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Grinding Tape Part III – NIU RB Chad Spann

0 Comments read Players, Running Back

In Part I of the Grinding Tape Series, Mid American Conference MVP Chad Spann explained the concepts behind plays that require a running back to understand blocking schemes, defensive tendencies, and reading keys.

In Part II, he revealed how quickly a runner needs to be able to process information to choose a hole, ball security protocol, and the importance of minimizing surface area to become a strong, after-contact runner.

This week, Spann discusses the difference in a runner’s pre-snap location in very similar-looking shotgun sets with very different blocking schemes, and what a back is looking at to determine the path of his run.

1st and 10, 10:00 1st QTR

Waldman: You do a nice job bouncing this run outside. You take the play behind your fullback’s lead block and get the left corner for a six-yard gain. Take us through the design and execution of this running play.

Spann: This play is once again our inside zone. The fullback is lining up on the right side, but this is not the way we normally run it. Our fullback is normally going to line up either back side or he’s going to start on the front side and come back to the backside when the ball is snapped. Every time, he’s going to cut this defensive end, which is going to give me a start at a cut back if there is one.

Waldman: This time he motions from the slot to a split position over the tight right tackle and tight end.

Pre snap look of inside zone play.

Waldman: As with the running plays we’ve looked at earlier in the game,  is the A-gap/one-technique DL the primary key for the blocking scheme?

Spann: Yes. On this particular play we’re going to double team again like we always do against that A-Gap player, the one-technique. That A-gap player is going to be double-teamed by the center and guard. Whoever had leverage is going to take over the block by himself and whoever can get free is going to come up and get the MIKE linebacker (No.32). The front side tackle has the defensive end and the tight end is going to take the stand up linebacker, which is the SAM (labeled as the OLB below).

Post snap blocking on inside zone.

Waldman: On this play the one-technique gets occupied rather quickly by the center, which allows the right guard to get into the defensive backfield and get his hands on the MIKE LB (No.32). What is the strategy for the DL lined up over the left guard – the three-technique?

Spann: That  guard and tackle on the backside are going against the three-technique and they double team him to the WILL linebacker (No.42). If the three-technique tries to cross the face of the guard, the backside tackle is going to come up and get No.42 and the fullback is going to come back and cut the defensive end to give me a lane. That’s not how we plan for it to happen, but that’s a possibility.

Waldman: So what is the primary hole for you on this play?

Spann: It is a B-gap play, which means we want it to hit the front side B-gap. We want the center and guard to mash that A-gap player down and have the center take over the block and the guard get up to the MIKE linebacker. And that’s where the hole should be (over right guard). That’s not always where it goes, because one thing that can kill zone plays is penetration and that’s what Toledo is trying to do – get gap penetration – and they did.

Toledo gets good gap penetration over center and right guard, which forces cutback.

Spann:  Their penetration jams up my holes a little bit and forces me to make this cutback, which normally I’ll get in trouble for making this big of a cutback…

Waldman: But you do a nice job of it (laughter). . .

Spann: . . . Yeah, I make a play out of it. And you see me again with the ball in the “wrong” hand, but initially this was supposed to be a front side play and by the time I make my decision with where I’m going to go I already have the ball in my right hand.

Waldman: But as you mentioned (see Part II of this analysis) earlier, you don’t want to change ball hands in traffic. At this point you do a nice job of accelerating past the Will LB (No.42) to get the corner.

Spann beating Will LB (No.42) to the corner on the cutback behind FB's block of DE.

Waldman: The key to this cutback from what I see is that the WILL LB (N0.42) took his initial steps towards the B-gap (right guard), which gave you room to get the corner on your cutback. The MIKE linebacker (No.32) had to free himself from the guard and get through the mesh. By the time he does, you have the corner just past the WILL.

Spann gains six yards after taking the backside corner.

Waldman: You turn the corner and stay inside the numbers to possibly work off the wide receiver’s block. The WILL does manage to run you down with the help of the MIKE and the free safety who delivers a head-on shot that you manage to meet with good pad level to deflect much of the blow.

1st and 10, 5:36 1st QTR

Waldman: This formation is a shotgun set with four receivers and no tight end or fullback. Three receivers are split to the right and a single receiver is wide left.

Zone-read play from shotgun, pre-snap.

Spann: In contrast to the last shotgun play where I was closer to the quarterback’s feet, this one is the zone-read play where I’m going to back up a little more.

Waldman: Why the difference with your pre-snap positioning in the formation?

Spann: It’s because this play doesn’t only to hit front side. It could hit backside. It could hit right up the middle.

So I’ve got be deep enough to read where this hole is going to be because we are doing true double teams unlike the last shotgun play, which was a full zone. I need a little more space to make these reads because my track  is going to be more downhill than it is going to be east and west.

The depth between me and the quarterback and my path is the huge difference between the last play and what I was trying to get across with the last shotgun play.  You’re going to see me come closer and downhill than going straight through the mesh.

Waldman: Before the snap, the outside receiver on the right motions to the hash to create a more conventional bunch look and this brings the strong safety into the box next to the MIKE linebacker. Tell us about the blocking scheme and of course, that A-gap defensive tackle who is almost directly over the center.

Zone-read blocking from shotgun set.

Spann: On this play we have the A-gap player front side, which means once again we’re going to double team him to the play side linebacker (the WILL). The tackle is going to be one-on-one with the defensive end back side because it is a zone read. Because the A-Gap player stays right where he’s at and he doesn’t try to shoot outside the guard, the guard is able to get up to the linebacker instead of the center doing it, which means the hole is going to be where the guard was.

Spann getting the ball and bouncing to left end.

Waldman: This play doesn’t windup going off the guard. You actually bounce this outside. I’ve always been curious what specifically a running back is viewing to determine the direction he takes on a run. Are you looking at the defense, your linemen, open space?

Spann: I’m not looking at the defensive linemen and where they are going. I’m looking at the helmet placements of my offensive linemen. That is what tells you which way to go. If your offensive lineman has his helmet on the right shoulder of the defensive lineman then your cut is going to be inside and to the right of that offensive lineman. Now if it’s to the left then you’re going to go inside because wherever his helmet is the opposite direction he’s trying to push him.

Waldman: To make sure I get it,  you’re following the helmets and wherever the helmet is. If the helmet is inside, you’re going inside. If the helmet is outside then you’re going outside.

Spann: Yep. On this play because of the helmets and the fact the  guard gets off clean to the linebacker, the play is supposed to be inside the guard.

Now that defensive end beats our tackle inside and that isn’t supposed to happen.  But because I have that extra depth in my initial stance I can read that and I see that happen as I try to hit that hole where the defensive end comes out.

I see it, I react to it, and I know I can get outside of it. So that’s my reading and reacting and I get around the corner for a seven-yard gain (see below).

Next week, we’ll discuss the art of the stiff arm, the pain of hip pointers, and the craft of pass protection.

Grinding Tape: NIU RB Chad Spann Part II

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In Part I of the Grinding Tape Series, Mid American Conference MVP Chad Spann explained the concepts behind plays that require a running back to understand blocking schemes, defensive tendencies, and reading keys. This week, he reveals how quickly a runner needs to be able to process information to choose a hole, ball security protocol, and the importance of minimizing surface area to become a strong, after-contact runner.

2nd and 7 12:43 1st Quarter

Waldman: Describe the next play for us.

Spann: This is “11” personnel [1 back and 1 tight end]. We’ve got two receivers out to the left, we have a tight end to the left, and we’ve got another receiver on the bottom. We’re in the Pistol.

Basically this is our Power. We generally run Power out of our 21 personnel.

However, our slot receivers have beaten a lot of guys deep and we’ve decided as an adjustment to line up with three receivers, hopefully pulling the linebacker out of the box with that third receiver and still run a power.

Now the guy that is being pulled out of the box is the SAM linebacker and [if we were running the play from 21 personnel rather than 11 personnel] he would be the fullback’s guy.

Since the fullback’s not in we’re hoping that the SAM has the slot receiver in man coverage so we can use our same blocking scheme up front to take on the two linebackers that are still in the box.

Power play from "11 personnel"

Waldman: So what actually happens here?

Spann: On this particular play the safety gets down into the box and we don’t have anyone to block him. Our guy who usually goes to block the safety is that slot receiver, but now he’s man-up on the linebacker (Above).

Post Snap

Blocking Scheme for 11 Personnel Power
Waldman: At the snap, the slot receiver veers to the left as if he’s running a swing screen behind the outside receiver and the linebacker initially follows him. But that leaves the safety…

Spann: …who sets the edge (below) and the linebacker cuts the pulling guard, which jumbles up the whole play.

Safety setting the edge and linebacker cutting pulling guard at line of scrimmage.

Waldman: Otherwise, the tight end and left tackle do a nice job of sealing the defensive end inside and you were decisive. You didn’t try to bounce the play outside; you lowered your pads into the crease and drove forward for a yard rather than risk a loss.

How tempting is it for a running back to want to bounce a run outside? You have to have a good feeling here that you’re not going to get much taking it through a small crease that’s well defended. But if you just could beat that one guy to the edge it’s a big gain. I see college runners try to do this all the time and when they get to the pros they struggle.

Finishing downhill.

Spann: One thing we’re always taught as runners is that the easiest way to be brought down is by running sideways (east west). That’s the easiest tackle for a defender. You won’t see me, or any running back on this team, running east west a lot and making cutbacks that way because we know we would be making things a lot easier for a defender to tackle us. And there’s always a chance somebody misses a tackle when you’re heading north south and because you’re heading downhill you’re in good shape to make a positive play.

3rd and 6, 12:06 1st Quarter

Waldman: You gain 12 yards on this play on a very decisive run, bouncing it to left end from a three-receiver set.

Spann: This is our zone read play. I essentially have the same rules on this play as I would for our inside zone play. I’m going to take my steps while looking at the A-gap player who is going to be double-teamed back to the MIKE linebacker [by the right guard and right tackle]. As I’m getting the handoff and running through the play I’m watching where the A-gap player goes. That player is going to set the hole for me.

What kills zone plays is penetration and that’s what they get on this play. I have a hole when the A-gap player goes to the right; it is between the center and the tackle blocking down.

Intended hole with double team of A-gap defender on front side.

Spann: We’re going to work a lot of double teams on this. We’re running to the left and [as I mentioned above ] the center and guard on the front side are going to double team the A-gap player – the one-technique player –to the linebacker (No. 45).

Now the backside guard and tackle are going to double team that three-technique up to the other linebacker (No.32) who is in the box (below).

Both double teams of one-technique (left side) and three-technique (right side).

Spann: So the play side tackle (the left tackle) is going to block the defensive end. The tight end on the backside is going to go to the next linebacker (who is outside the box and listed as “OLB” to the right of the TE). The tight end is going to seal the linebacker off.

The holes that I usually see are off of that center-guard double team (above). If the one-technique tries to go outside the guard then the center is going to come off the block and get to the linebacker. If the one-technique goes the other way or stays where he is then usually the guard will come off the block and get to the linebacker.

Waldman: In essence, you’re explaining the blocks that should open lanes for you to get to the second level if they are successful. With the zone-read play, there is a key player, correct?

Spann: We’re reading the backside tackle on this play. The quarterback is reading to see if the backside tackle comes straight up the field. If so, he’s giving me the ball. If the backside tackle is keying me then the quarterback is going to keep it.

Waldman: Let’s now see how the play actually develops after the snap and not just in theory.

Zone-read post-snap movement.

Waldman: There are a lot of  things happening here on the line. Let’s start with the one-technique/A-gap player you’re watching.

Spann: In this case the one-technique tries to go across the guard’s face because the line is executing a stunt [the left defensive end is looping inside of the one-technique/A-gap defensive tackle].

It wasn’t that [well executed because] where they stunted with the defensive end, it opened up the left side of the line.

When the defensive end came around the offensive line stayed on the same course. The stunt caused the left tackle to pick up the linebacker (No.45). And where the play was designed for the center to take No.45, now he’s picking up the defensive end.

Waldman: When I first watched the play it appeared as if it was originally designed for you to run off left tackle. So its pretty eye-opening to see that the play design was an inside run. When did you know you were taking this play outside?

Spann: When I see our left tackle take the linebacker (N0.45) and our backside (right) tackle getting pushed back into the hole due to penetration, which kills all zone plays.

The LDE stunts inside the one-technique and the LT takes LB (No.45).

Waldman: So you take the run further outside…

Spann: I take it a little bit further to one more hole. When I do,  the tackle knows where I’m at and I cut inside of him as he pushes the linebacker outside.

Waldman: And this is where you press the hole. Can you explain that concept?

Spann:  I set the block up by sticking my foot into the ground outside of the tackle to make that linebacker come up and put the tackle in a better position to make this block as I cut inside of him. As I do that it makes the hole bigger.

Pressing the hole created by the left tackle.

Waldman: When you spot your left tackle coming outside to seal the edge you take it to that one hole over and  make a decisive cut inside the tackle.  That press and cut also ruins the corner’s angle on you. You then  burst through the hole and up the line of scrimmage for a 12-yard gain.

End of run.

Waldman: Let’s talk a little bit about ball security. I always hear that the basic rule is to carry the ball under the outside arm. On this play you run the ball up the left hash and have the ball under your right arm for most of the play.  Can you clarify the protocol for ball security on a play like this one?

Spann: You always want the ball in your outside hand but as you look at this play, you’re going to naturally have the ball in your inside hand because you are coming across the quarterback during the exchange. If you want to have a proper hand off on this play, it’s going to end up in your right arm.

Now if I hit this play normally where I would have hit it, I would hit right inside the backside (right) tackle. This would have kept me on the right side of the play and I would have the ball in my right hand.

But because the defender got penetration and I had to bounce the play out to the next hole.  I had already made the decision to keep it in my right hand and I hadn’t changed hands yet because I don’t know exactly where I’m going and I’m still in a crowd of people.

You’ll never want to change hands in a crowd of people, but if you watch at the very last second before I get tackled, I’m switching hands and trying to use my inside hand to stiff arm this guy but I couldn’t get it off in time. My first available time to switch the ball was when I cleared that tackle’s block and that’s when the defender came up.

3rd and 1 10:24 1st Quarter

Waldman: This formation looks a lot like the zone-read we just watched.

Spann:It looks a lot like the play we looked at a second ago – a zone-read – but it’s a completely different play. This play is 11 personnel with two receivers to the right side and another receiver to the left and I’m in the shotgun to the right.

The subtle difference is that if you look at my stance in this play (below) and you look at it on the other play, I’m a lot tighter to the quarterback on this play. I was a yard deeper than the quarterback who was five yards deep on the last play. On this play, I’m right on his toes. I also lined up in the B-gap on the previous play, but now I’m over the tackle.

Pre-snap of what appears to be a zone-read, but is a full zone with line slanting left.

Spann: The reason why we do this is because the last play was like an inside zone play where we use double teams to get up to the linebackers. This play is a full zone and while I’m going to read it the exact same way as the other play, the blocking up front is going to be different. Everyone is going to be moving on their path to the left and get up to the second level.

Line slants zone left, LDE stunts inside and one-technique (RDT) loops behind RDE outside.

Waldman: Once again, we see the defensive end on the play side (left) stunt to the inside. You head to the left, dip outside of No.32 in the hole and pick up the first down. After what you explained to me with the last play, I’m left wondering if this was the intended direction of the play or another read and react situation.

Spann: There really is no place where this is supposed to hit. It hits outside a lot if that three-technique  to the play side (the LDT) comes downhill. If everyone on the defensive line is fanning to the left it’s going to cut back and be more of a downhill play. So there’s many places where this play can hit unlike the last one and I’m just supposed to find a hole and get into it.

Waldman: So what do you remember thinking or reacting to on this play?

Hole opening as Spann enters the mesh.

Spann: So you see me coming through the mesh. It’s not a read any more; the quarterback is going to give it me and I’m looking the whole time where I’m going, which was actually the same for the last zone read play.

But as soon as that hole presents itself I have to get through it as fast as I can. It’s third and one and we have to get the first down so I’m not trying to pick up a whole lot of yards. I see this hole where I can get one yard and I’m going to get it right now – that’s my mindset on this play.

That’s how we approach this play. We started running this play against Western Michigan this year and we actually ran it a lot my sophomore year, but we got away from it. It hits well. It hits play side a lot more than the [zone-read] play might. The zone read play might hit backside more where the quarterback keeps it.

Waldman: It’s interesting to see that when you get close to the first down marker on this play you make a move away from No.32 who jumps into your path. One thing I often see good short yardage runners do is when they are about to face contact head-on they are able to turn away or get sideways and pull that player down hill – almost backing their way down field. Is that more of an instinctive move or is it something you’ve watched other backs do?

Spann in the hole and dipping away from two linebackers for extra yardage.
Spann dips away from LB No.32 and gets skinny to turn away from OLB to get extra yardage.

Spann: It is kind of instinctive, but it is also something that can be worked on as well. We’ll go through bag drills before practice starts and we’ll run over the bags forward with our coach standing at the goal line and he’ll be a yard between the goal line and the boundary and we have to duck our shoulder to get into the end zone.

One thing that they stress is to take your numbers away from the defender so they can’t hit me square. So being able to keep them from hitting me square gives me an advantage.

Think about when a linebacker blitzes and a running back has to pick him up. A linebacker is going to lower his shoulder where the running back has to stay square to take it on. It’s exactly like that.

But this time the linebacker is going to try to tackle me square and I’m going to lower my shoulder so I have the advantage because he has less [surface] area to hit so I can run through it or I can deflect it or drag him forward because my momentum is going one direction at a sharper angle than his.

Waldman: When I watch runners who are good “after-contact” ball carriers, it seems like they are trying to give a defender as little surface area as possible to tackle.

And when they attack a defender, they do so with the idea of forcing the defender to grab one point with a lot of force behind it. When a back is moving like this,  it must be like trying to tackle the front of a spear or a club for the defender. It’s harder to tackle one point than several points of contact.

Spann: Exactly. When I can lower my shoulder and put it into your chest, I’m going to hit you first. As I mentioned in the Q&A we did, you either hit or be hit.

So when I turn my shoulders and dip my shoulder into somebody, I plan on hitting him first. He’s not going to be able to react fast enough because he’s thinking he’s about to lay out and hit me.

But while he’s laying out, I’ve already decided that I’m going to hit him while he’s suspended in the air. It becomes hard from them to react after that and still remember to wrap up because I made contact with them before they were ready.

Waldman: In addition to the pad level,  it’s also the hips that factor into getting your pads under a defender’s pads. A player I saw do this for years and years and loved watching was Edgerrin James. It seemed he always got lower than the guy he was taking on. You thought he was going to get taken down or stopped at the point of a collision, but he’d always find a way to get another yard, two, or three yards on the play.

Spann: Absolutely. I’m from Indianapolis, and I grew up watching Edgerrin James. I love Edgerrin James. He’s one of the backs that I grew to admire. I even wore No.32 for a year during my career.

He’s one of the guys that I emulated as well as Emmitt Smith. I watched a lot of Emmitt Smith and he used his off-arm very well. It’s weird because he carried the ball religiously in his left hand, but he was still able to use that right hand so well. It was those little things that I picked up on.

In the third part of this Grinding Tape Series with Chad Spann, we’ll learn what a runner is watching to determine his path between the tackles and the differences with a runners pre snap location in zone and zone-read shotgun plays.

Evaluating the Evaluator

0 Comments read Matt Waldman

With its vast knowledge of strategy and technique and a wealth of  financial resources at their disposal, NFL organizations not only have the potential to discover if that linebacker prospect fits their scheme, but they can also find out what he did with that blue pencil sharpener in Mrs. Beam’s second grade social studies class. So why do they still have a huge opportunity to improve as evaluators of talent? The answer is in the process.

During his 2011 NFL Draft Confidential special that aired on ESPN,  Bill Parcells describes football as a “talent-acquisition” industry.  And during the show’s next 90 minutes, Parcells provides great insights into the scouting process, how it generates a draft board, and its economic impact on the game.

But what got my attention as a former operations manager and director of a service sector business is the issues that NFL teams face to do consistent, accurate, and quality work.

One of the things I took away from the show is that the NFL has a lot in common with other businesses – especially those in the service and manufacturing sectors.

As with other industries, the word tenure isn’t a common way to describe jobs in the NFL. General managers, coaches, and personnel feel tremendous pressure to win now, which can lead to a results-driven mentality.

This is perfectly natural. However during those long hours of work in an urgent quest to attain these results, it’s difficult for an organization to feel the same urgency to scrutinize its processes that are in use to reach its goals.

The Inexact Science of Evaluation

During the ESPN special, Parcells repeatedly described talent evaluation as an “inexact science.” Once again, this is no different than the service and manufacturing industries where statistics are essential to measure productivity.

But what makes talent evaluation an inexact science is the fact that statistics cannot provide a full or accurate measure of an individual’s performance. Nor can statistics alone gauge talent or project future performance.

Because measuring and projecting individual performance deals with both objective and subjective criteria, it is vitally important that there is a strong methodology in place to ensure that evaluators are consistent with their approach to the work. Many service and manufacturing businesses have figured this out by embracing an approach that I call “quality-driven processes.”

These processes not only generate results that are more accurate and productive, but the structure of the process itself also helps these businesses get better at what they do with each passing year while saving money.

Don’t Blame The Evaluators, Focus on The Process

Based on the processes Parcells explained in this show, as well as conversations I have had with former scouts, I believe that as knowledgeable as teams are about the game, they lack of a high-quality, well-defined evaluation process. The current process isn’t designed to help them continuously improve and I think it is a reason why NFL teams frequently contribute to their own scouting mistakes.

Exhibit one is the NFL’s grading system. Most teams use a grading system that inherently create a high level of variability. And when individual evaluators have a different understanding of how a system is supposed to work because the system isn’t well-defined, differences of opinion among evaluators can be avoided.

Here is the basic system that most NFL teams use. There will be differences in the range of numbers, but this is essentially it.

Typical NFL Prospect Grading Scale

  • 9.00 –  A player for the ages (Jim Brown).
  • 8.00-8.99 – A perennial All-Pro.
  • 7.50 – 7.99 – Future All-Pro.
  • 7.00-7.49 – Pro-Bowl-caliber potential.
  • 6.50-6.99 – First-round-caliber player with Pro Bowl potential.  
  • 6.00-6.49 – Potential to become a quality NFL starter.
  •  5.50-5.99 – Potential starter and likely first-day pick.
  • 5.10-5.49 – Potential to make an NFL roster and contribute.
  • 5.01-5.09 – Has a better than 50/50 chance to make a roster.
  • 5.00 – Has an even chance to make a roster.
  • 4.75–4.99 – Training camp player.
  • 4.50-4.74 – Potential invitee to an NFL training camp.
  • 4.00-4.49 – Needs developmental time in another league.

On the surface this might seem like a very clear scoring system, but it’s not clear at all.

After talking with former scouts with recent stints in the NFL within the past 10 years, all of them explained to me that the score is a “hard grade.” This means the scout watches the player, writes some notes, and then assigns an overall grade according to these type of general definitions.

The potential problem is that it appears that none of these grades explicitly define what NFL scouts should be considering when evaluating a player:

  • Athletic skills (speed, flexibility, strength, agility, etc.)
  • Position-specific techniques (pad level, routes, blocking, etc.)
  • Conceptual knowledge of the game (vision, pocket presence, etc.)

You might argue, of course scouts understand what to look for when evaluating a player – that’s their job!

However, look at any industry that hasn’t really examined its processes and there are frequent errors that occur among employees with regards to how they define the criteria they use to evaluate performance. This is especially the case in the NFL.

According to ex-scouts there is an unwritten truism called the 25/25 Rule, which describes the tendency for NFL organizations to fire veteran scouts and replace them with new scouts in their mid-twenties (25) at an annual salary of 25K. This practice often occurs when teams change leadership. It also keeps scout salaries low – a nice side benefit.

However, the 25/25 Rule also creates an environment where scouts are more reticent to stand up for their takes on players. Working for the NFL is a dream job for many and job security is already a tenuous thing.

Training for scouts also appears to be lacking with some teams. One former scout for a team in the AFC North explained to me that his team never had a defined training for the position. New scouts were put to work and given the option to attend position meetings at the team complex when not engaged in 90-hour work weeks.

He explained that the skills portion of his job interview was to watch film and write notes about what he saw, but he never knew exactly what he specifically did that separated him from the other candidates for the job. Obviously, he was doing something right, but imagine what kind of things he was doing wrong that were tacitly reinforced because he didn’t get any formalized training.

The dynamic this creates within a team’s scouting department is similar to any business where there is a group of individuals made up of  different ages, different levels of job experience, and different levels of knowledge about the job.

Think I’m wrong? Next time you’re at work, gather a group of your peers and ask them all to define in writing how a simple task: how the receptionist should answer the telephone.

Then pretend you’re the receptionist answering the phone while they grade your performance using this 1-5 scale:

  1. Poor
  2. Fair
  3. Meets Expectations
  4. Good
  5. Excellent

Unless your company has very clear guidelines for every process, you’ll not only find that each of your peers has a different answer how the receptionist should answer the phone, but they also will have a very different idea of how well/poorly the job was done. To compound the problem, ask them after the fact how they define each of these grades and you’ll likely get a different answer from each person.

The problem this example underscores is that a lack of clearly defined criteria increases variation among those assigned to judge performance.

Where one scout might define a player’s performance as Good, another may define it as Meets Expectations. The difference between these two scores in the NFL might be the difference between a player projected to become a starter and one projected only to make a roster.

Undefined Processes + Process Variation = Poor Results

Former 49ers, Rams, and Cardinals scout Dave Razzano’s account [as told to Yahoo! writer Michael Silver] of a much-publicized run-in with Rams GM Charlie Armey over his scouting report of Utah QB Alex Smith is a glaring example.

Razzano’s refusal to fall in line with the widespread belief that Smith was a big-time quarterback prospect led to a heated confrontation with Armey in a meeting at Rams headquarters a couple of weeks before the ’05 draft. Razzano’s report on the former Utah quarterback opined that Smith was “not as good as our backup, Jeff Smoker. Backup only for the Rams.”

Armey, who declined to discuss the incident after it was initially reported by Santa Rosa Press Democrat’s Matt Maiocco, solicited the input of other scouts and coaches who’d studied far less tape (if any) of Smith, who ended up being picked No. 1 overall by the 49ers.

“There were 12 guys around the table, and Charley had them rate him on every attribute – arm strength; accuracy short; accuracy long; judgment; game management; ad-lib ability under pressure. And he put a highlight tape on the projector. I mean, obviously, he’s gonna be 30 out of 30, and every throw’s a great pass … it’s a highlight tape!

“He said, ‘Are you gonna sit there and be stubborn? Why can’t you see what we see?’ I got heated. I said, ‘I’ve watched seven tapes, and I’m not changing my grade.’ He told one of our assistants, ‘Go get all seven tapes.’ I started screaming, ‘You’re gonna look at highlight tapes? That’s how Akili Smith got drafted!’ [Scout] Tom Marino had me in a bear hug. I just lost my mind.”

Not only did they differ on how to score the player’s overall performance, but also what type of criteria (highlights of preselected plays or actual game conditions) to use to arrive at that grade.

Another former scout of an AFC East team said he saw his peers paraphrase material from print and Internet publications to complete his scouting reports.

These examples aren’t meant to cast NFL teams in a bad light. These are common issues in any industry where its processes aren’t given the scrutiny they deserve.  These are symptoms of poor processes management and poor processes create variation that can have a negative impact on the team on the field as well as economically.

Overestimate a player’s skill level and a team could wind up overpaying a player who cannot start for them. Underestimate a player’s skill level and a team can miss on the opportunity to acquire him.

This is the kind of variation that can be corrected with a good process, which:

  1. Defines specifically in writing what the team values in players.
  2. Defines which settings scouts can use to grade players.
  3. Clearly defines a grading system.
  4. Uses a system that incorporates all skills and techniques that a team wants to see from its prospects into the grading system.
  5. Prioritizes the importance of those skills and techniques with a weighted score the contributes to the overall evaluation.
  6. Scores players as only meeting or not meeting expectations of those scoring criteria rather than using a highly subjective number system.

No evaluation process is perfect, but I believe NFL teams will see great improvement to its talent evaluation process – and bottom line – once it decides to explore best practices in process management.

Doing so will help them create an evaluation process that will help their scouts and management stay on the same page and prevent issues that they have control over. In addition, when they do have a vast difference in opinion the process should be structured so it will help address the larger problem and continuously refine what they are doing as the game evolves.

The Rookie Scouting Portfolio already does this because it adopts and customizes best-practice methodologies for its performance monitoring that Fortune 500 companies use in the service and manufacturing sectors. I believe if an NFL team, and its wealth of resources and vast knowledge about the game, applied similar best practices in process management they would produce an incredibly strong scouting department that could give them a huge edge over their competition and ultimately save their team money.

Although I came to the Rookie Scouting Portfolio lacking NFL-caliber knowledge or football experience, I possessed the knowledge to build a process that would help me use others’ knowledge of the game to successfully evaluate the skills of NFL prospects. Moreover, my process continues to help me refine my knowledge and end product.

I don’t think it will be long before teams explore this avenue to improve their scouting process. The Saints recently purchased a system to refine their tracking and management of data. This is a step in the right direction. However, the same could be said about the use of video tape to record games for scouting.

What NFL teams need to consider is that a system only works well if you have a strong process to incorporate that system to fulfill an overall objective.

Otherwise, it’s just expensive technology.