of the defender who is almost four yards into the backfield.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=233]

He then bursts down hill with high knees through the crease, earning the first down and carrying a defender for a 12-yard gain on what could have been a three-yard loss.

Reading the Field A Level Ahead

Finding running backs with the capability to read and set up defenders a level ahead of the ball carrier’s current position is not as common as one might think. Most running backs–even in the NFL–read one level of defenders at a time. This 1st and 10 run with 10:11 in the game is a good example of Carey reading a level ahead. It’s a play that I think is easy for some analysts to get wrong and characterize it as Carey “wasting movement.”

Carey flanks the left side of the quarterback in this pistol set with 2×2 receivers. USC plays off coverage on the receivers and both safeties are deep enough that the defense is expect pass, but the linebackers are still in good position to defend the run. As Carey takes the exchange from the quarterback, note linebackers No.10 (middle of field) and No.56 (accountable for the left flat in the short zone).

No.10 maintains good position to defend the inside and prevent a cutback to the middle. No.56 does a strong job of reacting tot he hole between left guard and left tackle, flying towards the gap after accounting for the slot receiver and verifying the exchange between the quarterback and runner. However, watch Carey read No.56, bounce the play three steps to the outside, and force No.56 to account for the edge.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=252]

I believe Carey knew exactly what he was doing on this run: He saw the hole and the linebacker’s reaction, baited the defender outside, and all the while was prepared to spin his way inside and back his way through the small crease for positive yards. This is a lot like a two-way go, but Carey knows he’s operating in a tight space and has to factor the two first-tier defenders into his movement.

One of the reasons I believe Carey knew what he was doing is his spin move. He doesn’t try to do a complete 360-degree turn. If he does, the tackle plants him behind the line of scrimmage. Only a runner that does not see or feel the tackle working down the line tries a full spin. It’s the type of 360 move that at one time Darren McFadden might have tried on a zone play and failed. Carey spins so his back is to the defender and he has leverage to drive through the hit and earn yards.

A three-yard gain doesn’t seem impressive in the box score, but this is a good example of process trumping the product. Carey makes a good decision and is fast enough to set up the move while factoring four defenders into his choice, gaining three yards instead of potentially bouncing outside or cutting back for a loss or executing a full spin for no gain.

Some scouts would examine this run and label it a good example of “feel” or “intuition.”

Plays Big In Tight Quarters

The previous play was an example of how Carey leveraged his size for maximum power in a situation where he could have been planted into the ground by a much bigger man. This reception and run for a first down on 3rd and 7 with 9:40 in the game is technically a “space play” based on the location, but the room Carey has to operate in the flat as he makes the catch and run is anything but.

Once again this is a 2×2 receiver, 10 personnel shotgun set with Carey flanking the quarterback’s left side. USC has one safety deep middle and the rest of the coverage on the receivers is six yards off the line of scrimmage. Six USC defenders pack the box pre-snap.  USC sends four–including two defenders towards the left edge, which leaves the flat open until the middle linebacker can sprint across to account for Carey swing from the backfield.

Arizona’s quarterback does a good job holding the defense in the middle of the field long enough for the linebacker to account for the crossing route moving under him left to right. This look-off paired with the shallow cross leaves Carey open in the flat and forces the defensive back to drive up field from the Arizona 45 towards Carey working towards the ball at the line of scrimmage at the 35.

Carey feels the presence of the defensive back over top and extends his arms to attack the ball at the 39. It’s a play that, if he misses, he might have been accused of alligator arms, but upon repeated viewings I think the ball was far enough and low enough that Carey had to extend the way he did to make the catch and the presence of the defensive back was a secondary factor, at best.

Once Carey makes the catch, he illustrates the awareness to spin, avoid the big hit, and force a wrap. Once achieved, Carey has pad level and leg drive to drag two players four yards. He crossed the first down marker and gains another three. Not a Lache Seastrunk display of disappearing in thin air and taking the ball another 40 yards, but also a play that Lache Seastrunk does not make 9 times out of 10 at his current level of skill.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=274]

Carey flashes the skill to concentrate on what he needs to do in the moment while anticipating what comes next. He’s also consistent and finishing strong. It’s easy to forget his weight is in the range of 207-210 pounds.  I think he’ll add weight and explosion within the next year and it will only accentuate these positives of his game.

Tight quarters isn’t just winning against multiple defenders on top of you; navigating a sideline is another example. Here’s a catch as a check-down option after the play breaks down. Carey works across the formation towards the edge defender, but the quarterback is forced to scramble to Carey’s side due to interior pressure and Carey loses position on the defender because of the quarterback’s roll out.

The runner knows that it’s now time to work open as a receiver and he sprints to the right flat. The quarterback makes the throw and Carey makes the catch on the run five yards behind the line of scrimmage, but with the sideline open to him.

The pursing defensive linemen has an angle as Carey crosses the line of scrimmage to the sideline and there’s a defensive back over top and charging up the sideline. Carey stutters to freeze the two defenders, set up a block on the lineman, and plays give-a-leg-take-a-leg on the cornerback at the sideline. Even with the move to avoid much of the corner’s hit, Carey still gets hit hard on the leg, five yards past the line of scrimmage, maintains his balance while straddling the boundary and gains another five yards for the first down before the linebacker pushes the runner out.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=313]

It’s a tough play that appears easy when Carey executes it. It’s something I could say about all of these examples. It’s probably why football players and coaches are excited about him, but writers are lukewarm.

For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio and the RSP Post-Draft. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download now. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

 

Teddy Bridgewater’s NFL Personality Assessment

Best Louisville prospect in this draft? Maybe, but don't give the short end of the stick to the Cardinals' safety Calvin Pryor. Photo by KYNGPAO
Teddy Bridgewater’s personality assessment flies in the face of statements about the QB’s personality-leadership-capability to learn . Photo by KYNGPAO

An NFL source confirmed to me that Teddy Bridgewater has scored exceptionally well on a league-used personality assessment. 

I know how some bloggers have develop some disdain for the anonymous source when it comes to football news.  If you’re one of them, this isn’t the post you want to read. If you don’t care, tonight I’ve been given the green light to share basics about Teddy Bridgewater’s personality assessment that at least two-thirds of the league uses for rookie prospects.

I know the scores, but I have been cautioned not to share the exact numbers. What the source has confirmed is that Bridgewater scored exceptionally well on his personality assessment-very close to the highest possible score. Bridgewater scored high in these categories:

  • Focus
  • Interpersonal skills
  • Dedication
  • Self Efficacy
  • Affective Commitment

This information–if accurate–calls into question the points we’ve been hearing in the media since the combine that Bridgewater is dull and lacks leadership skills. These results support what at least many have seen that opposes the statements to the media that Bridgewater doesn’t have “It”. It also pokes holes in the statements from anonymous executives through major media that Bridgewater can’t “be the face of the franchise” or lacks “CEO” qualities.

Based on what I’ve seen from Bridgewater in Jon Gruden’s QB Camp, Bridgewater was straight-forward, accountable, and engaging. Is he the classic personality type that charmed Jon Gruden like Aaron Murray? Not at all.

Neither was Joe Montana, Joe Flacco, or even Johnny Unitas. It’s been said that Mike Nolan and the 49ers preferred Alex Smith’s grounded personality to Aaron Rodgers, who came across as arrogant.

Where the Wonderlic assesses book smarts in a timed environment, this test–according to my source–uses fast-paced, jarring questions that can often be embarrassing and pointed in nature. Much of the NFL is apparently sold on this  interview-style test’s ability to assess leadership, emotions under pressure, how a player works with others, and behavior on and off the field.

Is it a good test? I have no idea. I’m sure folks with some expertise could find flaws with it just like the Wonderlic.

Does this assessment prove that the NFL is exhibiting some degree of bias? It’s a good indicator that at the very least, Bridgewater doesn’t fit the tried-and-true mold that the NFL prefers when it risks high draft picks on quarterbacks: big arm, big frame, and/or great mobility.

When it comes to precision passers with smarts but arms, athleticism, and frames that are “good enough,” but top-drawer, the NFL seems to balk at the idea of using a top-15 pick. On the other hand, they’ll err this high with good athletes possessing lesser football skills and football intelligence.

As my buddy Ryan Riddle says, “It means that teams have to determine if Bridgewater’s intelligence for the game is that much better than the norm and that’s a very hard thing to evaluate.”  Drew Brees is mobile, but not dynamically athletic and his arm strength was lacking for teams to feel he was a “can’t-miss” guy. However, San Diego GM John Butler was confident that he stole Brees at the top of the second round.

If me, Daniel Jeremiah, Kurt Warner, Josh Norris, Doug Farrar and the rest of Draft Twitter are correct, Bridgewater is going to be the best value among the quarterbacks in this class.

For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

Futures: QB Tom Savage

Photo by Mike Pettigano.
Photo by Mike Pettigano.

Savage has the physical skills and flashes of on-field play that make him look like a first-rounder. Is his rumored late rise up draft boards a product of hyperbolic thinking?

Futures: Pittsburgh QB Tom Savage

By Matt Waldman

Beware of the fast rising quarterback. This is what Football Outsiders newcomer Jason Lisk wrote in 2012 after he did a search on quarterbacks whose stock rose in the month prior to the draft since 1990. His article led with Ryan Tannehill as the “buzz creator” approaching the 2012 NFL Draft that motivated his search for this dubious, late charge up draft boards to the first round.

While I liked Tannehill and still believe he is on his way to becoming a decent NFL starter, I think Lisk offered compelling examples why he could write an article about this subject. He mentions several players who reportedly had draft grades lower than the first round before the collective buzz from the postseason all-star games, combine, and workouts upped their draft stock in the final weeks.

I want to dig deeper than draft stock, which is shorthand for “ability and talent” for some, but as Lisk points out with some hindsight on his side, draft stock contains a healthy dose of other factors that influenced errors of judgment. One of these factors is what we might as well call “the eyeball test”—does he look like a franchise quarterback?

  • Does he have the requisite height?
  • Does he have the requisite weight?
  • Does he have a big arm?
  • Does he demonstrate the pro style throws that project well to the NFL?

If he has at least three of these four things, it appears that there are enough teams that believe that they can mold these players into good quarterbacks. They will often bet on these players at the expense of a more polished passer lacking the same qualities in abundance, but enough to get the job done.

Jim Druckenmiller is a great example. Tall, strong, and capable of throws that make people gush at workouts, Druckenmiller had trouble reading defenses and maneuvering the pocket.

Bill Walsh saw this was the case and told the 49ers to draft Jake Plummer. While Plummer never full lived up to his potential, he had enough moments to illustrate why Walsh liked the Arizona State Sun Devil the most from this quarterback class. Druckenmiller continued to have trouble with the same things he had in college and never left the San Francisco bench.

Patrick Ramsey was another late riser. ESPN’s Chris Mortensen relayed a lot of this sentiment in the final month prior to the draft for this strong-armed quarterback from Tulane with consistency issues. According to a Chicago Bears’ fans scouting site, Ramsey “looks like an All-American quarterback one play and totally different the next.”

Ramsey had difficulty reading defenses and maneuvering the pocket. Neither progressed enough for the former first-round pick to become a consistent NFL starter.

J.P. Losman was another Tulane product with a big arm and athleticism, who thought he could throw holes through defenders to get the ball to his wide receivers. He found out his ball didn’t burn through opposing defender’s flesh.

I’ll add Brandon Weeden to this list. A big guy with a big arm who had big production at a big-time school, add it all up and it still didn’t compensate for his big problem with rushing his reads under pressure because he didn’t maneuver the pocket with a comfort level desirable for an NFL quarterback. Weeden is now considered another one of Cleveland’s big mistakes on draft day.

I’m beginning to think there’s a pattern of mistakes that certain NFL teams make when it comes to evaluating quarterbacks. I don’t know if this is true, but after 10 years of studying players—9 of those where I published the RSP—it appears that some teams have too many magnifying factors and not enough knockout factors.

As I mentioned in my piece on Jimmy Garoppolo, I’m getting closer to the point of instituting knockout factors in evaluations. Certain mistakes in quarterbacking are fatal errors and might be too difficult to fix. How a passer reacts to pressure is one of them.

Magnifying factors is a term I thought of while writing this column. It’s a set of qualities that prospects display that get NFL decision makers excited—too excited. Scouts, general managers, coaches, or owners see some of these qualities and let them overshadow flaws.

Based on the strengths and weaknesses of these five players above, it appears some teams will rationalize that they can coach these flaws away where they might not feel the same if the prospect lacked these magnifying factors. A simply way of putting it is crass, but I believe it illustrates the point:

Some NFL analysts and decision-makers look at arm strength the way some men look at the quality of a woman’s chest when they decide whom to date—they’re focused solely on what’s below the neckline. Later, they have the nerve to complain about the person’s flaws.

I believe there is a lot of magnification happening with quarterback evaluation. None more apparent this year than with Pittsburgh quarterback Tom Savage.

The 6-5, 230-lb. quarterback is equipped with one of the strongest arms in this draft and that accounts for three of the four qualities that teams appear to magnify with their quarterback evaluation process. It’s easy to see how this magnification can take place with Savage. There are several plays that in a vacuum look like the passes of an NFL starter.

See enough of these on tape, and it’s understandable that a decision-maker will take this sum of good-looking moments and allow it to out-weight the bad. Because there’s no regulation of strength and weaknesses that prevent evaluators from exaggerating the importance of what they saw, it’s easy to hyperbolize rare physical characteristics.

Even if this is not their intent to do so, I don’t know of scouting reports that have embedded into their process defined scoring weights for certain qualities or knockout factors. Today I’ll show you some plays that I believe some evaluators might be prone to hyperbolizing and flawed plays where they may underestimate the difficulty of fixing.

Read the rest of Foobtall Outsiders.

Gruden QB Camp: Teddy Bridgewater

Best Louisville prospect in this draft? Maybe, but don't give the short end of the stick to the Cardinals' safety Calvin Pryor. Photo by KYNGPAO
What can people discern from one interview? The analysis below is an experiment to find out. Photo by KYNGPAO

Reader Advisory: This series is an experiment. The takes within are not anything that I’m willing to stand behind as enhancing or detracting from the “draft value” of the players I am profiling here. I developed this series to illustrate the subjectivity of a player interview. There will be plenty of armchair psychology and body language analysis interlaced with opinions based on my experiences as a manager, a journalist, and a student of football.  Learn about the actual personality assessment that two-thirds of the NFL has on Bridgewater. 

Intro

I have always thought Jon Gruden was sneaky-good at interviewing NFL prospects. The former coach is intelligent, he’s well-prepared, and he understands how to frame conversations that elicit information without attacking the player–even when delivering criticism. There’s a playfulness on the surface that belies the seriousness of Gruden’s points.

I repeat, this is an experiment and a series I’m writing because I’m curious what I’d see if I studied an interview as if I studied a game. There’s no weight I’m placing on this analysis. The intent is to show the variety of ways different observers can interpret the same interview.

I don’t agree with all the takes I’m positing. I will say that after studying three of these QB Camp shows, there are potential observations that are similar to observations I’ve seen others believe were valid points during job or field interviews as a writer.

Some of these insights may hit the mark–maybe even touch upon something deeper into the player’s personality. However, these takeaways may also be a reflection of a player’s nerves and insecurity about appearing on national television on the eve of the most important job selection process of his life to date.

I know that I’d be nervous about having my game dissected by a top expert in the field on national television. There are extraordinarily few people who wouldn’t feel this pressure and react with a measure of insecurity on some level.

I’m not telling you which of these takes I believe have actual merit.  These interviews are first impressions of a player’s personality away from the field. If I was a manager for a team’s front office, I’d want our organization to spend more time with the player to determine if a variety of co-workers had similar impressions.

For the last time,  these are hypothetical takes of one interview and these observations have no factor in my evaluation of the player as found in the RSP. As with every interview I’m studying in this series I watched it at least twice–often 3-4 times–to gather quotes and study the interaction between Gruden and his interview subject.

The first interview I analyzed was Tajh Boyd’s. A lot of his responses and body language indicated a player projecting confidence, but also some defensiveness and insecurity about his standing in this draft. He also appeared unwilling to reveal flaws in his game. Teddy Bridgewater also possesses some defensive body language in this interview. However, there’s a tell in Bridgewater’s body language and eye behavior that indicates a far different set of things happening between him and Gruden.

Opening Scene

“As a quarterback, I’m just saying that I am the eye of the hurricane,” says Bridgewater during the introduction of the show. “I’m smart with the football–38 touchdowns-4 interceptions. I was able to master the college game. And I feel that me being a student of the game, I’m most eager to learn.”

Gruden gives his introductory take of Bridgewater before the interview. Because his brother Jay played quarterback at Louisville, the coach’s impressions of Teddy Bridgewater were based on what he thought of the Louisville football program.

“This is a basketball school and for him to transform it into a football school for the three years that he was there . . . it excited me. I wanted to find out how he did it.”

A Polarizing Start

Did Bridgewater want to take his ball and go home? Photo by Jayel Aheram
Did Bridgewater want to take his ball and go home? Photo by Jayel Aheram

The Louisville QB begins the conversation with his elbows on the table and his fingers interwoven. This can be interpreted as a sign of anxiety. The rest of Bridgewater’s body language appears calm enough that the interwoven hand position is a protective-defensive gesture.

When asked about the recruiting process and why he chose Louisville after originally committing to Miami, Bridgewater maintains his hand position while telling the story. The QB describes Randy Shannon getting fired at Miami changed his mind about the program because he wanted to go somewhere there would be stability.

As he tells this story, Bridgewater’s eyes move to his left a couple of times–often a sign of recalling facts. When he talk about stability, Bridgewater punctuates the statement with a quick raise of his eyebrows. This is a sign of emphasizing or acknowledging a point.

Bridgewater also raises his shoulders for punched emphasis two different times as he explains that this story summed up his recruiting process. This too is a non-verbal accent of what he’s saying to hammer home emphasis.

“I heard when you went to Louisville–it was cold,” says Gruden. “I heard you got homesick . . . ”

“Nah,” interjects Bridgewater, shaking his head.

“There was a time where you were ready to leave Louisville,” Gruden continues, “Is that true?”

“Nah, there was a time that I was ready to go home. My freshman year,” explains Bridgewater, his fingers still interlaced while he raises his eyebrows twice to emphasize what he’s saying. “I wasn’t starting. Things weren’t going the way that I wanted them to go. I wanted to go home and just give up on football.”

At the end of this last sentence, Bridgewater does something that he’ll do through much of the interview: He pokes his tongue from his mouth as if he’s licking his lips and squints his eyes. This is often regarded as an expression of extreme disapproval.

Combine these two things with Bridgewater’s eyes moving right and downward before saying, “I wanted to go home and just give up on football,” and the body language indicates that Bridgewater is recalling his feelings at the time he was thinking about leaving the game behind. His reaction is as if the memory left a nasty taste.  One could determine that Bridgewater was disgusted with the idea of quitting football now that he looks back on it.

Bridgewater talks about meeting with the team chaplain and buying into that individual’s wisdom and the coaches’ wisdom. As he tells the story, he again looks to his right and down–a sign that he’s sharing feelings that he had about that experience. Bridgewater ends with another shoulder raise as he says, “everything worked out for me.”

Some could read into the entirety of this response and decide that despite the fact that Bridgewater contemplated leaving the team, the idea of actually following through went against everything he wanted to do.

The actual admission that Bridgewater considered quitting football could be a polarizing one.

Some may say that if Bridgewater even considered quitting that he truly doesn’t love football the way they want a prospect to love it. Others might say that he’s emotionally soft and if he doesn’t get his way, he will threaten to take his ball and go home.

In contrast, some may see that Bridgewater’s actual decision to stay combined with his body language while telling the story indicates that the quarterback loves football or at the very least hates giving up on anything.

Others may see this statement’s candor and see a great deal of confidence from Bridgewater to admit he felt this way. They may see that Bridgewater is willing to show some vulnerability and weakness and share how he’s grown up as a teen moving into early adulthood.

These observers may believe Bridgewater’s exchange with Gruden is an indication that he’s strong enough to handle everything swirling around him–much like the eye of a hurricane he describes himself to be at the beginning of the segment.

Lemons Into Lemonade

Russell Wilson revels in the challenge of adversity. Does Bridgewater? Photo by  Whateyesee13
Russell Wilson revels in the challenge of adversity. Does Bridgewater? Photo by Whateyesee13

The next segment features Bridgewater’s first pass, which is a deep route for an interception–an awful throw. Gruden asks if Bridgewater remembers it.

“I remember it like it was yesterday,” responds Bridgewater, whose smile includes his eyes–a sign it’s a genuine smile. Bridgewater’s hands are still at the table with the fingers interlaced. There’s a pattern of behavior in this show where Bridgewater seems to show comfort with unpleasant events. One might examine his reactions to these events and determine he revels in the fact that he was strong enough to overcome them.

Gruden queues the Kentucky game the following week and sets up his question by describing how the young Bridgewater came off the bench and had a big game. Gruden shows pro-caliber throws that remind the coach of Drew Brees. He shows Charlie Strong’s excitement after a touchdown. And he has a clip of Bridgewater celebrating with his coach.

“Is Strong saying, ‘You’re my guy now?” asks Gruden.

“I said, ‘I told you, coach,'” says Bridgewater, who peppers this sequence with intermittent laughter.

There are a lot of notable stories about quarterbacks sharing confidence to their coaches or superiors. Tom Brady thanked Robert Kraft for picking him and that it would be the best pick he ever made. Peyton Manning told Bill Polian in a pre-draft interview that if the Colts didn’t pick him, that Manning would kick Indy’s ass for the duration of his career.

Gruden told Tajh Boyd a story about Russell Wilson as a rookie starter. When the Seahawks were down, he walked up to Pete Carroll and according to the Seattle coach, said that he was excited about the opportunity to be down by 14 and take the game back. Carroll thought Wilson was crazy in the best sense.

Bridgewater’s “I told you, coach,” might not be up there as bold statements, but some teams may recognize it as confidence in that same category.

Still Waters Run Deep

One criticism of Bridgewater by some anonymous NFL people is that the quarterback was a dud during interviews. At least one executive spoke anonymously to a reporter to question the quarterback’s leadership. Based on his body language, there is some indication that Bridgewater is a passionate individual who, in a public setting off the field, keeps his feelings below the surface.

Bridgewater’s responses earlier in the show where often accompanied by eye movements that indicate he was accessing feelings as he recalled events. The next line of questions reveal the same tendency, but how to interpret it is more difficult.

Gruden asks Bridgewater why he left a year early when everyone loved him at Louisville.

“I had a plan when I was being recruited,” says Bridgewater, dropping his eyes downward and to his right to access his feelings while telling the rest of the story. “I had a plan when I was being recruited. My plan was to get my degree in three years. I told every school that recruited me, ‘Listen, I’m on a three-year plan,’ and I have always been purpose driven my entire life. That played a huge factor, I was able to get my degree–in sports administration–and the rest was history.”

What adds a layer of complexity to this story is the eye movement in combination with Bridgewater poking his tongue from his mouth twice during his explanation. It could be a sign that Bridgewater didn’t like the question. However, he didn’t poke the tongue upon hearing the question; the first time he did it was in the middle of his answer.

There is a possibility that Bridgewater was remembering something distasteful about the recruiting process as he was recalling events. Remember, the eye movement downward  and to the right is about recalling feelings associated with events. The memory Bridgewater is retelling is what he told college recruiters and before he tells Gruden what he told recruiters, his tongue pokes from his mouth (often a symbol of disgust, distaste, or rejecting something–in this case something he remembers that he might not be sharing fully) when he says, “Listen, I’m on a three-year plan.”

We all have read enough about the recruiting process to understand how this can be a distasteful process. Perhaps Bridgewater is also remembering the reactions of recruiters when he said he was on a three-year plan and didn’t like what they said.

It’s also possible that Bridgewater doesn’t like Gruden’s question in the first place. The young quarterback may feel he’s ready for the next step and he has his degree, so why ask the question. Charlie Strong is gone and Bobby Petrino has returned–new coach, new offense, and new scrutiny based on one year of a lot of changes. The idea of staying in school for all of that has a mighty distasteful element for any college quarterback who has more to lose than gain in the NFL evaluation process.

The second tongue poke is also curious because it comes after Bridgewater says he graduated with a degree in sports administration. Maybe Bridgewater doesn’t like the degree that he earned.

Considering the schedule a player has to undertake while balancing football and academics, the quarterback might have wished he could have studied something else. Robert Smith’s story as well as the recent feature on college bag men, supports the notion that athletic programs steer players towards certain degrees because it’s convenient for the team.

It could also mean that Bridgewater doesn’t value the college degree that much at this point in his life. He’s about to go pro. Maybe he got the degree for his mom. It’s also possible that he was recalling the work he had to do in order to finish the degree in three years and it elicited memories he didn’t like.

The tongue comes out during another question where one might not expect it: When Gruden cues a video of Louisville sports icons Tom Jackson and Muhammad Ali before a Cardinals game and Ali is wearing Bridgewater’s jersey.

“What was it like to see Ali in your jersey?”

As Bridgewater responds, his eyes move down and to his left. This is an indication of a person recalling facts as well as outside stimuli like sights and sounds of the event. As Bridgewater does this, he begins to tell about what it was like on the field that night before the game.

The quarterback then sticks his tongue out after saying how meaningful it was to him to see Ali in his jersey. Is he lying? Some might say the tongue poke reveals there’s a layer to this story that he’s not sharing.

Bridgewater’s tongue poke could be a betrayal of his concluding statement, “it was one of the most happy days of my life.” Remember, football players learn early on that when they speak to the media that he has to respond with platitudes.

It’s possible Bridgewater finds giving platitudes distasteful–even if he understands how positive it is to see “the Greatest” wearing his jersey. Bridgewater’s genuine smile complements this track of analysis.

A response about Ali has nothing to do with quarterbacking. However, it may indicate that Bridgewater feels deeply, isn’t sharing everything that he remembers and felt about these events, and some of those memories aren’t pleasant. It may also indicate that Bridgewater doesn’t like Gruden’s questions. If he had his way, perhaps he’d only talk about the actual game of football.

If any of these insights are accurate, the fact that Bridgewater is pleasant, selective, and appropriate with his answers could be seen as a positive. It reveals a level of maturity and understanding of what’s right to share with the media.

Of course, all of this about a tongue poking out could be the fact that Bridgewater’s lips are dry, his mouth is dry, or it’s some odd habit he’s had all his life.

The Gloves Come Off

Photo by Todd Huffman
Photo by Todd Huffman

We see more of this behavior from Bridgewater when Gruden broached the quarterback’s pro day preparation. At this point, Bridgewater unclasped his fingers, grabs a pen and begins this response with his forearms and hands on the table.

Holding an object as well as the position of his forearms is an indication of a protective posture. Like Tajh Boyd, the way Bridgewater is sitting could be interpreted as a person steeling himself to address something he feels uncomfortable about.

Unlike Boyd, Bridgewater’s response appears more forthcoming than many of the Clemson quarterback’s answers. As Bridgewater tells the story of when he first began wearing the gloves, nothing in his body language or words were notable during his very straightforward explanation.

Then Gruden mentions the pro day and points out Bridgewater isn’t wearing gloves. At this point, Bridgewater’s tongue pokes out.

It could be habit. It could be the Bridgewater has been anticipating this subject to come up and now that it has he’s expressing his subconscious dislike of it.

Bridgewater talks about going back to Florida to train and the weather and his eye move down and to the right–accessing feelings associated with being there. His eyes move in that direction again as he recalls his high school days when he didn’t ear a glove.

Immediately after saying the word “glove,” the tongue comes out. A pretty obvious indication that he doesn’t like this glove subject. As he tells the story, his hands remain in this protective position, but nothing about his eyes, face, head, or body position indicate that he’s hiding anything and this is consistent with him taking responsibility for what happened on his pro day.

From this standpoint, it’s possible that Bridgewater’s tongue poking in this retelling of the story is a sign that he is angry with himself for not keeping his gloves on. This is something that could be supported by him subsequently telling Gruden,  “I’m one of those guys that trusts preparation and gains confidence the more that I prepare.”

“I learned a valuable lesson that day,” says Bridgewater about his pro day. He looks down and to his right–recounting how he felt about that moment. Then he looks straight at Gruden and follows with a response that show accountability. “I had a few balls that got away from me that day.”

Bridgewater squints once as he makes this statement–another potential sign that he was disappointed with himself as he recounts the event.

“Like I said, I was able to walk away from the event and learn: ‘Just do what got you there,'” he says with genuine smile while nodding his head and raising his eyebrows at Gruden as he talked about how he should have worn the gloves if that’s a normal part of his routine. He sticks his tongue out after saying, “If you’re comfortable with the gloves, wear the gloves.”

The body language and his words during this explanation of his pro day suggest a number of possibilities that could all be true:

  1. Bridgewater truly learned a lesson and he still has some lingering disgust about his pro day performance.
  2. He’s disgusted with the scrutiny over a few poor passes and rejects the idea that he had a bad pro day.
  3. He thinks the whole discussion of the gloves/no gloves is overblown.

“Do you have thick skin?” asks Gruden.

Bridgewater sticks his tongue out, lowers his head, and looks up as he responds, “Yes sir.”

The body signals indicate rejection of something. He could be  rejecting the notion that anyone would even question his ability to handle this kind of scrutiny. Or he could be thinking of the questions people have of his ability and rejecting that notion. He could also be indicating that the criticism bothers him and he doesn’t agree with it.

When Gruden imitates Mel Kiper dissecting a bad slant, out comes Bridgewater’s tongue.

“I can’t control what people say about me,” says Bridgewater as he tilts his head to the side, which is often an indication of someone about to reveal something that’s vulnerable and truthful. It’s a sign that Bridgewater trusts Gruden or trusts in the traits he possesses as a football player and is about to share. “I can control my work ethic, my study habits, and the way I communicate with teammates.”

When asked again if he has thick skin, Bridgewater gives a very straightforward “yes sir,” while nodding quick enough that it’s not likely a faked agreement signal. Slow nodding is often a mechanical affectation to simulate agreement.

Bridgewater’s responses to the most difficult line of questions he’ll get in this interview demonstrate accountability in a situation that doesn’t feel good to him, honesty about the basic facts, deeper feelings of disgust that he’s not completely sharing, and potential rejection of the notion that the events reveal something negative about his overall potential.

Some may say this is a reflection of inner confidence because unlike Tajh Boyd, Bridgewater isn’t comparing himself to anyone and the rejection of the criticism isn’t verbal. He’s not changing the subject, he’s not avoiding the issue, and he’s answering the questions head-on with specifics. But he’s demonstrating a subtle rejection of the criticisms as he addresses them.

The Easy Part: The Film

Projector

Gruden introduces the next segment with an overall positive take of Bridgewater’s film. The coach says he liked watching Bridgewater at Louisville because the quarterback ran a similar offense that Gruden ran as a pro coach and that knowledge will make Bridgewater a quick study.

The coach begins the segment with a voi dire of Bridgewater’s knowledge of  west coast concepts in the Louisville offense then he asks the QB if he liked playing in the system.

“Oh I loved it,” answers Bridgewater who talks about the freedom he had in it. “So much in the quarterbacks hands to make decisions at the line of scrimmage, know each guys’ routes, and know the offense in and out.”

The rest of the segment is spent at the white board. Gruden has Bridgewater explain his understanding off the offensive concepts. Gruden asks Bridgewater why the quarterback made certain reads and as Bridgewater gives his explanations, Gruden nods in agreement.

There’s a lot of praise coming from Gruden when it comes to Bridgewater demonstrating an understanding of what defenses do to defend the routes and how Bridgewater would counter these tendencies. Multiple fist bumps and multiple verbal praises in this segment.

After the on-field segment, the episode flashes back to the film room and the subject returns to toughness–this time on-field toughness.

“What kind of leader are you?” asks Gruden.

“When I was younger–a freshman and a sophomore–I kind of lead by example. But as I got older, I understood that it took more. It took more than just going out there and executing. You have to be that coach on the field,” says Bridgewater as Gruden looks ahead but with his eyes turned to the right (often an indicator that the person doing this is imagining as he’s listening).  “Someone who motivates guys. Tells them when they’re having a bad day, ‘C’mon guys, let’s pick it up.’ Talks to the offensive line and tells them to give me two more seconds.”

The notion that Gruden was imagining an event has some merit. Gruden follows this response with a film example of the Connecticut game when Bridgewater’s receivers drop multiple passes. Gruden clicks to a scene at the sideline where Bridgewater is talking to his teammates.

Gruden later asks if Bridgewater ever yelled at his teammates.

The quarterback describes a practice during his sophomore year where he did so and explains how it shocked his teammates–the tongue making an appearance again accompanied with a squint. This could indicate a certain amount of intensity Bridgewater is experiencing from recalling this moment.

The tongue poke might indicate that he finds the yelling distasteful and it’s not his style. It’s not as if he said, “yeah, I yell at them all the time.”

The fact that he’s not quick to get onto teammates could be perceived as a positive or negative. Some teams might want more intensity. Others might like the fact that he can get his points across without yelling, but will do so if he needs to–even if he finds it distasteful.

Gruden doesn’t question this further. Het sums up the lesson in a question that’s phrased as if Bridgewater clearly knows the answer.

“Sometimes you just have to take control of the whole team, don’t you?”

In the Boyd episode–Gruden was telling Boyd certain lessons. Not once did he tell Bridgewater to write anything down–although the quarterback did. In contrast, Gruden told Boyd and Johnny Manziel to write things down.

The coach even asked Boyd to promise to focus on certain things. None of that happened with Bridgewater.

“On the toughness meter how tough is Teddy Bridgewater?” asks Gruden after he and Bridgewater watch a highlight package of the Louisville QB’s sacks.

“I’m off the charts,” responds Bridgewater without missing a beat and a smile on his face that includes his eyes–an addition indicator of a truthful smile. If this is any indication, Bridgewater knows he’s tough like he knows he’s breathing.

“You’ve got a lot poise and a lot of toughness playing this game,” says Gruden, staring into the QB’s eyes.

The coach walks Bridgewater through the Rutgers game–a contest where the quarterback comes off the bench with a high ankle sprain and broken wrist to lead Louisville to a BCS Sugar Bowl. The entire time, there’s nothing but a relaxed vibe that includes jokes and laughter between both coach and QB.

Then Gruden jumps to the Florida game in the Sugar Bowl where Bridgewater gets smacked by Jon Bostic on the first pass. Bridgewater tells Gruden it’s the hardest hit he ever felt and says it with that same smile where the eyes are a part of the smile.  He even laughs about it pointing out the scar that he got on his chin from the hit.

“Then [Bostic] got up dancing after hitting me in the forehead…I was pissed about that,” says Bridgewater before poking the tongue out. He then squints as he says, “It added fuel to the fire.”

“What is it about you?” says Gruden.

Bridgewater’s eyes light up with his smile.

“I’m just tough. I’m a different breed. I’m a rare breed. My kind is becoming extinct. My background has made me what I am today,” says Bridgewater, now squinting as he talks about his background. “It has made me physically and mentally tough. Nothing bothers me [biting his tongue for a moment–an indication that might not be true]. You can set my hair on fire, I’m still going to go. I’m just one of those guys”

One might look at this statement and see the tongue-biting as if he’s not sure he should say what he says next, but decides to anyhow. It could also mean that Bridgewater is bothered by things–which is certainly an indication throughout this interview–bothered deeply by them. Even so, it appears he handles these things head-on and appropriately, which is really all one can ask from a mature human being.

Conclusions

Bridgewater comes off as a person in touch and in control of his emotions even if there are indications that he has deep emotions that he doesn’t want to share. His behavior during the interview could be an indication that he’s had a fair number of events that he associates with intense feelings–some of them unpleasant.

There is also some indication that he has a deep belief in his toughness and ability to overcome adversity. A lot of these rejection signals with the tongue could be a reflection of an inner monologue that says something like, “None of this matters, I’ll overcome anything you throw at me.”

At the same time, some may look at Bridgewater thinking about quitting as a freshman as believe he doesn’t love football or he doesn’t respond well to adversity. The take depends on how open these people are to allowing a young man to mature and learn lessons.

For actual analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio – available now. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

Futures: Alabama MLB C.J. Mosely

Mosely

Seeking an lesson in playing middle linebacker? C.J. Mosely’s game is instructive. 

Futures: Alabama MLB C.J. Mosely

By Matt Waldman

He can’t catch, he’s had numerous injuries, and a well-executed read-option keeper can trip him up. But if these are the only damning aspects to middle linebacker C.J. Mosely’s game, and his injuries don’t present a long-term concern, there aren’t 10 players in this class I want more.

Mosely’s game is instructive to playing middle linebacker:

  • Addressing run gaps to help teammates
  • Beating lead blockers and attacking the ball carrier
  • Strong pass coverage—man and zone
  • Making good pre-snap diagnosis
  • Finishing plays

He’s not the best middle linebacker you’ll ever see, but the Alabama defender should become a stalwart for an effective NFL unit. The more I study middle linebackers, the more I see the commonalities between them and their natural adversary the running back.

I have always ascribed multiple definitions for a running back’s vision:

  • The patience to allow the play to develop as close as possible to its design.
  • The skill to find and anticipate the creases as they open.
  • The ability to see and set up unblocked defenders at the other side of these creases.
  • The peripheral vision and/or understanding of the opponents’ tendencies to identify the cutback lanes and the timing to exploit them.
  • The judgment to know when to be patient and when to be decisive.
  • The maturity to understand when to resist the urge for the big play in lieu of the short, punishing play that moves the chains.

The last two are of monumental importance if a runner wants to succeed in the NFL. And in many ways, all of these points of vision apply to a good middle linebacker like Mosely. Read the rest at Football Outsiders.

Gray Matter: RBs Andre Williams and Anthony Dixon

Anthony Dixon isn't the athlete Andrew Williams is, but he has shown more as a football player. Photo by Jeffery Beall.
Anthony Dixon isn’t the athlete Andre Williams is, but he has shown more as a football player. Photo by Jeffery Beall.

I see the good from Andre Williams, but will he show it often enough on the field? 

I’m often asked about my “misses.” Who were they? What did I learn?

The answers aren’t always as simple as the questions.  Sometimes the outcome is wrong, but the process is right.

Cincinnati running back Cedric Peerman hasn’t shown me anything contrary to my take on the rare occasions he gets to carry the football. The fact that Jay Gruden admitted that they didn’t know what they had in Peerman adds to my take that Peerman could have developed into a starter if given a true shot.

Sometimes the arriving at a decisive take on a player isn’t incredibly difficult–even with a defined methodology. There are prospects whose tape is enough of a mixed bag when it comes to pivotal components of their games that determine which examples should carry more weight is a tough call.

While it’s natural to worry about being “right” or “wrong” with the call, what I learn from the players who fall into the grey areas of my process helps me tighten it over time. These adjustments are more gradual than immediate, but the potential lessons of these difficult evaluations hold great value.

This isn’t what some people want to hear. They want immediate answers and instant adjustments.

I’m not into the fly-by-night; I’m an aspiring craftsman. I’m hoping there will be many years ahead of valuable lessons based on mistakes.

One of my not-so-simple misses is Anthony Dixon, one of my favorite backs in the 2010 NFL Draft. The runner from Mississippi State  is a bruiser with the footwork and agility of a runner 20 pounds lighter than his 6’0″, 233-lb. frame.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/RjPpHxlSThk]

A sixth-round pick of the 49ers, Dixon has hung onto a roster spot thanks to his special teams play. However, the 26-year-old Dixon is unlikely to earn significant time as an NFL starter after failing to push Frank Gore for time on the San Francisco depth chart early in his career. One of the reasons that Dixon didn’t earn more chances is that he did not display consistent maturity as a decision maker.

The coaching staff expected its young runner to lower the pads and work downhill, but Dixon either bounced too many runs outside or displayed too much hesitation on plays designed to go between the tackles. The early take on Dixon is that he lacked the balance of decision-making maturity and creativity to solidify a spot in the offensive rotation early in his career.

Dixon has been pegged as a special teams performer and fullback-running back `tweener. He was a solid fit for Jim Harbaugh’s gap-style ground game, which wasn’t the predominant system during the Mike Singletary era. On rare occasions, fans saw Dixon earning time in Harbaugh’s backfield as big-lead closer.

Because Joique Bell, Alfred Morris, Knowshon Moreno, and Pierre Thomas aren’t extraordinary physical talents and they’re still making an impact ahead of more touted prospects, I wouldn’t be surprised if there’s more to come with Dixon’s story than what I mentioned above.

Even so, there is something I should have taken into account in hindsight: the Mississippi State ground game. The Bulldogs incorporated a lot misdirection with its run game in a gap-style offense: shotgun draws, counter plays, and traps.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/zvHPZi7_apk]

Although Dixon communicated a sound understanding of his keys at the line of scrimmage when I talked with him about his favorite plays at Mississippi State, the Bulldogs offense didn’t require sophisticated decisions from its backs. Dixon had to show just enough patience for one set of blocks to develop and make that destination of the run work. In most cases, Dixon’s physical skills were enough to earn yards after contact if Mississippi State failed to open wide lanes for its back.

Recently I went back to watch some of Dixon’s tape. I didn’t have the same impression of Dixon during my post-mortem analysis. The athleticism, power, and agility are all still there. However, I now see how the Mississippi State offense inflated my take of Dixon’s vision.

Where I missed on Dixon was his decision-making coming out school. Where I still may hit is his athleticism, burst, and balance if the decision-making has improved.

Funny enough, I wrote  90 percent of this piece and banked it in my archives well before Dixon earned a contract with the Bills and Mike Mayock announced his love for Boston College running back Andre Williams.

Williams is a big back like Dixon, but his evaluation has some difficult moments. The 6’0″, 227-pound Williams stars in a gap style ground game that loves to run traps, counters, and power. Both runners have enough quickness to move the chains, but neither shows the NFL speed to defeat a good angle from a defender in pursuit.

What adds complexity to this comparison contrast is that Dixon displays better athleticism on the field than Williams despite the fact that the Boston College back had an impressive combine. Williams’ physical skills don’t show up with the frequency that I expect from the top prospects at the position.

The professional market is too saturated with running backs who show more on a consistent basis for me to have as positive of a take on Williams as Mayock.

Even so, I like to explore the grey matter of my evaluations. Here are three plays that reveal glimpses of Williams’ best.

Power

Pair Williams in a power running game and the Boston College starter can get the job done. Here’s a 13-yard gain from a 23 personnel I-formation run against nine defenders in the box. The Eagles pulls its left guard to the right side and leads Williams to the hole behind his fullback.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/1lafGKn45VA?start=105]

Williams demonstrates some press-and-cut ability on this play. Ideally, I’d want to see Williams approach the hole outside the guard’s shoulder and then cut inside the guard at the line of scrimmage to exploit the hole opening to the inside.

Instead, Williams is positioned in the middle of the guard’s back. Yet it’s still a good enough spot for him to press the lane with a jab step to the outside shoulder and cut to the inside.

WilliamsA1

This move compels the defender on the pulling guard to peek outside and a beat late as Williams enters the hole inside the guard.

WilliamsA2

Williams gains three yards untouched through the hole and has some momentum to face the safety coming down hill and poised to deliver a shot to the runner’s legs. Williams’ knee level is high enough to repel the contact, maintain his balance, and earn another six yards before finishing the play coming over top of the defensive back making the tackle.

This is one of the better runs I’ve seen from Williams against contact where he doesn’t have a massive down-hill head start. Unfortunately, there aren’t many of them–even this one play doesn’t tip the scales for me over the wealth of plays where he’s unable to bully in tight spaces.

Here’s another nice press and cut from Williams from a heavy I-formation set.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/1lafGKn45VA?start=137]

Note the direction of the defense’s helmets after he executes the press and cutback. If Williams can make these cuts with this level of patience, agility, and burst more often in the NFL than he did at Boston College it will force me to re-examine how a small sample of plays can carry more weight despite being the exception to the rule in a player’s portfolio.

WilliamsA3

Speed

Williams’ difficulty opening his stride to reach that extra gear he showed at the combine limits his upside in the NFL. Here’s a play that would be a much bigger gain if Williams had elite speed for the NFL game. However, it’s a good example of enough speed to produce as a starter in the league.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/1lafGKn45VA?start=49]

As Williams reaches the flat, the safety has a bead on the running back. In this situation, Williams opens his stride enough that the safety cannot reach the runner at the eight-yard mark of the run.

Williams out runs this angle of the defender and earns another 16 yards beyond that safety’s original target trajectory.  If  not for the cornerback, Williams is off to the races.

But at this point, I have to stick with my take that Williams in pads doesn’t match his exploits in shorts. If not for Mike Mayock’s take likely reflecting the tenor of the NFL, I would have expected the Boston College starter to get a call in April as a late draft pick.

In the hyper-competitive world of professional sports and the perception-fueled environment of bloggers and fans, my assessment doesn’t sound complimentary. However, I remind you that for a player with an excellent mental-emotional approach to his career, the NFL Draft is only the beginning.

If the Boston College runner can demonstrate these skills with greater consistency, I’ll be eating my words. Of course, lessons like these offer plenty of nutritional value and build stronger bones for evaluation processes.

 For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

Futures: Pitt DT Aaron Donald

Aaron Donald is as promising as Geno Atkins Photo by Ashley and Matthew Hemingway.
Aaron Donald is as promising as Geno Atkins Photo by Ashley and Matthew Hemingway.

I’m not a betting man, but if I were, Aaron Donald would be one of two players in this deep draft class that I’d have no reservations betting on as a future star.

Futures: Pittsburgh DT Aaron Donald

By Matt Waldman


Help Wanted: Football Players

Candidates must demonstrate efficiency and productivity while performing in a fast-paced, stressful environment. Speed, quickness, and strength required. Toughness and quick thinking are essential. Prototypical height and weight for role preferred, but will consider candidates with exceptional compensatory skills. Major college program is a plus. Relocation required. Job entails travel for 50-65 percent of work year. Submit a portfolio of work, at least five professional and five character references, and a working phone number to NFL.com. Eligible candidates should expect to receive a call in May for a summer training program at one of our 32 branches.

If only it was as easy as it looks on the page.

I don’t get to visit often, but I’m a big fan of The Sideline View. Lance Zierlein, John Harris and the rest of the team provide the goods on the game. As I examined the first round of Zierlein’s latest mock draft, it struck me that for a class noted for its depth of talent, there are few “safe” picks.

Greg Robinson, Khalil Mack, Ryan Shazier, Eric Ebron, Dee Ford, Johnny Manziel, and Anthony Barr have a ton of upside, but they are just a small list of the top 50 players on draft boards with notable shortcomings. However, most starters in the NFL have flaws and the NFL knows that the upside it covets from these headliners outweighs the risks.

Some of these flaws have nothing to do with a player’s work on the field. Jadeveon Clowney and C.J. Mosley are two prospects with unquestioned skill, but rumors about Clowney’s work ethic (which I think are questionable in origin) and Mosley’s injury history generate lingering questions about them fulfilling their vast promise.

My short list of safe picks — barring issues of character and injury — includes Jake Matthews, Sammy Watkins, Teddy Bridgewater, Odell Beckham, Mike Evans, and Darqueze Dennard. I am confident that barring catastrophic injury, these six players will at least provide 6-to-8 years of serviceable work as starters in the NFL.

If I were a betting man, there are only two players in Zierlein’s mock draft that I’d wager on developing into Pro Bowl players. The one from the above list of players is Watkins, and the other is Aaron Donald. Read the rest at Football Outsiders.

Boiler Room: Nebraska WR Quincy Enunwa

Enunwa inspires reflection about innocence and experience. Photo by Craig Chandler.
Enunwa inspires reflection about innocence and experience. Photo by Craig Chandler.

Ever think about how you’ve changed over the years? What did the “old you” think, say, and do versus the “new you?” This is something I think about all the time when I’m studying football players.

I remember the first time I saw Terrell Owens as a rookie. He wasn’t the rocked-up, raging force of productivity and insecurity that he became, but the quickness, balance, and power was all there.  He caught a hitch in the left flat, gave a little shake to avoid the corner, spun off a linebacker’s hit, stiff-armed a safety, and carried two more defenders for the first down.

It only took one play and I was sold.

That was the old me–a fan, not a football writer. I’d see something spine-tingling from a player and I’d allow that feeling to wash over me and permeate my entire take. Now, I’m more circumspect about what immediately impresses me.

However, it’s not always a good thing. We allow our experiences to filter out too much of what’s wondrous and joyful about the world. Sometimes those inexperienced takes get to the core truth in ways that more experienced viewpoints can over analyze and discard. There’s something to maintaining (or maybe the more accurate word is “re-cultivating”)  a certain amount of innocence to your internal viewfinder.

Nebraska wide receiver Quincy Enunwa inspires this kind of reflection on my end. When I first watched the Cornhusker wideout tear through a secondary with the ball in his hands, I saw flashes of Terrell Owens. Then I saw Enunwa catch–and drop–the ball with hands techniques that need enough work to have concerns about his game and the ambivalence returns.

Although my RSP ranking of Enunwa reflects more of my ambivalence about his NFL potential, this Boiler Room post encapsulates the receiver’s upside with a 35-yard gain through the  Purdue Boilermakers’ defense in 2013.

When I witness moments like these,  I imagine if I was working for an NFL organization creating cut-ups for a personnel director would I include this play as part of a cut-up of highlights? The Boiler Room Series is focused on prospects that I expect to be drafted, and often before the fourth round.

With the depth of this wide receiver class, Enunwa is a player I expect to go after the fourth round. However, I know there are fans of his potential and today I’m going to show you a play that you won’t find on a highlight reel on the Internet.

He gained 35 on a 3rd and 5 pass with 2:37 in the half from a 2×2 receiver 10 personnel shotgun set. He was the outside right receiver running a stop route, but he spotted the opening behind the shallow defender and drifted the inside. Enunwa caught the ball over his back shoulder with his hands close to his body just outside the right hash. Good adjustment and catch with his hands. The rest is pure viewing candy (click the enlarge arrow at the bottom right of the video to see this at full size).

[wpvideo rmpFk61f]

Enunwa packs enough athleticism and skill as a ball carrier on a run across the width of the field to evoke memories of a young Terrell Owens or Dez Bryant: burst, jukes, a hurdle, a spin, power, balance, and a couple of stiff arms. It’s a play you don’t easily forget.

If anything, it’s a play that is very difficult to balance with Enunwa’s flaws:

Enunwa doesn’t catch the ball with his fingertips. But man, you saw him tear through Purdue, right? 

Enunwa isn’t sharp enough with his turns. Dude, just get him the ball and he’ll wreak havoc just like that catch over the middle at Purdue 

Enunwa has difficulty tracking short passes. Screw the verticals, just feed him the ball with a running start in the shallow zone and he’s money! 

 The innocent football fan in me says Enunwa will be a good NFL starter. The experienced football writer says Enunwa might be a good NFL starter if he improves his overall game, but it’s far from a guarantee. The older–and maybe wiser–analyst says Enunwa can help a team immediately as part of a starting rotation, but if he’s going to reach his potential as player difficult to stop on every down he has a lot of work ahead.

But Matt, did you see Enunwa . . . 

For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

The QB to Defend the Planet: The Finalists

Who would you pick to defend the planet in a science fiction  football game? Photo by Frankula.
Who would you pick to defend the planet in a science fiction football game? Photo by Frankula.

Chris Trapasso (with some Waldman sarcasm) tallies the votes and reveals the finalists for who we’d pick to defend our planet in a game with an alien race.

 

By Chris Trapasso and Matt Waldman

The scenario is simple, albeit nutty: If an alien race invades earth and challenges the human race to a football game for the right to the planet, which quarterback from any era of history would we choose to defend our planet?

The follow-up question to this piece of science fiction included us picking a college passer just in case the aliens wouldn’t allow us to pick a current pro or all-time pro that they could reanimate to his prime.

The Twitter/RSP population has spoken.

There was an overwhelming favorite, but let’s start with some fun tidbits from the selection process.
  • Clemson’s Tajh Boyd received as many votes as Drew Brees and Tim Tebow (1) –   These three votes span the entire quality spectrum of the position. As well as the range of our voters’ survival instincts. 
  • Wyoming’s Brett Smith, earned the same number of votes as Dan Marino – Smith, who is slowly but surely falling into the “overrated because he’s so underrated” category among draftniks, received two votesthe same as Marino. Both have fast releases and can maneuver a pocket. Marino was just far more efficient at doing so. Personally we think the votes for Smith were to create a “Cowboys vs. Aliens” headline. No dice.
  • Jimmy Garoppolo earned one more vote than Joe Namath – Making good on guarantees doesn’t mean much anymore. I supposed that has to do with us being products of an informercial generation. Garoppolo captured more votes than Steve Young and Ben Roethlisberger. Good thing these were minority votes, we’d be enslaved by now.
  • College QBs were easier to pick than the NFL – The variety of great NFL quarterbacks split the vote for the pro player far more than the college passers. This is why players like Drew Brees, Ben Roethlisberger, Steve Young, and even some of our NFL finalists received fewer votes than middling college players above.
Now that we’ve finished profiling the voters who wanted to a chance to live free of alien rule, enslavement, or total annihlation, one man triumphantly stood out among his fellow gun-slinging peers— Johnny Manziel. 
 
Manziel earned a whopping 40 votes out of a possible 88. Louisville’s Teddy Bridgewater was Manziel’s closest competitor, prospect or not, with 19 votes. 
 
These two  talented youngsters have yet to take a snap in the NFL. However, folks must have watched Manziel against Alabama and figured if he could hold his own against the Crimson tide, he could stare down an alien A-gap blitz. Plus, we have our suspicions that Nick Saban is an alien spy.
Manziel and Bridgewater represent two of the three college finalists. Blake Bortles earned the third spot (the play-not-to-lose GM vote). We’ll be shocked if Manziel doesn’t win the college vote. However, the NFL/All-time vote is still up for grabs.
 
Rookie QBs
Johnny Manziel (40 votes)
Teddy Bridgewater (19 votes)
Blake Bortles (7 votes)
All-Time or Current QBs
Joe Montana (14 votes)
Peyton Manning (11 votes)
Brett Favre (6 votes)
Matt will profile the pros and cons for each and hold a vote for the final two.