Category Quarterback

Reese’s Senior Bowl Offensive Practices Day 3

January 22, 2014 0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Quarterback, Running Back, Tight End, Wide Receiver

It may look like Dan McCullors in a Sr. Bowl uniform, but it is his twin brother Reese. Photo by Thomas Vanderwal. — It may look like Dan McCullers in a Sr. Bowl uniform, but it is his twin brother Reese. Photo by Thomas Vanderwal.

Players Who Grew On Me

Oregon’s Josh Huff leads this list of players who I like more as I leave Mobile than I did upon my arrival. The receiver demonstrated that he could catch the ball with his hands on a consistent basis. While he doesn’t make receptions at the level of difficulty we see from the top receivers in the NFL, he caught a few passes where he had to lay out for the ball and made a few tough plays down field against tight coverage in the end zone. I’ll be reviewing my game research and watching more of Huff in the coming weeks.

I am not among the draft analysts bullish on Antonio Andrews. However, the Western Kentucky running back demonstrated some sweet movement as a route runner and some maturity as an interior runner. I still don’t see Andrews as a future starter, but I’ll be taking another look because he’s a bigger, stronger back than I thought at a surprising 225 pounds and he did some things at practice a little better than I anticipated from him as a decision-maker.

Northwestern’s Kain Colter made an excellent catch up the flat on a go route that handily beat Pierre Desir in practice today. The throw led Colter a little far, requiring a diving extension with his back to the quarterback. This was one of the types of targets I wanted to see from the QB-WR conversion project and Colter came strong. His breaks still need a lot of work, but he’s held his own this week and I’m more optimistic about his potential than I was when I arrived.

Shaq Evans also had an excellent catch in the corner of the end zone in tight coverage on an under-thrown ball this morning. The acrobatic effort cost Evans some practice time because he landed funny on his leg and walked to the sideline with a slight limp and trying to jog off the injury before realizing it wasn’t going away.

Evans has dropped the ball multiple times this week, but they were often situations one could explain away with logic that could exonerate him, including poor communication from the quarterback with regards to the placement and timing of the throw and difficult adjustments required in tight coverage. I believe his hands are better than the final outcome of these targets revealed, but there will be analysts who think otherwise. The UCLA receiver will be a mid-to-late pick, but I think he has potential to grow into a starter one day.

Jerick McKinnon flashed some speed after a cutback that his tape hinted at, but did not truly fulfill. I’m still not sure this run during 11-on-11’s was a fair indication of his speed, but it was more than what I saw against Florida and Georgia. His performance was a positive step towards convincing a more cynical viewer like me that he could emerge as a more than a special teams player.

Players Who Lost a Little In My Eyes

Jordan Matthews’ skill at making the tough catch in the thick of the hit zone between the hashes is something that endears him to me. Truth be told, his difficulty separating from defenders in this practice on a daily basis is an issue. Matthews’ is big and strong enough to bait a corner into a poor angle and then use hands to knock the defender off-balance. He did this well for some big plays this week.

What Matthews couldn’t do was separate deep without initiating contact. There were multiple plays over the past few days where Matthews failed to earn separation within the first five yards and it prompted him to initiate contact a second time with the hope of knocking his opponent off-balance in the process. I didn’t see this as a good sign.

Moreover Matthews is not an efficient runner. I’m not talking about his ball-carrying skills. I’m reiterating something that my colleague Turron Davenport of Pro Football Central – a former college wide receiver – mentioned about Matthews working hard and less efficiently to get to his top speed.

I know that some of my data-head, analytic-thinking brethren have looked at Matthews’ height (and hopefully pay attention to the fact that he’s not as heavy as they assumed) and volume of production in the Vanderbilt offense and believe he’s a bargain compared to Sammy Watkins. I’m leaning harder to the point of view that in this year’s draft Watkins is the “you get what you pay for” option.

Matthews will cost less because he is a lesser physical talent with good, but not great skills. Fantasy owners might not notice the difference at the end of their rookie year, but when it comes to talent the numbers won’t make them right.

Arthur Lynch is a wily route runner. Watching the tight end set up linebackers and safeties in the short zone this week was a lot of fun. I only wish I had Adam Sandler’s remote from the movie “Click” to pause, rewind, and slow-mo the action. As an underneath option, I think Lynch can do good work, but his lack of explosion limits him more as a receiver than I believed when I arrived in Mobile.

Cody Hoffman’s difficulty winning against press coverage – especially today – was an eye-opener. The South team corners have grown more patient when facing Hoffman’s opening release moves and the receiver had difficulty moving them off their spots. The result was frequent collisions with defenders that disrupted Hoffman’s gate, balance, and timing.

There’s a good chance that Hoffman will trick a few defenders on the North squad during the game because they aren’t familiar with him. This is why the practices reveal more than the game. The sessions this week are indicative of how NFL teams will adjust over time and become familiar with a player’s style. The game is more like the first game or two where that familiarity isn’t game.

Unfortunately, you’ll see fans tout a player because of a good in-game performance when there’s often a lot more to it than the guy being a “gamer.” Hoffman might earn that “gamer” label, but the practices revealed a long-strider with a quick first step but not the guile or technical repertoire to win at a consistent rate. He’s capable of amazing catches, but the consistency is missing right now.

Inconclusive Evidence

Davenport told me that Wake Forest’s Michael Campanaro is coming off a collarbone injury. The receiver had good moments as an underneath option this week. However, I still don’t have a good feel for his skill to separate and make difficult plays against physical coverage.

Jimmy Garappolo is the hot item this week. I didn’t see enough to form an opinion. I wish I did, but what I witnessed was a quarterback with Derek Carr’s size, some true zip in the range of 10-20 yards, and a consistent predilection for placing the ball to the back shoulder or hip of receivers when the more optimal choice was leading them down field.

At first glance, there’s a lot of open space that Eastern Illinois’ offense generated for Garappolo. I’m looking forward to examining this quarterback’s game in greater detail.

Wyoming wide receiver Robert Herron’s practice performances were predictable in the sense that he experienced a slew of 2-3 dropped passes during a period of practice and then caught everything else, including some difficult targets. I didn’t see this type of behavior on tape, but I want to re-examine him nonetheless.

They Are Who I Thought They Were

Versatile, agile, and mature between the tackles, Charles Sims is a Senior Bowl darling. You’ve read enough about him on my blog, go here.

Jared Abbrederis may not be the size I thought he was, but he’s the same fine all-around receiver I saw at Wisconsin. He’s a player I’d love to have on an NFL team who can play a variety of roles as a returner and receiver.

Quarterbacks Stephen Morris and Logan Thomas offer eye-popping physical characteristics and flashes of promise, but lack the conceptual feel or the game and consistency to generate interest beyond a late-round pick (save a rogue team that falls in love with looks over the substance of their performances).

C.J. Fiedorowicz is a blocking tight end in training. Gator Hoskins is an H-back in training. And arguably the best potential all-around tight end was Crockett Gillmore from Colorado State – a late edition who, along with the likes of Alex Bayer, were more intriguing options than the original picks for this game. Bayer was not in attendance, but Gillmore made a beautiful over the head catch about 25 yards down field on a corner route and his blocking was physical and on-point today.

Jeff Janis continues to intrigue folks who see the big body with a reasonably quick gait, but ignore that he caught over 75 percent of his targets against his body and didn’t have more than a handful of receptions on targets of moderate difficulty.

I almost gave Ryan Grant consideration in my tier of players who raised their standing in my eyes. He had some slick releases and did a fine job of getting on top of defenders early on vertical routes. There were still several routes where he lost control of his footing trying to break harder than his balance would allow. I liked the effort, but as I mentioned during the preview, Grant has to demonstrate consistency. This was a step in the right direction.

For more Senior Bowl Info also check out:

For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2013 Rookie Scouting Portfolio.The 2014 RSP will available April 1 and if you pre-order before February 10, you get a 10 percent discount. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

UCF QB Blake Bortles

January 13, 2014 0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Quarterback

QB Blake Bortles is a tall glass with water at the halfway mark, but is it half-full or half-empty?

Last year, I broached the topic of comparing a quarterback prospect – E.J. Manuel – to a half a glass of water. Some saw the Bills quarterback as half-full, others half-empty.

Blake Bortles is also one of those “glasses of water” in this year’s 2014 quarterback class. The 6-3, 23o-lb. quarterback has the physical skills of an higher-functioning NFL starter and he flashes the feel and conceptual talent to develop into one.

The Central Florida Knight’s junior season has excited the media and divided the scouts. Is he a top prospect because of what he is and what he could become or is he a developmental project with few guarantees? Where and when Bortles goes in April nobody knows. Since I don’t make round projection a priority in my analysis of talent, I have only a passing interest.

However, I do care about talent, potential, and team fit. Like Manuel, I view Bortles as a player with lessons to learn, but “unlearning” a lot of bad habits isn’t one of them. He’d fit best on a team with a staff that sports a track record of success developing quarterbacks. It would be even better if he sat behind a veteran sold on aiding Bortles’ long-term development.

If the Central Florida quarterback lands in this type of situation, he has shown enough feel for the game that he can develop into a capable NFL starter. He has the upside to lead a team to the playoffs and carry that team in the fourth quarter of games. Yet, if his development becomes a case of mostly self-directed study, Bortles could create knots in his game that become more difficult to untie later.

What’s compelling about Bortles is his athleticism, a feel for managing the chaos of the pocket, flashes of pinpoint accuracy, and budding conceptual skill at manipulating defenses. Bortles most prominent struggles occur in three areas: complex coverage schemes common to the NFL, executing accurate throws outside the hash, and making consistent and mature decisions with regard to placement of targets.

I’ve seen a comparison or two between Bortles and Jake Locker. I’m not sold it’s the right stylistic choice, but I haven’t arrived at one I like yet. Physically they are similar athletes, but there are notable differences.

Locker often threw bad passes with good mechanics and footwork. It was the aspect of his game that concerned scouts.

Bortles often throws good passes with mediocre footwork. Locker had a running back mentality far more often than Bortles and the UCF quarterback has a better feel for the pocket that should help him develop into good NFL passer with the right team environment.

I have more to study of Bortles, but based on his performance against South Carolina – a defense filled with NFL-caliber athletes that incorporates coverage schemes that Bortles will encounter in the NFL – I believe Bortles has a better feel for the game as a quarterback than Locker even if he still has much to learn.

When examining Bortles’ footwork, I see a quarterback who may not be as experienced as his fellow prospect Derek Carr, but Bortles often appears more patient and poised with his mindset. If I were to draft a quarterback from this class who has the potential to remain calm during the chaos, Bortles would be on my short list.

Accuracy

Bortles delivers in the short game with the accuracy and placement on the move of a basketball point guard. He’s capable of making plays under duress. Here is a 2nd-and-5 play with 1:57 in the first quarter from a 1×2 receiver, 11-personnel set with Bortles working from center at the Central Florida 6 versus South Carolina’s four-man front, its corners tight to the ends, and its safeties 10 yards deep.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=109&w=560&h=315]

At the snap, Bortles gives a quick jab of a play fake towards the back heading to the right. As the quarterback turns left he’s face to face with the right defensive end in the end zone. Bortles reacts fast and throws a jump pass to the tight end on the drag route while taking a hit to the chest.

The ball arrives on time to the tight end, hitting the receiver in stride two yards behind the line of scrimmage. The throw gives the receiver room to turn outside the right hash with the safety only a half a yard behind. The placement is the difference between a completion for a loss and room for the tight end to break the safety’s tackle and get the first down.

This is a risky type of decision that could have resulted in mayhem and it’s the type of choice that some scouts and personnel men will dislike. However it’s also a display of athleticism, accuracy, and a willingness to take punishment to win a play.

Bortles also executes these skills well in the screen game and a screen game is a good fit for an athletic (but not game-breaking) runner who can draw a defense to him. Brees and Brett Favre are examples of quarterbacks with excellent screen games.

Where Bortles’ accuracy falters in the short and intermediate game is a specific set of throws outside the hash or from one end of the hash to the other. This 1st and 10 at the UCF 50 early in the second quarter is a good example.

The offense is in a 1×2 receiver 11 personnel pistol versus South Carolina’s nickel look with two safeties deep. The “setup” on this play is the single receiver on the left side motioning across the formation to the right – it’s the eye candy for the defense so Bortles can make a deeper throw to the same side.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=145&w=560&h=315]

At the snap, the receiver swings to the right flat and Bortles stares down this route with his feet pointed towards his shallow receiver. After baiting the shallow zone into the short look, Bortles turns down field and delivers the ball from the 44 of the Knights to the Gamecocks’ 35 to the receiver crossing the right hash. Bortles’ throw is too high and the receiver tips the ball skyward in an attempt to highpoint it.

The reason is Bortles’ feet. They are too wide after his initial turn from the short route to the down field route. The wide stance causes the ball to sail. Bortles has to be more precise with his turns or make a post-turn adjustment with his feet to throw from a more balanced stance.

Here’s another wide-stance throw that sails in the third quarter from a 2×1 receiver 11 personnel shotgun set.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=350&w=560&h=315]

Bortles takes a three-step drop, turns to his left and the step he takes towards the receiver during his release is too long and widens his base. The receiver still makes the catch, but the ball sails from the right hash to the left sideline.

Once again, this is a footwork issue and the shorter-faster the drop, the more precise the footwork and the body position as to be. We laud the inherent athleticism of a great juke, spin move or lateral cut to avoid a defender, but the discipline, precision and detail of drops and quick turns to deliver an accurate football requires a similar form of athleticism found in high-end ball room dancing competitions. It’s no coincidence that some NFL wide receivers have performed well in that ballroom dance series in ABC.

Several quarterbacks would fare well, too. When the FOX play-by-play crew quoted Sean Payton saying that Drew Brees was the finest “foot athlete” he’s ever seen, it wasn’t surprising. Brees’ accuracy is among the best in the NFL and he also moves more than most of his peers – even set plays. Matt Ryan also excels at the quick game that requires precision timing and accuracy.

If Bortles continues working on his feet, he has the athleticism and base accuracy to execute this type of passing game if paired with a fine route runner like Roddy White. The key will be honing his feet to remain balanced with multiple turns and steps during this brief span between snap and throw. Based on his ability as a runner and improviser, I see enough from his footwork that there’s an opportunity to maximize this skill if he’s dedicated to the NFL like a career and not like he won he won the lottery.

Eye Manipulation

When a quarterback exhibits the skill to use his eyes to hold or bait the defense, it’s often a product of a passer’s comfort with the play, the opposing defense, and his physical skill to execute. Here’s a dig route Bortles hits in stride with good rhythm and an easy throwing motion. It’s a 2nd-and-11 pass with 0:46 in the first quarter from a 1×2 receiver pistol at the 15 of UCF.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=135&w=560&h=315]

Bortles drops looking to the middle and then turns to the single receiver side at the right flat towards the running back peeling to the flat before returning to the receiver on the dig. The integration of his eyes and feet to got form left to right, change the depth of his target to the right, and then make an effortless delivery of the ball to the receiver in stride and with good velocity is all quality work.

Here’s a 2nd and 13 with 5:28 in the half with UCF in a 2×1 receiver 11 personnel set with the runner and tight end to the single receiver side. South Carolina is employing another 4-3 look with the weak side linebacker playing inside shade of the slot receiver. Bortles’ work here flashes his potential as a player who can learn to layer multiple techniques in a short span to manipulate a defender on quick-hitting plays.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=262&w=560&h=315]

The quarterback executes a one-step drop, turns right, pumps to the back in the flat (or resets the ball if you don’t believe it was actually a pump), and then hits the receiver low and inside up the right sideline. This is savvy play manipulation with the eyes, the action of the ball, and the feet to give his receiver the chance to earn 12 yards under the corner.

Where Bortles gets dinged by NFL scouts is his skill recognizing defenses that employ hybrid man/zone concepts before the snap. This type of defensive scheme that varies where it uses man and zone on the same play in an attempt to trick the quarterback is common in the NFL. The athleticism and flexibility of South Carolina’s defense is a reason I chose to study Bortles’ performance in this game.

The Gamecocks intercept Bortles for the first time using this hybrid concept on a 1st and 20 pass with 1:28 in the half from a nickel look with the corners off the outside receivers between 5-7 yards. When Bortles comes to the line in a 2×1 receiver 11 personnel alignment, the quarterback reads the safeties and sees a defensive alignment that looks like pure zone. He does not note the potential impact on the cornerback coverage when the safeties change their positions just before the snap.

As a result, Bortles thinks he can look off the safety to his left and then turn to the right and deliver a route between the zone. The corner, now playing off-man, breaks on the route and cuts off the receiver for the interception.

One of the many reasons Peyton Manning is great is his skill at baiting a defense into revealing its coverage much earlier in a play than it wants. In fact, it’s often the last second before the snap that reveals the greatest clues of what a defense is doing. For Bortles becoming a competent player will be a matter of study and drilling (easier said than done).

Pocket Managment

South Carolina’s defense has presented a strong test for a quarterback’s pocket skills well before Clowney ever set foot on the Columbia campus. The Gamecocks tested Bortles’ skill to maneuver the pocket and find the open man down field several times in this game.

Bortles won some and lost some if you count the end result, but the overall process that he demonstrates to address the pressure is impressive. His skills in the pocket project well in the NFL if he can get better with his feet and improve his recognition of coverage.

This sack by Kelcey Quarles on 3rd and 3 with 13:54 in the half is a good example of a bad result, but a good process. Bortles comes to the line in a 2×1 receiver 11 personnel formation versus Carolina’s 4-3 look with both safeties inside the hash 10 yards deep.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=160&w=560&h=315]

The quarterback takes a three-step drop and Clowney comes roaring outside the left tackle. By the end of Bortles’ drop, Clowney is two steps away. This is the point of the play where Bortles shares something in common with the best NFL quarterbacks in the pocket.

I noted Sunday on Twitter that Andrew Luck, Russell Wilson, and Brees possess a common trait when it comes to eluding pressure from the pocket and it’s not something I have discussed before: They wait as long as possible before executing the first move to avoid the defender. They bait the defender with their stillness, draw him in, and then explode with a turn or dip to ensure the defender has no time to alter his angle to them.

Bortles has this maneuver down pat. On this play, the quarterback is looking down the middle at the end of his drop and waits until Clowney’s approach is too close to alter. Once Clowney reaches that point of no return, the quarterback spins left of the defensive end’s approach, leaving Clowney with nothing but a desperate shot at grasping Bortles’ jersey.

As a quick tangent, Bortles displayed the speed later in this game to escape Clowney to the left flat and throw the ball away. It was a display of speed and quickness that not many NFL quarterbacks will possess.

Back to this play, because there’s more to see. As Bortles spins free of Clowney’s angle, he turns into the second defensive end’s trajectory and is in this end’s face. To compound matters, the defensive tackle on the left side is coming free and closing fast.

Bortles’ sudden spin is enough to get loose from Clowney and in bang-bang succession Bortles makes the second defensive end miss by turning away from the pressure. Throughout it all, the quarterback still manages to keep his arm in position to throw.

If you suspend any thought about the outcome of this play and look at his work avoiding two defensive ends in succession while keeping his arm in a position to deliver the ball, that’s the takeaway despite and anti-climatic ending for the offense.

Here’s nice display of climbing and then sliding – a 2nd and 10 from a 2×1 receiver 11 personnel pistol with 13:56 left from the 25 of Central Florida. Bortles faces a nickel look with two safeties split at the hashes.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=387&w=560&h=315]

He drops five steps, feels the pressure off the right side from then end, climbs, and then slides to his right. His eyes are down field the entire time. He throws the ball from the right hash to the receiver on the comeback at the right sideline seven yards down field. The receiver drops the ball, but the movement from Bortles is noteworthy.

This 1st and 10 pass of 30 yards from release point to reception that splits the defenders up the seam with great accuracy is also a fine display of pocket management. Bortles comes to the line with 6:47 in the half from a 1×2 receiver 11 personnel pistol with the back to the right and the tight end at left end versus a nickel look with two safeties deep split at the TE and slot man.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=225&w=560&h=315]

Bortles takes a five-step drop while looking to the middle. As pressure comes from right end, the quarterback hitches to the left, sliding away from the end and splits the zone up the seam to his receiver on the deep cross. The receiver gets his hands on the ball, but the safety over top delivers a hard hit on the airborne receiver, knocking the ball lose, and incurring a personal foul penalty.

Technically, this is an excellent throw. However, it’s not the type of target that Bortles should make unless the game is on the line and no other choice but to place his receiver in harm’s way. A more optimal decision would be to place the ball to the back shoulder and give his receive an opportunity to protect himself.

Accuracy is the basic part of the equation, but placement is advanced section of quarterbacking. This next play should have been a touchdown, but the lack of mature placement results in Bortles’ second interception.

This is a shotgun set on 2nd and 10 with 6:58 left versus South Carolina’s nickel. One safety is 10 yards off the line in the flat, the other occupies the deep middle. But as I mentioned about last-second movements that reveal the true nature of the coverage, the shallow safety begins a deep drop to change his depth to 20 yards just prior to the snap.

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=548&w=560&h=315]

Bortles takes a five step drop looking to the middle and then the left. He makes the read based on the safeties but doesn’t see the deep drop by the middle linebacker that completes what is really happening with this pre-snap safety rotation.

Bortles targets his receiver down the middle seam and this linebacker’s drop beats the throw. Although Bortles likely misread the coverage, he could have beaten it anyway if he throws the ball to a more optimal spot of the field – over the linebacker to the back of the end zone (just as the analyst explains on the broadcast).

As with the 30-yard pass leading his receiver into the teeth of the secondary, Bortles attempts to thread the needle on this potential touchdown rather than lead his teammate to open territory.

Flashes of Integration (View Play and Replay)

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYd29xlmc04&start=464&w=560&h=315]

This 73-yard touchdown is a good example of Bortles combining several of these skills into one positive result. South Carolina opts for a 3-3-5 look with the strong safety at linebacker depth between the defensive end and slot left receiver. At the snap, the safety in the middle of the field drops to his zone and the defensive back on the right plays man on a receiver while the defensive back on the left appears to play zone.

Bortles looks to the middle during his three-step drop, hitches a step to slide past Clowney’s pressure off the edge, and delivers the deep cross under the high safety at the Central Florida 44. It’s a high throw, but not so high that the receiver can’t highpoint the target in stride, turn up field and gain 55 after the catch.

Overall, I was impressed with Bortles’ performance against the Gamecocks. It was far from perfect, but even Andrew Luck struggled making reads and maneuvering pressure at the college level (see Oregon and Oklahoma State). Bortles isn’t the slam dunk prospect that most think Luck was, but I like his feel for the game.

If I had responsibility picking players for an NFL team, Bortles makes my shortlist of first-round candidates based on what I’ve seen thus far and would remain there at least until I interviewed him. I believe he’s closer to what the Titans are hoping they’ll see consistently from Jake Locker.

“One Good Year” And Other Asinine Thoughts on QB Evaluation

January 13, 2014 0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Quarterback

This guy had "one good year" in college football. Photo by PDA.Photo — This guy had “one good year” in college football. Photo by PDA.Photo

One good year. It’s a cautionary refrain from the chorus of skeptics not sold on Central Florida junior Blake Bortles as a top-flight quarterback prospect (see my evaluation of Bortles vs. South Carolina). In the wee hours of the morning in a video-lit room evaluating quarterbacks, this three-word phrase will strike the fear in the hearts of most veteran scouts.

One good year could be Akili Smith, who like Bortles, was another 6’3″, 220-plus-pound college wonder who the Cincinnati Bengals took third overall in the 1999 NFL Draft. Smith had the arm and the legs to carry team, but according to Smith, who is now coaching quarterbacks at St. Augustine High School in San Diego, he spent more time curling glasses at bars than he did grinding tape in Cincinnati.

However, one good year is also Cam Newton, who took the NFL by storm as a rookie and along with a fine defense has pried open the Panthers’ window of contention. Many scouts were also singing the One good year dirge during the winter of 2011 for this rocket armed athlete who has grown each year as a quarterback and team leader despite concerns he didn’t possess the right kind of potential to handle the role on the field and in the locker room.

More than anything, one good year means NFL scouts don’t have enough evidence to cover their collective assets if a quarterback like Bortles fails. It’s one thing to invest a second, third, or fourth-round pick in players like Colin Kaepernick, Russell Wilson, Drew Brees, Matt Schaub, or Aaron Brooks and spin their development as a surprise or a stroke of scouting/coaching genius. It’s another to anoint first-round picks the future of the franchise and watch them set back a team’s development.

Personally, I think the phrase one good year is just a phrase. Giving those three words anywhere close to the weight of what’s seen in a game, in practice, or during a team interview is asinine.

Let’s go with the popular idea that a first-round quarterback should be more than a “capable starter.” I know what that means to me, but I have no idea what it means to everyone else. The same goes for “he should be a star.”

Then there’s the inevitable truth that stars rise and decline. If you don’t believe me, look in the sky.

There are many ways to define what that either term means. I’m defining a star as a quarterback who has done at least one of the following during his career:

Earned multiple trips to the Pro Bowl.
Led the league in meaningful passing categories (yards, touchdowns, completion percentage, or QB rating) for multiple seasons.
Led his team to multiple conference championship games.

Here is my criteria for capable starter status. A quarterback with this label should have done at least one of the following:

Led his team to the playoffs at least once.
Earned one trip to the Pro Bowl.
Earned top-5 production in meaningful passing categories (see above) for multiple seasons.

Using this criteria on the 51 first-round quarterbacks drafted since 1993, 22 of them are or were at least capable starters. That’s an underwhelming 45 percent success rate. Only 8 of these first-round picks can be considered stars – an appropriate stardom rate of 15 percent even in this day and age where everyone earns a trophy for participating.

Here’s a look at 17 years of first-round quarterbacks courtesy of DraftHistory.com. I’m not counting the 2013 class – even in today’s ever-impatient media-fan-ownership environment of the NFL, they get a pass.

Year	No.	Round	Pick	Name	Star	Capable	Comments
2012	1	1	1	Andrew Luck		x	Quintessential rising star. But by this conservative criteria, a “capable starter.”
	2	1	2	Robert Griffin III		x	Pro-Bowl rookie season, toilet bowl sophomore year. Still, a “capable starter.”
	3	1	8	Ryan Tannehill			Flashes of good work, but jury still out.
	4	1	22	Brandon Weeden			Two years in and the Browns are eyeing the draft for a QB once again.
2011s	1	3	0	Terrelle Pryor			Had moments this year, but regressed and lost the starting job.
2011	1	1	1	Cam Newton		x	On the cusp of stardom accoridng to my simplistic criteria.
	2	1	8	Jake Locker			Injuries and play mean the jury is out.
	3	1	10	Blaine Gabbert			The Jaguars are giving him one more year. I think they mean with the team and not as a starter unless he wows everyone.
	4	1	12	Christian Ponder			Like the coaching staff, out with the old and in with the new.
2010	1	1	1	Sam Bradford			The talent is there but he cannot be considered a capable starter yet.
	2	1	25	Tim Tebow			Italy is calling.
	2	1	5	Mark Sanchez			Sanchez is the fly in my criteria’s ointment, because it considers him a star. Fortunately, I’m not counting it. Common sense is a beautiful thing.
	3	1	17	Josh Freeman			Where will Freeman land?
2008	1	1	3	Matt Ryan		x	Not quite a star, but more than capable.
	2	1	18	Joe Flacco		x	Highly capable.
2007	1	1	1	JaMarcus Russell			Have we heard anything from Jeff Garcia lately?
	2	1	22	Brady Quinn			Storied program, big muscles, QB looks, and holds a clipboard with the best of them.
2006	1	1	3	Vince Young		x	At one time, capable but blew it. Still, it counts.
	2	1	10	Matt Leinart			The next Tom Brady . . .
	3	1	11	Jay Cutler		x	Capable starter.
2005	1	1	1	Alex Smith		x	Capable starter.
	2	1	24	Aaron Rodgers	x		Stud.
	3	1	25	Jason Campbell			Career backup.
2004	1	1	1	Eli Manning		x	Capable starter.
	2	1	4	Philip Rivers	x		Low end of stardom, but qualifies.
	3	1	11	Ben Roethlisberger	x		Stats don’t justify stardom, but the postseason does.
	4	1	22	J.P. Losman			Trent Edwards was better until Adrian Wilson got to him.
2003	1	1	1	Carson Palmer		x	Capable starter.
	2	1	7	Byron Leftwich		x	Low end of capable starter at one time.
	3	1	19	Kyle Boller			Big arm, big-name school, big disappointment.
	4	1	22	Rex Grossman			Low-end of capable starter w/his Super Bowl appearance.
2002	1	1	1	David Carr			Human pin cushion.
	2	1	3	Joey Harrington			Good college quarterback, good at the piano, and decent on FS1 Network.
	3	1	32	Patrick Ramsey			Reserve.
2001	1	1	1	Michael Vick		x	One-time capable starter with exciting gifts.
2000	1	1	18	Chad Pennington			Not healthy enough to earn capable starter status even if he was in spirit.
1999	1	1	1	Tim Couch			Capable SEC commentator for a regional cable network.
	2	1	2	Donovan McNabb	x		One-time star.
	3	1	3	Akili Smith			High school QB coach.
	4	1	11	Daunte Culpepper	x		One-time star.
	5	1	12	Cade McNown			Where are they now?
1998	1	1	1	Peyton Manning	x		Hall of Famer.
	2	1	2	Ryan Leaf			Still in the news on occasion.
1997	1	1	26	Jim Druckenmiller			Big, strong, and UDFA/NFL Europe’s Jeff Garcia much better.
1995	1	1	3	Steve McNair	x		Underrated star. Yes, I’m biased. I don’t care. Don’t argue . . .
	2	1	5	Kerry Collins		x	Capable starter at one point.
1994	1	1	3	Heath Shuler			I wonder what Norv Turner was thinking when he laid eyes on Shuler.
	2	1	6	Trent Dilfer		x	Beginning to remind me of F. Murray Abraham in “Finding Forrester.”
1993	1	1	1	Drew Bledsoe	x		Low-end star at one time.
	2	1	2	Rick Mirer			Goes to show you even Bill Walsh was fallible.

I inadvertently omitted Matt Stafford from this list (capable starter), but I did count him into my calculations. I don’t know about you, but a 45 percent success rate for a first-round quarterback developing into a capable starter tells me that having hard and fast rules about where and when you invest in a quarterback is foolish.

Another acceptable notion of “common sense” is that NFL teams shouldn’t draft a quarterback unless they believe that player sees star potential from that prospect. Using the same sample size and criteria, there are 35 quarterbacks since 1993 that were drafted with one of the top-15 overall picks. Only 6 of those 35 passers became stars – a whopping 17 percent success rate for meeting these organizations’ expectations.

Go easier on these top-15 picks and consider them successful as “capable starters” then that rate jumps to 54 percent. Still, the probability for turning a top-15 overall pick at quarterback has been marginally better than a coin flip. If the NFL hasn’t figured out how to project the talent with more accuracy than it has, then why should anyone listen to a former or current scout, coach, general manager, or owner when they explain their criteria for what makes a good first-round caliber quarterback?

This is not a complete indictment of NFL personnel men. Injuries and surrounding talent can alter the prospects of a young player that teams probably did a fair job of evaluating. However, the idea that the NFL and the draft community should be critiquing what constitutes a potential “bull’s-eye” with an anecdotal theory about “one good year” when it has difficulty hitting the target is putting the Super Bowl before the regular season.

This week, I’ll post some evaluation notes on Bortles. I promise you “one good year,” won’t be a part of my analysis.

Futures: Fresno State QB Derek Carr

January 8, 2014 0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Quarterback

Want a glimpse into a quarterback’s mind? Watch his feet. Derek Carr’s reveal initiative and impulsivity.

Futures: Fresno State QB Derek Carr

by Matt Waldman

Want a glimpse into a quarterback’s mind? Watch his feet.

If there’s a minimal amount of footwork before a throw, the passer is making quick decisions. If there are hitches after the initial drop, the decision process is taking longer.

If the footwork in either instance is precise, there’s a greater chance the quarterback has a mental command of his environment and the resulting passes will be accurate. If the steps and stance are sloppy and off balanced, chaos – in the pocket or in the passer’s mind – is often afoot.

One of the pervading concerns about individuals from this spread generation of NFL quarterback prospects is their ability to transition from a shotgun attack to dropping from center and reading more advanced defensive concepts on the retreat. Even as the NFL has adopted the spread, these are concerns that place Fresno State’s Derek Carr front and center among this crop of quarterback prospects.

A first-round prospect on many analysts’ draft boards heading into the pre-draft madness, Carr runs an offense that uses a lot of screens and slants. This is nothing new. Cam Newton, Robert Griffin, Brandon Weeden, Geno Smith, Blaine Gabbert and Nick Foles all came from spread-heavy attacks.

However, there’s a perception among many analysts based on conversations with scouts that prospects from spread-heavy offenses have more to prove when it comes to selling a team on their ability to transition to the NFL. It’s among the reasons why there was a much more grounded, confident mood around the selection of players like Andrew Luck, Ryan Tannehill, Christian Ponder, Mike Glennon, and Sam Bradford – even if the returns have been equally mixed.

This week’s Futures examines Carr’s game with footwork as an underlying focus. David Carr’s younger brother has all the physical tools to become a productive NFL starter. The question is – as it is for more prospects at the top half of the draft – does he possess the mental acumen to integrate these skills into the complexities of leading an NFL offense?

Carr’s spread offense doesn’t provide definitive answers, but it does offer worthwhile clues about his future transition. These indicators tell me Carr is not an instant star, but give him two to three years and he can be the quarterback a team can build around.

Read the rest at Football Outsiders.

Mike Glennon Preview

November 27, 2013 0 Comments read Players, Quarterback

Is QB Mike Glennon a draft-not-to-lose pick? If he goes in the first two rounds, I think so. Photo by Akulawolf.

I’m cautiously optimistic about Mike Glennon’s game thus far. He’s making sound decisions for the Buccaneers and when under heavy pressure, he’s doing a better job of throwing the ball away or taking the sack rather than throwing the ball up for grabs. However, the reason Glennon is performing so well is the team doing a great job of its play calling and giving the rookie time to make decisions at relaxed pace compared to many NFL passers. In essence the Buccaneers are a great fit for a play-not-to-lose style. Here’s a taste of the breakdown of Mike Glennon and why he’s been successful this season. The rest you can read as a Footballguys subscriber.

Why Mike Glennon Is Succeeding

Greg Cosell made headlines about saying Glennon was ahead of Robert Griffin III in his development, but it’s really no surprise. Griffin is playing in an offense that makes far different demands than the traditional pocket game that Glennon has always used and without a summer of practice, Griffin’s development has stalled a year.

The combination of the pass protection, play action game, and smart play calls according to down and distance are helping Glennon use his big arm and decent mobility. Yet, I don’t want to downplay Glennon. If he can continue to make smart decisions during the next 2-3 seasons of his development, he has shown enough for the Buccaneers to invest in him as a long-term starter.

The pervading theme for Glennon is time and space. Give the rookie these two resources and he has the basic skills – and a fine arm – to move an offense. Here’s a 3rd-and-six pass where the Buccaneers begin in an 10 personnel 3×1 receiver set and shift running back Brian Leonard to the trips side tight to the formation. The aim is to flood the Lions’ zone, create a breakdown in coverage, and generate a wide-open receiver.

The offensive line does a fine job of keeping the pocket clean and providing a great deal of space for Glennon to survey the field and step into any throw.

This is not the kind of pocket space we’re typically seeing in Washington or locales like Jacksonville or Pittsburgh. Give a quarterback this much space and he better find an open receiver or at least make a pinpoint throw to lead a receiver to open space.

The amount of time that the Tampa offensive line provides Glennon on this play allows the rookie quarterback to wait for Tim Wright, the rookie tight end, to finish his stem and break on a deeper in route. Wright, a slow possession receiver at Rutgers, has average speed for a move tight end.

Note the room Glennon has to step into this throw. No defender is in Glennon’s path to force the quarterback to alter his stride and follow-through. Plus, there’s a huge passing lane in the middle of the line for the quarterback to deliver the ball.

It’s a picture-perfect delivery that looks like something seen at a football practice, not an NFL pocket. The pass travels 21 yards on a rope to Wright.

QB Case Keenum: Color Me Impressed

November 12, 2013 0 Comments read Players, Quarterback

Case Keenum is the most surprising bench player in the NFL this year. I’ve studied his three starts and I believe the Cardinals defense provided the best evidence that the Texans’ new starter has the potential to succeed long-term.

I’ve kept a close eye on Case Keenum for the past three weeks. The first-time starter was solid against a brash Kansas City defense that loaded the box and dared the quarterback to make quick decisions. The Colts tried a similar approach and Keenum made them pay with an aggressive vertical game. Although the Chiefs have a better overall defense in the stats column, last weekend’s game versus the Cardinals was Keenum’s stiffest test to date, and the quarterback impressed me with his poise and maturity.

Arizona presented a true litmus test for Keenum, because its pass rush is most dangerous up the middle. Daryl Washington and Karlos Dansby can wreak havoc on a passing game when the Cardinals use them in conjunction with Darnell Dockett to penetrate the pocket through the A gaps. How a quarterback handles A-gap pressure is a great indicator of his poise and maturity. Keenum had some rough moments, but far fewer than I expected.

Initiation Phase

The first play of the game featured John Abraham making a strip-sack-fumble recovery for a touchdown off the edge. The Cardinals smell blood and the second offensive play of the game is an illustration of what pressure up the middle can do to a quarterback. Although the Cardinals fail to force the turnover, it should have been 14-0 Arizona after two plays.

Keenum is facing another defense with one safety high. His check-downs on this play are his fullback and receiver Andre Johnson running the cross. His deeper routes are the tight end and DeAndre Hopkins. Hopkins has single coverage, but the development of the play forces Keenum to abandon a deeper throw. I haven’t had a chance to access the All-22 on this play, so while it’s possible Keenum lacked the anticipation and confidence deliver the ball to Hopkins, past performance dictates it’s unlikely – especially with the corner peeking into the backfield from the get-go on this play.

Keenum looks to the safety as he begins his drop from center. It’s worth noting that Keenum is earning more looks from center as he earns more starts, but the quarterback still spends a majority of his time in the pistol or the shotgun. The motor coordination to read the field and execute on a drop from center is more difficult than a drop from the other two formations: More steps, more momentum to control, and more reads to make closer to the line while on the move. While I believe it is overstated, one of the reasons teams favor tall quarterbacks in a traditional pocket game from center is the ability to see over some of the passing lanes when closer to the line of scrimmage.

As Keenum completes his drop, the Cardinals defense has the tight end well-covered and neither of the shallow routes are at the stage of breaking open. At the same time, the right guard is getting bulldozed into the pocket and Keenum’s path.

Keenum is a mobile player, but what are his options? If he moves right, he gives the edge rusher a free path. If he slides to his left, the linebacker on the fullback has a shot to make the play and there’s still the defensive tackle crashing the middle who has the inside shoulder of the guard and the angle to pursue without resistance.

Keenum does the right thing by staying in the pocket. In contrast, here’s the mobile Seneca Wallace on Sunday leaning too hard on his mobility in a similar situation.

Wallace has two receivers to his left and one to his right. This play will end with Wallace in the right flat desperately trying to get rid of the ball to one receiver and the whole orchestration is his doing – and ultimately his undoing as the Packers’ starter in short order.

Interior pressure begins to build off right guard in the photo above. Although the pressure isn’t nearly as intrusive as what Keenum experiences, watch Wallace perceive the pressure and react to his right.

This opens the pursuit lane for the edge defender off right tackle and Wallace has just made his job even more difficult. If he remained patient in the pocket, he would have had more options to target in the passing game. This move to the right cuts off half the field and two-thirds of the receivers he has running routes at the moment.

Look below and you can see the defensive lineman also have open pursuit lanes to the flat. Instead of one defensive tackle pushing the pocket up the middle – who, by the way gets addressed when the guard recovers enough to shore up his protection – now Wallace has three defenders with angles on him for a sack.

Moreover, there’s only one receiver for Wallace to target. This is at least until the tight end breaks from the line of scrimmage and releases as an outlet that Wallace would have to target with a throw across his body while on the move.

Wallace has to deliver a pump fake to freeze the defense before targeting his receiver returning up the sideline for a whopping completion of . . .

Negative yardage before the receiver becomes a ball carrier. This play isn’t about physical ability. Wallace has enough speed and arm strength to play in the league. What he lacks on this play is the ability to stay in the pocket at the first sign of pressure or the knowledge of where he should break the pocket to maximize his chances for a positive play and minimize the potential of a negative one. Wallace also injures his groin on this play and left the game.

Keenum, demonstrates this patience Wallace lacked and it’s clear from this game that he doesn’t perceive pressure too early. He stands his ground, waits for the crossing route to come open, and delivers the ball from the pocket. The problem is that the crossing route is never really open. Keenum, in a hurry due to the pressure up the middle, forgets that the safety has position to come over the top to cut off the target. This is why more patience with the single coverage or throwing the ball away might have been wiser options. I would have also considered sliding left and throwing the ball away if Keenum couldn’t bait the linebacker to come downhill.

As the ball arrives (see below), the safety comes over the top. If he makes this catch there is a ton of green grass and blockers to pave the way for a pick-six. Imagine the complexion of this game with Arizona up 14-0 after two plays – and two Keenum turnovers. Could this have altered Keenum’s confidence? Possibly. However, I’d like to think that the same guy who listened to Cris Collinsworth say, “You’re not exactly 6’6″ . . . ” and responded, “Not yet . . .” without missing a beat, would have the confidence not to retreat into a shell.

The question is irrelevant now; the safety gets his hands on the ball, but cannot secure the interception.

Keenum lives for another play. After this trial by fire, the Texans quarterback learns from the experience and begins to make wiser plays under heavier pressure.

Outside Pressure

The first-year starter’s highlight plays have often been flights from pressure where he flushed to one side of the of the field and throws the ball deep. Fun plays to watch, but what about pressure situations where the defense forces Keenum to exhibit more control? This 2nd-and-14 play in the first quarter is a great example of Keenum doing just that.

Keenum has two vertical routes inside with his outside bunch receiver Hopkins crossing the middle. Houston’s fullback runs a flat route on this play-action pass.

Keenum finishes the play fake and the defense, sending five and dropping six, has strong intermediate and short coverage in the middle of the field. The pressure will come from Keenum’s blind side.

Keenum feels the pressure working loose from the left as he finishes his drop and does a good job of climbing the pocket in rhythm.

His eyes stay focused downfield and he’s able to see three options: Hopkins on the cross, Johnson in the middle of the field, and the fullback in the flat.

As Keenum works towards the line of scrimmage, this forces the secondary to slide to Keenum’s right and towards the pocket. Keenum’s movement opens the fullback in the flat.

The fact that Keenum climbs the pocket in rhythm helps the quarterback keep his feet under him to deliver an accurate throw.

First down.

Restraint

Pressure forces impulsive behavior, especially interior pressure. However, Keenum exhibits the poise of a veteran in a situation where many veterans turn their back to the pressure or force the ball into coverage. The play begins with Hopkins and Johnson running dual crossing routes, the tight end stretching the seam, and the fullback running a wheel route to the left sideline. The Cardinals send five defenders to the pocket, running a twist with John Abraham working from the right edge to the middle.

Keenum is again under center, so there’s more to process on the move with less field to see at the early stages of his drop.

As Keenum finishes his drop, Abraham is making his way to an open lane up the middle. As you can see, the Texans receivers are well covered with the exception of Tate in the right flat. Even Tate isn’t a great option, because he’s seven yards behind in the line of scrimmage with a Karlos Dansby waiting in the flat. Considering that Dansby has 78 tackles this year and a huge majority of them unassisted, Keenum is seeking better options.

Nothing comes open within the next beat and the defense is constricting the pocket. Keenum has no running lane, but what he does display is a quarterback’s best friend if he can execute it: a pump fake.

Keenum flashes the ball, freezes the defense, and opens a crease in the pocket with this move. Not all quarterbacks have the skill to execute a good pump fake. Those that do often lack the awareness of when to use it.

Keenum’s pump fake gives him second life in the pocket. He keeps his eyes down field, slides to his left, and when nothing comes open, delivers a second pump fake. I love the small slide. Many NFL quarterbacks in this situation would have turned their backs to the defense and tried to roll away from the inside pressure 2-3 frames ago. This is the type of poise that is proving the Texans coaching staff right about Keenum and something they must have seen enough in practice to hope he could display it when the lights came on.

At this point, Keenum freezes the secondary and this buys him just enough time to flee the pocket to the left flat.

I also like that Keenum opts to slide with plenty of room to avoid a huge hit. Another small sign of maturity that I hope is a pattern for him during his development.

Third and short is much better than most of the consequences that could have come from this play.

Patience With Eyes And Feet

This touchdown pass is essentially a two-man route using play action. Andre Johnson makes one of two fantastic catches in this game, but Keenum does a ton to make his play happen.

This is a max protection scheme where the fullback and running back block and eventually release from the line of scrimmage as receivers once the play breaks down. The quarterback has to execute a strong play fake, patience, and excellent pass placement against a zone defense that has a lot of defenders occupying very little space.

Keenum begins the play with his back turned to the line of scrimmage while executing the play fake with good extension of the ball towards the running back.

The initial action is good, but Keenum’s decision to duck lower to sell the fake is an added touch that forces the linebackers up field.

Once Keenum finishes his drop he’s staring at Hopkins crossing between four defenders in a tight zone over the middle. What I like is that Keenum remains patient and sells the defense on the idea that he’s waiting for Hopkins to clear the middle and deliver the ball in that direction.

It helps that Keenum’s second look continues along the trajectory of Hopkins’ break, but also gives the quarterback the opportunity to spot Johnson running the opposite direction behind Hopkins. This is a conceptual benefit to routes that crisscross at various depths.

As Keenum spots Johnson breaking open from left to right, the interior pressure makes its way into the pocket. Keenum has time to slide to his right to avoid a hit, but if he does he likely tips off Johnson’s cross and forces a scramble drill to the right side where the defense will flow to the area and eliminate any openings.

Keenum stands his ground and delivers the ball to a spot where only Johnson can make the catch. It’s a 25-yard throw that requires good timing and velocity with a 300-plus-pounder breathing down his back.

Johnson makes an excellent catch at the boundary for the score, but it’s Keenum’s play fake, use of his eyes to hold the defense in the middle of the field, and the willingness to stand his ground to deliver a strike that sets up the highlight reel play.

The Blurry Line Between Patience and Hesitation

Not everything Keenum did was good without question. Here’s a second-quarter play where Keenum converts the first down after leaving the pocket, but I wonder if he forced the scramble because he was hesitant to act on what he saw. This is 2nd-and-six pass where interior pressure forces Keenum to flush right, but did Keenum wait too long? See for yourself.

Keenum’s primary read is the tight end in the slot running an out at the first down marker. Good anticipation on this play would be for Keenum to deliver the ball just as the receiver begins his break (at the top of his stem).

This is the top of the receiver’s stem and Keenum should be in the middle of his release if he’s going to deliver the ball with impeccable timing. However, the cornerback is sitting on this route. It posses a good question: Is the tight end open? Based on the position of the corner to the outside with his pads downhill, I think Keenum made a wise choice not to throw the ball. However, you can see below that he’s still thinking about it for another beat.

As the tight end makes his break, you can see that the defensive back has a clear angle to cut off the throw and it’s a pick-six if he wins. If he loses, the tight end might have possession with the corner flying up the sideline in the opposite directon without the ball, but it’s a risky play. Meanwhile, the defensive tackle is working inside the left guard and the window of protection is closing in this pocket.

Many a reckless or freaked out quarterback under pressure still throws the pass at this point, but to Keenum’s credit he’s not one of them. This consistent interior pressure is something I’ve been waiting to see Keenum face before I could give an opinion on what I think of the quarterback long-term. Now that I see how he handles interior pressure, I think the quarterback has the goods to remain in the league for a long time as a contributor on some level – at least as a high-end backup or short-term starter. Perhaps more if he can demonstrate the ability to overcome what defensive coordinators will do to game plan against Keenum once they see enough of him on film.

There’s no climbing the pocket on this play. Keenum must retreat, reset, and choose a direction to roll.

The Texans’ starter does a good job keeping his eyes downfield and his body ready to deliver the ball as he moves to the right flat.

Solid technique to throw with his feet mostly under him as he spots the receiver coming back to him at the sideline.

First down.

Lingering Concerns: Reading The Middle of The Field

The most difficult area of the field to master for a quarterback is the middle. Defenders are changing positions, disguising zones, and demonstrate more range than most young quarterbacks are used to seeing most weeks at the college level. This is the last great frontier for Keenum’s development.

This play from the Texans’ end zone is a lucky outcome of a bad decision and it exemplifies the pass protection skills of linebackers the Keenum isn’t used to seeing outside of perhaps his old buddy Phillip Steward at Houston. Playing the bigger, faster, more experienced version of Steward is veteran linebacker Karlos Dansby – one of my favorite vets in the game today.

Keenum begins this 3rd-and-7 with his receivers tight to the formation. His primary read will be Hopkins, the outside receiver in the left flat. Dansby, circled below, reads Keenum’s eyes, gauges the receiver and works to his spot in the zone to defend the pass.

Dansby, who has played both inside and outside linebacker with success in the NFL, is a known for his skill as a pass defender despite the fact that he was an excellent blitzer as an inside player at Auburn – and now during his second stint in Arizona.

Keenum does not anticipate the drop or he believes he can fit the ball over Dansby to Hopkins. This proves to be a tighter window than he anticipates.

Dansby high-points the ball, nearly intercepting it with room up the flat to score if he does. Instead, the ball flies through his mitts and into the arms of the rookie Hopkins.

The receiver makes the catch, turns up field, and turns a disastrous decision into a fine play. Good outcome, bad process.

Throughout this game, Arizona sent pressure up the middle and Keenum demonstrated the awareness to throw the ball away, scramble to an open spot as a runner, and even in some cases take the sack rather than risk a turnover. With 5:15 left and down by 10, Keenum opts to take a risk. This is a good example of what some coaches or analysts will call “pressing”, when the quarterback tries to force the ball to make a play when the team is behind. It’s a negative connotation, but there are points in a game where the quarterback has to take chances or the game will end.

At this point in the game, I can see how Keenum might feel this is the time to gamble. It’s a two-possession game and even if the Texans can score in the next two plays, it might run another 30-45 seconds off the clock. A player like Manning or Brees might not press in this situation, knowing that the offense is built for big plays and high tempo. The Texans haven’t been built in that image.

Keenum has three deeper routes and one crossing route on this play. The Cardinals send an inside linebacker and safety up the middle on a blitz to disrupt Keenum’s process, dropping the outside linebacker at the left hash into coverage of the shallow zone.

Keenum takes his drop looking at the deep coverage. All three deep routes are accounted for, save potentially a deep throw up the left sideline to Hopkins, but Patrick Peterson is on the rookie with outside technique. Considering that Keenum lacks a great arm and this is an opposite-hash throw to one of the better press corners in football, it’s not going to happen.

Once Keenum reads the deep zone, the pressure is already coming. Keenum sees the shallow cross, but he doesn’t have a strong sense of the passing lane where he’s delivering the ball. There are two players of defense at Keenum’s left in position to defend this throw. As we saw earlier, the young quarterback still isn’t used to the level of athleticism of linebackers and defensive linemen.

Keenum forces the ball on the cross as he’s hit. The first defender tips the ball skyward.

The second defender nearly makes a play on the ball. This is one of three potential interceptions that Keenum could have thrown in this game and two of these plays had a strong shot of becoming pick-sixes.

I could tell you that I think the Texans’ starter is going to become a good starter in the NFL – and I like his chances more than I did three weeks ago. Keenum may lack the great arm or size, but he has all the tools to help an offense compete every week. But based on what I’m watching I’d just be rolling the dice if I told you he’s a passer with a future to bet on.

Keenum has shown me enough that I think he’s a good player and a bargain. That said, I like his poise, pocket presence, and aggressive mentality. If he can maintain those three qualities and get better at reading defenses, he has a shot to maintain the starting job in Houston for longer than this year.

For more analysis of offensive skill players like this post, download the 2013 Rookie Scouting Portfolio available April 1. Prepayment is available now. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2013 RSP at no additional charge. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

“The Degradation of a Young Stud – Part I” Starring Robert Griffin

October 30, 2013 0 Comments read Players, Quarterback

There are a ton of questions, but no easy answers for the Washington offense.

Sounds like an adult film, right? It is and it isn’t. What I witnessed from Washington’s passing offense against Denver this weekend was so nasty it will compel viewers take a long shower afterwards. Equally disturbing is that this film possesses a lot of elements of an exploitation flick. I had a difficult time watching an innocent, young talent treated this way. Worst of all, it’s difficult to assess blame and there in lurks the elements of psychological horror that chills the blood.

What we’re witnessing with Robert Griffin is the side of the double-edged sword that can cut the wielder. Last year, Washington took the risk and went all-in with an offensive philosophy that leaned heavily on one exceptional skill set of a single player. This year, Robert Griffin – that individual who could diminish the collective weaknesses of his teammates – can’t do what he used to and his impairment is exploiting the weaknesses of this unit.

The knee injury offers the easiest answer to what’s ailing Griffin and Washington. However, there are more questions that I couldn’t shake when I watch the Denver game. Will Griffin ever regain his 2012 explosiveness? If he does, is this the best thing for his long-term development as an NFL quarterback? Is Washington’s offense stunting Griffin’s development in order to exploit his athleticism? Or, is this what happens when a team takes an aggressive approach to molding the scheme around its talent and that talent disappears? The horror is that there’s really no one to blame and feel satisfied.

Do you blame Griffin for getting hurt? Perhaps you blame Shanahan and Dr. James Andrews for not looking out for their rookie and the future of their team in a playoff game, but considering the culture of the players, the league, the fans, the media, and the coaches, it would be unrealistic and hypocritical.

Do you blame the Shanahans for developing an offense predicated on Griffin’s game-changing speed that has degraded from the genius of simplicity to just plain simplistic thanks to one anterior cruciate ligament? So we’ll laud Washington for maximizing what one player could do for the benefit of the organization last year, then criticize him for not knowing when or if that one player will return to the physical form required to make that offense take flight? Learn the second half of the phrase that starts Go big or . . .

Do you blame a weak offensive line that looked a lot better last year because one false move by a defense could lead to a 60-yard touchdown, putting the rest of the league on amber alert to every movement Griffin made between the snap of the ball and the official’s whistle? Do you blame Pierre Garcon for getting hurt and Washington’s patience with him and Griffin returning to form? Not me. Why would Washington try to revamp a team when it expects its quarterback to return to form at some point? There has to be some level of patience this year to determine if it will happen or if they’ll have to adjust.

I have no solutions to the questions that this performance raises, only sympathy.

The Knee Isn’t Firing on All Cylinders

My analysis begins with something I learned from Thursday night’s Carolina blowout of the Tampa Buccaneers, and it wasn’t on the field; it was an interview the analysts had with Darrelle Revis about his recovery from an ACL tear.

Revis consulted numerous players who had undergone the grueling rehab and returned the field. Most of them said that it was a bumpy ride where the knee would have moments where it would respond as old, but most of the athleticism wasn’t firing on all cylinders. They told Revis to remain patient and work through it. One day, the knee will respond, everything will fall into place, and he’ll feel back to normal.

When I’ve watched Griffin this season, I’ve seen him experiencing these ups and downs with his knee. This read option play against the Broncos illustrates that the initial quickness is back, but explosiveness required to make second and third moves back-to-back-to-back are not.

This is your garden-variety zone read play. You have your linemen engaging in a pair of double teams where one of the players in each double team is supposed to work his way to a linebacker, the receivers run off their coverage, and the H-Back serves as Griffin’s lead blocker if the quarterback keeps the ball.

The play begins as designed. As you can see Denver’s defense is patient. The linebackers and safeties are remaining disciplined to the possibility of Griffin keeping this exchange and the defensive end is maintaining his gap responsibility rather than crashing down the line of scrimmage to attack the running back. This is something Griffin and the Washington offense is seeing more often and it is a contributing factor to the drop in the quarterback’s yards per carry average. If you ask me, it’s not the biggest reason; it’s the knee.

However on this play, the lead blocking could be a lot better. The H-Back doesn’t address the defensive end at all. Perhaps he’s taking an outside angle and expecting Griffin to do the same. Even so, the end is too quick and Griffin is too slow to bounce this outside with the angle the H-Back provides to the end without any resistance. Also note the safety at the left hash watching the play unfold. This is good depth. He’s still accounting for a potential crossing route from right to left so he’s above the receiver, but he’s well enough outside to stop Griffin if the quarterback breaks through the first level to the left flat.

The H-Back works past the end towards the safety, leaving Griffin to beat the defensive end. If the H-Back even gave so much as a shove on the end, perhaps Griffin could have taken the ball outside and still show the speed to get separation. I think the H-Back should have helped here. Even so, based on what I’ve seen thus far I don’t think Griffin wins this foot race to the edge and if he does, the explosion to turn the corner isn’t there. Griffin opts to use his good leg to avoid the defender. He plants this healthy knee into the ground, and spins inside the end to avoid the tackle.

As Griffin spins past the end, the H-Back has a good angle on the safety and it appears the running back is in position to work outside the left tackle Trent Williams to address the linebacker working outside Williams’ position. Once Griffin gets reoriented down hill, there’s enough space in the left flat for a positive gain.

At this point, the blocks should be setting up so Griffin will only have one unblocked man to beat and if it doesn’t happen, he should still pick up enough help from his teammates for a gain of 4-5 yards. The problem is the H-Back, who overruns his angle to the safety.

To compound matters, the H-Back isn’t fast enough to recover as Griffin attempts to bounce this run to the edge. Last year, Griffin had the explosion to drive off that braced knee and get outside No.82 if that H-Back actually gauged the correct angle to seal the safety inside. This year, no chance; there isn’t enough explosiveness to gloss over a poor angle from a teammate.

Play over.

At this point, Griffin is about explosive as Aaron Rodgers. The Packers quarterback is a fine athlete capable of getting outside the pocket when flushed and he’ll gash a defense as a runner, but the Packers don’t design running plays as heavy part of its play-calling rotation. Understandably, Washington built its 2012 playoff team on the legs of Griffin. It’s also understandable why they didn’t change the offense after Griffin’s injury, hoping that the young quarterback would regain his explosion at some point during the season and the team could ride out the rough spots. It may still happen, but long-term is this what’s best for the team?

To be fair, if Washington did change the offense I have doubts the rest of the surrounding talent is capable of sustaining a high level of production for a pocket passer to thrive with the game’s current offensive concepts.

In its current incarnation, Kurt Cousins can’t run this offense close to the way a healthy Griffin can because he doesn’t break good defensive schemes with pure foot speed. Washington would have to change by necessity. However, the staff is clearly still holding out hope for old Griffin to return to form. This is the danger of designing an offense that leans so hard on one specific skill set of an individual player – especially a young passer who is still learning how to maximize his potential from the pocket.

As you will see below, this Washington offense – and really most offenses – is a delicately balanced series of processes that can go south fast when an integral part breaks. If you look closely at Atlanta’s scheme you’ll discover that the root cause of several ailments for the Falcons offense is Roddy White’s injury. He’s the one-on-one player that runs every style of route and possesses the timing with Matt Ryan to force opponents to single cover one of White, Julio Jones, and Tony Gonzalez on every play. He’s the player who makes teams pay in the intermediate range for biting on run fakes. And he’s the receiver who automatically draws the best cover corner even with a healthy Jones around.

When White started the season gimpy, the Falcons could still hit big plays to Julio Jones and Tony Gonzalez but there wasn’t enough consistent production down-to-down and that prevented the team from building momentum with play-calling and maintaining an advantage. Washington’s pivotal player is Griffin because of the offense’s reliance on the zone read and all the play action, max protection, and simple route concepts that they were able to build off it due to a defense’s fear of Griffin’s speed.

Now Griffin doesn’t have that same caliber of speed and the team is in limbo, running plays that don’t match Griffin’s current skill or his intellectual-football potential as a passer.

Max Protection-Minimum Results

Here’s a play that would have worked just fine last year with a healthy Griffin, but defenses aren’t buying because they know the quarterback isn’t capable of selling it. Two games from now if the explosion returns, sure. But what if it’s four games, eight games, or never? Right now the play below is obsolete.

This is a diamond formation with two receivers at slot width from the line of scrimmage. These are the only two receivers running routes on this play against a Broncos defense that will drop six into coverage. Already, this doesn’t sound promising.

Griffin begins his drop and his three backs set a perimeter to assist the offensive line. If I didn’t know better, it would appear the coaches are so worried about Griffin’s knee that they’re adding a second layer of protection behind the offensive line to insure the quarterback earns a clean pocket to throw the deep ball without a hit to his legs. I think the coaches are worried more about the offensive line’s difficulty protecting Griffin while he guts through an ACL rehab in record time.

If Washington is going to max protect, shouldn’t they be expecting a heavy pass rush? Is Griffin not reading the safeties’ position or is he not allowed t0 change the play to something better? This is an ugly play that makes Griffin look like he’s a first-year player lacking the intellectual sophistication to handle a pro offense. Again, I don’t think this is true nor is it the intent of the coaching staff. However this isn’t the only max protect-simplistic route play in this game. It’s just a disturbing blow-back of creating a simple offense predicated more on elite athleticism and less on spreading the field to manipulate an offense.

It may appear degrading to a player like Robert Griffin, a prospect known for his intellect, but name a young, technically proficient, healthy receiver in Washington’s lineup and you’ll come up empty. Garcon is the closest thing to player to fit this description, but his wheels aren’t back, either. If anything, Griffin’s injury is revealing just how valuable one player’s game-changing ability can be.

Last year Griffin’s wheels were an element that forced defenses to overreact to even the simplest measures for fear of getting burned, which allowed a two-receiver passing game to work. This year, the wheels lack tread to corner to the open field that’s available above. The Broncos edge defenders and linebackers are confident that if it maintains its position, Griffin is no longer fast enough to win big as a ball carrier. Let him try to squeeze a deep ball into double coverage.

As you can see, both receivers have two defenders on them as Griffin targets the deepest zone.

At least Griffin errs long so there’s no danger of a turnover.

Another unintended consequence of Washington not changing its system and waiting for Griffin to recover his big-play ability is that the quarterback’s legs can’t hide as many of the offensive line’s weaknesses in pass protection.

This is another 30 personnel pistol set with two receivers split at slot width on either side of the formation. Denver has seen this look enough times in the game that by the fourth quarter, they’re using one deep safety and placing 10 defenders within the short and intermediate zones to handle it.

Griffin executes play action with the back as hit two receivers work down field against a secondary dropping into coverage. The linebackers stay in position to address any routes in shallow zone, but read to green dog if this once again is a max protect scheme. The only wrinkle to his play is Joshua Morgan, No.15, reversing field and working to the right flat as a dump-off. However, this is a slow-developing route and it requires the Washington offensive line to provide Griffin the time to check down.

Griffin finishes his drop, looking down field where the intermediate and deep zone contains two receivers matched against four defenders. Meanwhile, H-Back Logan Paulsen is assigned to an edge defender. With a healthy Griffin, it’s a risky but understandable to commit Paulsen to the edge with a running back to chip, but with this version of Griffin who cannot make the pass rush pay with his legs? Uh-uh.

Fortunately Griffin still has enough athleticism to avert disaster, using a straight-arm to slide past the edge rush. Even so, we know he’s not going to run. Denver knows this too. They have three defenders at the second level waiting for Griffin to break the pocket.

What else do they have to do? There are only two receivers on this play! If they green dog, there’s a chance they open a lane to allow Griffin behind them. It’s safer to stand there with their thumbs up their hind parts, keep the quarterback in front of them, and wait for him to indicate pass and send the closes linebacker towards the pocket after that.

Griffin resets his feet and this is the cue for one of the linebackers to green dog. Niles Paul is open in the right flat and he will have a one-on-one match up with a linebacker by the time he makes the catch. However, he needs Griffin to look Paul’s way to make the check-down. Instead, Griffin is pressing – bombs away.

In this case the receiver gets behind the secondary.

Griffin overshot the ball once again. Disrupt a quarterback from his spot in the pocket and he loses accuracy.

Make The Offense Squirm

Earlier in the game, Denver sent pressure at this max protect scheme – a double-corner blitz – and the Broncos linebackers were disciplined and waited for Griffin to attempt to break the pocket. I think teams see that containing Griffin in the pocket, eliminate easy runs for even a now-moderately athletic runner, and force him to pick a secondary apart with his arm and limited choices is the way to go.

This discipline is even more evident with blitz variation where both corners pressure the pocket, but the corner on the side where the quarterback keeper would go temporarily pauses his blitz until the quarterback finishes the read option phase of the exchange.

Once again, only two Washington receivers release on pass routes. Meanwhile, the defensive tackle also drops. However the depth of this drop indicates to me it’s intent is to keep the pocket intact and force Griffin to throw the ball than to cover a receiver.

The corner off the left side pauses his rush long enough to ensure that Griffin is dropping to pass and not opting to run. His teammates in the middle have nothing to do but play security guard patrol for a quarterback breaking the pocket as a runner.

Now that Griffin shows he’s truly dropping to pass, the cornerback resumes his blitz. Griffin is poised to do the right thing conceptually, which is to throw into the blitz and his receiver is open.

Griffin releases the ball with room to spare, but his pass is high.

The receiver – I believe it’s Garcon – attempts a one-handed grab . . .

And makes the play. After this completion, Denver opted not to blitz, force the receivers to face double coverage, watch Griffin and the offensive line squirm. Even when Washington sent more than two receivers down field, Denver decided they’d make Griffin and his receivers prove they could win by throwing the football on a set play.

No max-protection on this play, but it’s still a conservative passing attack with the field compressed more than what we often seen with NFL offenses.

As Griffin executes the read option fake, the Broncos linebackers remain patient, as does the defensive end on that read side. Also note the Broncos safety No.45. He’s spying Griffin the entire play.

As Griffin drops, the edge rusher works around the tight end, a mismatch for the defense that last year’s version of Griffin arguably uses his legs to make the Broncos pay. However, there’s still the safety spy – an added layer of protection for the defense that perhaps a healthy Griffin would not avoid.

Griffin climbs the pocket, doesn’t see an open receiver among the three running routes against six defenders in coverage – yep, still a 2-to-1 defensive advantage in DBs to WRs – and then is forced to slide to his left. Meanwhile, look No.99 near the left hash where Griffin is about to slide. Do you notice who is assigned to block this defensive linemen?

That’s Alfred Morris. A tight end on a player like Shaun Phillips or Von Miller? A running back on a defensive tackle? Two offensive linemen on the right side blocking air and grass? Not a good look on this play.

Griffin may not have the same explosiveness, but he’s still quick enough to slide from the edge rusher and then dip outside the defensive end. Not fast enough to slalom these big defenders without getting touched, but that’s part of the recovery process, if not the great athleticism of defensive linemen in today’s NFL.

Griffin just escapes a sack as he’s flushed to his left and this is where the spy comes into play.

This is where the play could still go alright if Griffin opts to run and make the most of this one-on-one match up with the safety. However, what he does next is a cardinal sin of quarterbacking and potentially an indication that his walk doesn’t match his talk about his confidence level in his knee.

Griffin pulls up and attempts a throw across the field with a defender bearing down. Yes, this sometimes works but when it does there’s a level of anticipation to place the ball at a spot where the receiver is the only one with a chance to work towards the ball. In this case, Griffin delivers the ball to the receiver in a static spot that forces that receiver to wait on the ball – a dangerous play because now the receiver must stand still and time a leap while the defender as the advantage of attacking the pass.

Also note the spin of the ball. There were a few throws where the ball came out funky because Griffin pressed too much to make a big play due to a scheme that emphasizes the speed that hasn’t returned to him yet and sends minimal receivers into maximum coverage.

The safety jumps the target, tips the ball, and ends the play. Washington is fortunate this play didn’t result in a turnover.

What’s happening with Washington’s offense is to be expected when its scheme’s lynchpin is a rare athlete and that athlete has lost that edge. Based on past history, it should return, but I’m not counting on it this year. This raises a broader set of questions: What will Washington do in the offseason?

Will they begin transitioning Griffin’s development to that of a pocket passer? Griffin was my No.2 quarterback in draft class that at the top was among the 3-4 best crops of rookie passers since 1983. Griffin’s intelligence, toughness, fundamental feel for the pocket, and deep accuracy (when not forced to throw into double coverage) are all reasons why I’ve always thought he could develop into a pocket passer with the mobility/accuracy that approached that of Steve Young and Aaron Rodgers. However, Washington has to upgrade its receiving corps and offensive line.

Will Washington keep its current system and wait for Griffin to regain his elite athleticism? If Washington remains patient and Griffin does return to form, they’ll have the luxury of adding talent but not forced to overhaul its offensive system and continue to rely on Griffin’s legs to put defenses on edge. But what if the Broncos’ method of defending Griffin works even when the quarterback’s explosiveness returns? Will Griffin and the coaching staff make the steps necessary to develop more advanced methods of execution for the passing game? They have the collective smarts and potential, but they need the talent.

I have a lot more to write about this game in Part II of this post, including the punishment Griffin is taking – something he’s always done as a player. But I’ll end this post with this final question: Knowing what we do about Griffin’s toughness and desire to play and the Washington organization making a questionable call about his leg in the playoffs last year, would it have been wiser to shut Griffin for the first 10-12 games of this season?

I don’t have an answer.

See Part II – Watching Grass Grow and Reasons For Hope

For more analysis of skill players like this post, download the 2013 Rookie Scouting Portfolio available April 1. Prepayment is available now. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2013 RSP at no additional charge. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

Why Matt Stafford is a Polarizing Quarterback

October 21, 2013 0 Comments read Players, Quarterback

The Emily Post School of Quarterback Analysts does not approve. Photo by Marianne O'Leary. — The Emily Post School of Quarterback Analysts does not approve. Photo by Marianne O’Leary.

I’m a Matt Stafford fan. If you’re the kind of person who has an anxiety attack if you don’t have your morning coffee in that black mug you bought 12 years ago, then you probably dislike Stafford. If you’re a nitpicking analyst who lacks the perspective to see that numerous small flaws don’t outweigh a significant positive, you probably hate the Lions quarterback. I get it and many of these people are excellent writers with a terrific grasp of the sport.

They still need to stop thinking like the engineers, lawyers, and accountants that they are who write as a sideline.

At least once a week on Twitter, I see a writer slam Stafford for his poor footwork, his unsound throwing form, and his tendency not to follow through with his release in situations where he had a chance. And these Emily Posts of NFL football analysis are accurate with their takes. But are they really seeing the big picture?

They can cite quarterback rating, win-loss record, completion percentage to receivers not named Johnson, and several other points that fit their argument against Stafford ever becoming a top-notch starting quarterback. To be honest, I’m not confident that Stafford will ever take that next step to join the ranks of the very best in the league even if his yardage and touchdown totals might allow fans to make an argument in his favor as his career unfolds.

What is important to mention is that I see a bias among fans and analysts with honorary certificates from the Emily Post Evening School of Quarterback Technique. They’re naturally a paint by numbers crowd. They’ve learned the nuances of the game’s rules, strategies, and techniques, but they’ve failed to maintain an overall perspective beyond the minutiae of these details.

The acceptable model of “good quarterbacking” is still in the spectrum of Matt Ryan. The Falcons quarterback is a paint-by-numbers dream. If prep schools taught quarterbacking the way J. Evans Pritchard’s introduction outlines the proper way to appreciate poetry, Ryan would be within the acceptable range of that formula. Sam Bradford would probably be higher than you think – a player the Emily Post analysts would praise as an under-appreciated passer who has had unfortunate circumstances to begin his career.

However, I think Matt Ryan and Matt Stafford are pretty even as quarterbacks. Most will disagree because they have a bias when it comes to favoring mental acumen and consistency over special physical talent and inventive creativity. I’m among the most guilty of emphasizing the mental-savvy angle over physical talent.

But my message is really about not writing off less physically talented players. At the same time, you shouldn’t write off players who may lack the refined technique and high-end preparation results in the robotic, J. Evans Pritchard style of play. Lots of folks will tell you that they dislike quarterbacks like Brett Favre, Tim Tebow, Jay Cutler, and Ben Roethlisberger for their off-field behavior. However, I think one of the root issues that isn’t discussed is that they are creative players who err on the side of erratic behavior.

It’s easier to accept the fact that a player like Matt Ryan is going to be a conceptual quarter-bot with limited arm strength, mobility, and creativity when the play breaks down (although he has just enough arm and mobility to have a wide range before his athleticism and inventiveness reach their outer limits) than it is to accept an athlete with an off-the-chart arm and inventiveness like Matt Stafford to experience a brain fart. There’s something more acceptable within our society for our opponent to test our physical limitations than to come undone conceptually.

The Emily Post quarterbacks aren’t risk takers. As a result, their mistakes don’t appear as egregious as the likes of Favre, Roethlisberger, Cutler, or Tebow. These passers are more PR-friendly to fans and personnel directors. They’re either hitting the appropriate marks or the defense put them in situations where they could not physically make the play and the blame is spread among the passer’s teammates and coaches. The risk takers are more likely to have extremes that look like genius on a good day and imbecility on a bad day.

Give Stafford Julio Jones, Roddy White, and Tony Gonzalez, and I think he’d be just as productive as Ryan. He’d have more highs and lows, but I think the overall difference would be minimal. However until recently, Stafford has had one quality weapon compared to Ryan’s three. While we’re quick to show Stafford’s flaws, we’re trying to place a round peg in a square hole.

Stafford is capable of things many quarterbacks can’t do, but it also means his style will generate the types of mistakes that frustrate us because we don’t realize that high-end physical genius requires a risk that can cross the line to recklessness. With the exception of Tom Coughlin, most coaches are more patient with running backs in this sense. Aggressive players like Adrian Peterson or Eric Dickerson fumbled dozens of times during the first three years of their careers, but the coaches continued to go to the well with them. Coughlin, doesn’t want to recognize that David Wilson is a special physical talent whose risk of imbecility is worth the reward of game-changing genius.

Here’s a typical Matt Stafford play that I believe treads the line between genius and imbecility, but something you have to encourage if you’re going to commit to a player of Stafford’s rare physical talent. It’s a 3rd-and-six pass from a 1×3 receiver, 10 personnel pistol at the Bengals’ 11 with 3:42 in the first quarter and down by seven.

On this play, Cincinnati drops seven and rushes four. When at defense has the likes of Carlos Dunlap, Michael Johnson, and a sub like Wallace Gilberry do complement the interior like of Geno Atkins and Domata Peko, it’s a great reason why the Bengals are in first place in the AFC North. This is the same rush-four, drop-seven formula that made the Ravens defense dominant for several years. Seattle’s unit is also approaching this realm of excellence.

Stafford takes the snap and looks deep to short on the trips side as his starting point of his read. This is a good move, considering that the presnap photo above shows that the single receiver has a corner playing outside with a safety over top covering the inside. If the single receiver drew man coverage, Stafford would likely look there first.

The main player Stafford is seeking is Johnson deep, but the coverage drop has enough depth that the Lions quarterback has to come off his favorite target. While the other receiver working behind Johnson is breaking open outside, this is not a good choice. The linebacker at the five is in great position to break on the route and the receiver’s break is too shallow to generate a lot of yardage without breaking a tackle. The biggest reason this route isn’t a viable option is Carlos Dunlap generating a push so deep into the pocket that he closes Stafford’s throwing lane outside. If he guns it, the pass will be low enough to deflect. If he lofts it, the linebacker has time to cut it off or break up the receiver’s attempt.

To compound the difficulty of this situation, Michael Johnson has whipped the left tackle off the edge and it’s impossible for Stafford to climb the pocket without working through contact from the defensive end. While Stafford is a big quarterback, climbing the pocket in this situation is a losing proposition for even the most physically sturdy quarterbacks in the league 95 percent of the time – and I’m being generous. Stafford could try to spin outside the pocket , but if he does this, only Brandon Pettigrew (No.87) is working to the left flat on the cross and the tight end’s path leads directly towards the linebacker and cornerback – not good odds for Stafford, who will have to run at least 10 yards just to reach the line of scrimmage if he opts to tuck the ball and try to gain the first down with his legs.

Stafford knows that his only choice is No.18 Durham on the crossing route under the tight end. Durham gets the benefit of Pettigrew crossing the face of the linebacker at the left hash. With an accurate throw, he can hit Durham on the run in the direction of he two receivers running off the coverage on the right side of the field. The depth of Durham’s route is enough to earn the first down. This is all diagnosis that J.W. Pritchard would approve. However, look at the position of Johnson and Dunlap when Stafford reaches his third read.

For most NFL quarterbacks, this is checkmate. Brady, Manning, or Ryan making this play? Forget it. They’re throwing it away for another day. The defense painted them into a corner that they can’t escape. Stafford, Cutler, or Favre back in the day? Different story.

As maddening as Stafford’s Quisenberry throwing motion can be on plays where he has time to use proper form, this play is a work of art. Stafford not only releases the ball before Johnson wraps him, but from an angle that whizzes past Johnson’s ear hole, splits the defensive ends, and leads the receiver low and away so he can shield the oncoming defender to make the play.

Durham makes the grab, turns inside the defender over his back and falls forward to the Cincinnati three for the first down. Three plays later, Stafford hits Pettigrew to tie the game. If you look at the idea methods of throwing the football, field position, down-and-distance, and game situation, the “low-risk” play would have been to throw the ball away or take the sack and kick the field goal. But does it make sense to tell a player not to play to his physical ability because he’s in the top 1 percentile of throwers of a football?

It’s a high-risk play for the average NFL starter, but is it really a high-risk play for a guy like Stafford? Perhaps it still is, but I doubt the Lions drafted Stafford without the realization that he was a creative, risk-taking gunslinger. You make a commitment to a player like Stafford with the willingness to live with the tear-your-hair-out moments. It doesn’t mean you don’t try to limit them, but not at the expense of removing the creativity completely from his game.

Marc Trestman hasn’t killed Jay Cutler’s creativity. By emphasizing the run, focusing on quick reads and short passes, and improving the offensive line, the coach has just limited the situations where Cutler is forced to take as many egregious risks. Even Dan Reeves didn’t completely kill John Elway’s creativity. It may have felt that way to Elway, who had the shackles on him via Sammy Winder’s 3.9 yards-per-carry average for three and a half quarters per game. But if the game script called for it, Reeves unleashed Elway’s special talent.

I don’t know if Matt Stafford will ever become a great quarterback, but his physical skills make him capable of rare moments that the more conventional starters in this league will never have. We just have to realize that the good and the bad we face with a physical marvel (Stafford) is different from that of a technician (Ryan).

For more analysis of skill players like this post, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio available April 1. Prepayment is available now. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2014 RSP at no additional charge. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

Futures at Football Outsiders: Texas A&M QB Johnny Manziel

September 28, 2013 0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Quarterback

Manziel epitomizes the strengths and weaknesses of a creative manager. See below. Photo by Matt Velazquez.

Futures: Texas A&M QB Johnny Manziel

by Matt Waldman

Management Style and Quarterbacking

In last week’s Futures on Georgia quarterback Aaron Murray, I described quarterbacking styles within the context of task-oriented management and creative management. Be it a white-collar, blue-collar, or athletic career, these are two basic ends of the spectrum when talking about management styles.

Task-oriented managers love the routine and rhythm of a predictable, reliable process. As they acquire more experience, a high-functioning, task-oriented manager knows the boundaries of his processes so well that he’ll often appear far more spontaneous to a wide range of problems than he is.

Matt Ryan and Tom Brady are perfect examples of high-functioning, task-oriented quarterbacks. They know every detail of what’s supposed to be happening in their environment and control it so well that they can anticipate most things that defenses will attempt to wreck an offense’s performance. When their teammates are playing efficiently, they appear far more creative than they are because their level of preparation helps them develop processes to avoid the same major issues that confound less experienced passers.

I mentioned Peyton Manning and Drew Brees as task-oriented quarterbacks last week, but I’m having second thoughts. It’s not an exaggeration that Manning is a coach on the field. I’ve talked to a former Colts player who has played with three other teams and he affirms that Manning is unique in this regard. His intelligence and preparation might exceed every other quarterback who has ever played the game.

This gives Manning a much wider box of operation than any quarterback in the game, regardless of style. His creativity comes in the strategic aspects of the game, but it’s rooted in having a fantastic memory and method of preparation. Last year ESPN ran a story about Manning contacting a former staffer with Tennessee to help him find tape of a play that he remembered was successful. Manning implemented it successfully as a red-zone call during the season.

If I had to make a final call, I’d stick with the task-oriented label for Manning. I’m not as certain about Brees.

I wonder if Brees is that rare individual who balances both worlds of task-oriented preparation and creative and intuitive problem solving when it’s time to perform. While the Saints quarterback is obsessive to the point that the smallest details of his workout routines don’t change –- to the point that teammates have to cut short what they’re doing to accommodate their quarterback — I’ve also seen Brees create when form and function go out the window and he does it as well as many of the quarterbacks on the far end of the creative spectrum.

I believe Russell Wilson is also one of those players. His task-oriented skills are strong. When he arrived in Madison, Wisconsin he learned the Badgers system -– a more task-oriented, rhythm based, West Coast offense –- in record time. His preparation was so strong that he not only earned the starting job without contest, he was also voted team captain.

But it was his play in North Carolina State’s offense for three years that impressed me the more than he did at Wisconsin. Wilson had to merge his understanding and execution of the offensive system’s process with his athleticism and creativity. He made off-balanced throws with anticipation and accuracy against blitzes that generally fluster most task-oriented passers. He could buy time, keep his head about him, and create productive results when the plays broke down beyond all sense of recognition.

Read the rest at Football Outsiders

Futures: UGA QB Aaron Murray

September 21, 2013 0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Quarterback

Quarterbacks can be divided into task-oriented managers and creative managers. Find out which one fits best for Aaron Murray. Photo by Wade Rackley.

Futures: UGA QB Aaron Murray

By Matt Waldman

The most glaring example of the difference between a good college player and a good NFL player is at the quarterback position. It’s also the position where draftniks and football evaluators have one of the loosest working definitions for the term “developmental prospect.” I’ve seen this term used to describe players judged as undrafted free agents who would be best served looking for work with the Canadian or Arena League just as often as I’ve seen it as a label for a second or third-round prospect.

But it was only a few years ago that the NFL draft had nearly twice the number of rounds, which explains why a third-round player and an undrafted free agent can have the same label. Considering that NFL scouting is still rooted in mid-20th century practices (I’m not talking about some teams’ uses of iPads and databases to track and store information, but the actual concepts and techniques they use to assess players), it shouldn’t be a surprise.

Georgia’s Aaron Murray is a quarterback I’ve seen projected by my colleagues at CBS as a third-round prospect and top-100 player, but whose game matches my working definition of a developmental player. The Bulldog’s four-year starter exhibits sound fundamentals, base accuracy in the passing game, and enough awareness to lead a winning football team in one of the best conferences in college football.

However, Murray also epitomizes the skills gap between big-time college passers and the pro quarterbacks fighting for remaining rosters spots in the NFL. This week’s Futures profiles Murray’s comfort zone and where his inner demons lurk. If the Georgia quarterback can expand his ability to translate what he’s learning in the classroom to what he does on the field, he could have a career as a capable backup. However, I think the third-round grade is an optimistic assessment.

A good way to explain this is a quick look at Murray’s former competitor for the starting job when they were freshmen: Zach Mettenberger, who played at a local high school no more than 20 minutes from the UGA campus. Mettenberger was the prototypical pocket passer in terms of size and arm strength and I thought he was the better prospect. After he was arrested on alcohol, disorderly conduct, and obstruction of justice charges during spring break of his freshman year, it didn’t matter – he was booted from the team and Murray earned the job.

I haven’t studied Mettenberger in depth since then, but I’m not the least bit shocked that Cam Cameron’s system is bringing out the best in the LSU quarterback and reviving his draft stock. Mettenberger has the physical skills and prototypical size most NFL teams covet and I wouldn’t be surprised if Mettenberger’s classification as a developmental player also earns the accompanying tag of “future starter”.

Murray’s developmental label might warrant starter consideration, but I think the fit is more team-specific for the 6-foot-1, 208-pound quarterback. Russell Wilson, Drew Brees, and Aaron Rodgers’ skills are proof that quarterbacks between 5-foot-10 and 6-foot-2 can succeed as NFL starters, but they are currently exceptions to the rule. I think Murray’s upside is more along the spectrum of Alex Smith and Jeff Garcia as the best-case scenarios with Bruce Gradkowski as a more realistic aspiration: quarterbacks who perform best in the classic version of the West Coast Offense predicated on short passing, rhythm, and movement.

Read the rest at Football Outsiders