Posts tagged Rookie Scouting Portfolio

WR Size: Is It Valid Analysis? By Chase Stuart and Matt Waldman

0 Comments read Players, Wide Receiver
Photo by Dr. Clifford Choi.
If correlation were causation, this photo and others like it wouldn’t exist. Photo by Dr. Clifford Choi.

Chase Stuart of Football Perspective drops by to collaborate on the topic of wide receiver size and the limits of applying analytics to the subject.

Matt Waldman: Stats Ministers and Their Church

I’m a fan of applying analytics to football. Those who do it best possess rigorous statistical training or are disciplined about maintaining limits with its application. Brian Burke wrote that at its core, football analytics is no different than the classic scientific method. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are some bad scientists out there, who behave more like religious zealots than statisticians. I call them Stats Ministers. They claim objectivity when their methodology and fervor is anything but.

Stats Ministers scoff at the notion that anyone would see value in a wide receiver under a specific height and weight. They love to share how an overwhelming number of receivers above that specific height and weight mark make up the highest production tiers at the history of the position, but that narrow observation doesn’t prove the broader point that among top-tier prospects, taller wide receivers fare better than shorter ones. In fact, what the Stats Ministers ignore is that a disproportionately high number of the biggest busts were above a certain height and weight, too. Having a microphone does not mean one conducted thoughtful analysis: it could also mean one has a bully pulpit where a person with less knowledge and perspective of the subject will look at the correlation and come to the conclusion that it must be so.

However, correlation isn’t causation. Questioning why anyone would like a smaller wide receiver based on larger number of top wide receivers having size is an example of pointing to faulty ‘data backed’ points. Pointing to historical data can only get you so far: it’s not that different than the reasoning that led to Warren Moon going undrafted. That’s an extreme comparison, of course, but the structure of the argument is the same: there were very few black quarterbacks who had experienced any sort of success in the NFL, so why would Moon? Sometimes you have to shift eras to see in a clear light what “correlation isn’t causation” really looks like.

It was overwhelmingly obvious that Moon could play quarterback if you watched him. But if you’re prejudiced by past history rather than open to learning what to study on the field, then it isn’t overwhelmingly obvious. Data can help define the boundaries of risk, but when those wielding the data want to eliminate the search for the exceptional they’ve gone too far. Even as we see players get taller, stronger, and faster, wide receivers under 6’2″, 210 pounds aren’t the exception.

Analytics-minded individuals employed by NFL teams — who have backgrounds in statistics – don’t follow this line of thoughts. Those with whom I spoke acknowledged that there is an effective player archetype of the small, quick receiver. They recognize the large number of size of shorter/smaller receivers who have been impact players in the NFL that make the size argument moot: Isaac Bruce, Derrick Mason, Wes Welker, Marvin Harrison, DeSean Jackson, Torry Holt, Steve Smith, Jerry Rice, Tim Brown, Antonio Brown, Pierre Garcon, Victor Cruz, and Reggie Wayne are just a small sample of players who did not match this 6-2, 210-pound requirement.

This size/weight notion and discussion of “calibration” or what I think they actually mean–reverse regression–is also a classic statistical case of overfitting. There are too many variables and complexities to the game and the position to throw up two data points like height and weight and derive a predictive model on quality talent among receivers. The only fact about big/tall receivers is that they tend to have a large catch radius. Otherwise, there is no factual basis to assume that these players have more talent and skill.

The dangerous thing about this type of thinking is that many of these “Stats Ministers” were trained using perfect data sets in the classroom and their math is reliant on “high fit” equations. When they tackle a real world environment like football they still expect these lessons to help them when it won’t. However, there are plenty of people who are reading and buying into what they’re selling. I showed my argument above to Chase Stuart and asked him to share his thoughts. Here’s his analysis:

Chase Stuart: Analysis of the Big vs. Small WR Question

We should begin by first getting a sense of the distribution of height among wide receivers in the draft. The graph below shows the number of wide receivers selected in the first two rounds of each draft from 1970 to 2013 at each height (in inches):

 

wr draft ht

The distribution is somewhat like a bell curve, with the peak height being 6’1″, and the curve being slightly skewed thereafter towards shorter players (more 6’0 receivers than 6’2″, more 5’11″ receivers than 6’3″, and so on).

Now, let’s look at the number of WRs who have made three Pro Bowls since 1970:

wr pro bowl ht

The most common height for a wide receiver who has made three Pro Bowls since the AFL-NFL merger is 72 inches. And while Harold Jackson is the only wide receiver right at 5’10 to make the list, players at 71 and 69 inches are pretty well represented, too. I suppose it’s easy to forget smaller receivers, so here’s the list of wide receivers 6′0 or shorter with 3 pro bowls:

 

Mel Gray
Mark Duper
Mark Clayton
Gary Clark
Steve Smith
Wes Welker
Harold Jackson
Charlie Joiner
Cliff Branch
Lynn Swann
Steve Largent
Stanley Morgan
Henry Ellard
Anthony Carter
Anthony Miller
Paul Warfield
Drew Pearson
Wes Chandler
Irving Fryar
Tim Brown
Sterling Sharpe
Isaac Bruce
Rod Smith
Marvin Harrison
Hines Ward
Donald Driver
Torry Holt
Reggie Wayne
DeSean Jackson

Recent history

Now, let’s turn to players drafted since 2000. This next graph shows how many wide receivers were selected in the first two rounds of drafts from ’00 to ’13, based on height:

wr draft 2000 2013 ht

As you can see, the draft is skewing towards taller wide receivers in recent years. Part of that is because nearly all positions are getting bigger and taller (and faster), but the real question concerns whether this trend is overvaluing tall wide receivers.

It’s too early to grade receivers from the 2012 or 2013 classes, so let’s look at all receivers drafted in the first round between 2000 and 2011. There were 21 receivers drafted who were 6’3 or taller, compared to just 14 receivers drafted who stood six feet tall or shorter. On average, these taller receivers were drafted with the 13th pick in the draft, while the set of short receivers were selected, on average, with the 21st pick.

So we would expect the taller receivers to be better players, since they were drafted eight spots higher. But that wasn’t really the case. Both sets of players produced nearly identical receiving yards averages:

Type Rookie Year 2 Year 2
Short 535 669 709
Tall 567 676 720

Taller wide receivers have fared ever so slightly better than shorter receivers. But once you factor in draft position, that edge disappears. If you look at the ten highest drafted “short” receivers, they still were drafted later (on average, 17th overall) than the average “tall” receiver. But their three-year receiving yards line is better, reading 563-694-790. In other words, I don’t see evidence to indicate that shorter receivers, once taking draft position into account, are worse than taller receivers. If anything, the evidence points the other way, suggesting that talent evaluators are more comfortable “reaching” for a taller player who isn’t quite as good. Players like Santana Moss, Lee Evans, Percy Harvin, and Jeremy Maclin were very productive shorter picks; for some reason, it’s easy for some folks to forget the success of those shorter receivers, and also forget the failures of taller players like Charles Rogers, Mike Williams, Jonathan Baldwin, Sylvester Morris, David Terrell, Michael Jenkins, Reggie Williams, and Matt Jones.

But that’s just one way of answering the question. What I did next was run a regression using draft value using the values from my Draft Value Chart and height to predict success. If the draft was truly efficient — i.e., if height was properly being incorporated into a player’s draft position–then adding height to the regression would be useless. But if height was being improperly valued by NFL decision makers, the regression would tell us that, too.

To measure success, I used True Receiving Yards by players in their first five seasons.  I jointly developed True Receiving Yards with Neil Paine (now of 538 fame), and you can read the background about it here and here.

The basic explanation is that TRY adjusts receiver numbers for era and combines receptions, receiving yards, and receiving touchdowns into one number, and adjusts for the volume of each team’s passing attack.  The end result is one number that looks like receiving yards: Antonio Brown, AJ Green, Josh Gordon, Calvin Johnson, Anquan Boldin, and Demaryius Thomas all had between 1100 and 1200 TRY last year.

First, I had to isolate a sample of receivers to analyze.  I decided to take 20 years of NFL drafts, looking at all players drafted between 1990 and 2009 who played in an NFL game, and their number of TRYs in their first five seasons. (Note: As will become clear at the end of this post, I have little reason to think this is an issue.  But technically, I should note that I am only looking at drafted wide receivers who actually played in an NFL game.  So if, for example, height is disproportionately linked to players who are drafted but fail to make it to an NFL game, that would be important to know but would be ignored in this analysis.)

To give you a sense of what type of players TRY likes, here are the top 10 leaders (in order) in True Receiving Yards accumulated during their first five seasons among players drafted between 1990 and 2009:

  • Randy Moss
  • Torry Holt
  • Marvin Harrison
  • Larry Fitzgerald
  • Chad Johnson
  • Calvin Johnson
  • Keyshawn Johnson
  • Anquan Boldin
  • Herman Moore
  • Andre Johnson

First, I ran a regression using Draft Pick Value as my sole input and True Receiving Yards as my output.  The best-fit formula was:

TRY through five years = 348 + 131.3 * Draft Pick Value

That doesn’t mean much in the abstract, so let’s use an example.  Keyshawn Johnson was the first pick in the draft, which gives him a draft value of 34.6. This formula projected Johnson to have 4,890 TRY through five years.  In reality, he had 4,838.   The R^2 in the regression was 0.60, which is pretty strong: It means draft pick is pretty strongly tied to wide receiver production, a sign that the market is pretty efficient.

Then I re-ran the formula using draft pick value *and* height as my inputs.  As it turns out, the height variable was completely meaningless.  The R^2 remained at 0.60, and the coefficient on the height variable was not close to significant (p=0.53) despite a large sample of 543 players.

In other words, NFL GMs were properly valuing height in the draft during this period.

In case you’re curious, the 15 biggest “overachievers” as far as TRY relative to draft position were, in order: Marques Colston, Santana Moss, Brandon Marshall, Darrell Jackson, Terrell Owens, Anquan Boldin, Antonio Freeman, Chad Johnson, Coles, Mike Wallace, Greg Jennings, Chris Chambers, Marvin Harrison, Hines Ward, and Steve Johnson.

In this sample, about 50% of the players were taller than 6-0, and only about 30% of the receivers were 5-11 or shorter. We shouldn’t necessarily expect to see a bunch of short overachievers, but I’m convinced that height was properly valued by NFL teams in the draft at least over this 20-year period. There may be fewer star receivers who are short, but that’s only because there are fewer star receiver prospects who are short. Once an NFL team puts a high grade on a short prospect, that’s pretty much all we need to know.

Of the 33 players drafted in the top 15, just one-third of them were six feet or shorter.  As a group, there were a couple of big overachievers (Torry Holt, Lee Evans), some other players who did very well (Joey Galloway, Terry Glenn, and Donte Stallworth), and a few big busts (Desmond Howard, Ted Ginn, Troy Edwards, and Peter Warrick).  Ike Hilliard and Mike Pritchard round out the group.  But I see nothing to indicate that short receivers who are highly drafted do any worse than tall receivers who are highly drafted.  It’s just that usually, the taller receiver is drafted earlier.

Waldman: Why the Exceptional is Valuable

When a team finds a good player with exceptional qualities--like the too short/too slow UDFA Rod Smith--it has ancillary benefits for the organization. Photo by Jeffery Beall.
When a team finds a good player with exceptional qualities–like the too short/too slow UDFA Rod Smith–it has ancillary benefits for the organization. Photo by Jeffery Beall.

Chase’s analysis echoes what I have heard from those with NFL analytics backgrounds: There are too many variables to consider with raw stats to indicate that big receivers are inherently better than small receivers and there are viable archetypes of the effective small receiver.

What concerns me about the attempts to pigeonhole player evaluation into narrower physical parameters is that if taken too far one might as well replace the word “talent” in the phrase “talent evaluation” and use “athletic” or “physical” in its place. I may be wrong, but I get the sense that some of these Stats Ministers–intentionally or otherwise–dislike the exceptional when it comes to human nature. They’re seeking a way to make scouting a plain of square holes where the square pegs fit neatly into each place.

The problem with this philosophy is that once a concept, strategy, or view becomes the “right way” it evolves into the standard convention. Once it becomes conventional, it’s considered “safe.” However this is not true in the arena of competition. If you’re seeking the conventional, you’ve limited the possibilities of finding and creating environments for the exceptional to grow.

Many players who didn’t match the ideal size for their positions and had success were difference makers on winning teams–often Super Bowl Champions. I’d argue that exceptions to the rule that succeed are often drivers of excellence:

  • Russell Wilson didn’t meet the faulty “data backed” physical prototypes for quarterback and picking this exception to the rule in the third round earned them exceptional savings to acquire or keep other players for a Super Bowl run.
  • Rod Smith was too short, too slow, a rookie at 25, and not even drafted. But like a lot of his peers I mentioned above, his production was a huge factor for his team becoming a contender. The fact he was the exception to the rule freed Denver to acquire other pieces to the puzzle.
  • Joe Montana was too small, threw a wobbly ball, and was a third-round pick who was more of a point guard than full-fledged pocket passer, but he was just the type of player Bill Walsh was seeking in an offense that changed the entire course of the game. But at the time, the west coast offense was the exception to the rule that turned the league upside down.
  • Buddy Ryan the Bears drafted a bunch of defenders that didn’t meet physical prototypes for traditional roles in a 4-3, but the 46 defense took Chicago to Super Bowl dominance.
  • Drew Brees, Darren Sproles, and Marques Colston were exceptions to the rule. The Saints offense has been the driver for this team’s playoff and Super Bowl appearances.

I could name more, but the point isn’t to list every player. Why should I? Players who become top starters in the NFL are by very definition the exception to the rule. The only thing height gives a wide receiver is potential position on a target due to wing span, but it doesn’t help hand-eye coordination, body position, route running, comfort with physical contact, and understanding of a defense.

There are also smaller players with good arm length, leaping ability, quickness, and strength to earn similar, if not better position on a target. Even when the smaller receivers lack the same caliber of physical measurements as the bigger players, if  they possess all of the other traits of a good receiver that these big athletes lack then size doesn’t matter.

There are legitimate archetypes for smaller, quick receivers with change of direction. However, there are social biases with these correlations that filter out players from the earliest stages of the game. These biases include the idea that the vast majority of these types of players are in the highest levels of football so anything different should be discouraged at the high school and college level–think white wide receivers, running backs, and cornerbacks as examples.

Players who succeed in defying these social biases and also possess the skill and persistence to overcome them.  I’ve shown this video before, but physicist Neil deGrasse Tyson makes a strong point against “data backed” arguments of this nature when he answered a question posed about the small number of female and black scientists in the world. Harvard President Lawrence Summers hazarded a guess that it was genetics. Tyson’s answer is a great example why correlation isn’t causation.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/KEeBPSvcNZQ?start=3689]

The greatest irony about this specific crowd of data zealots is that they are often the first to complain about coaching tendencies that have same biases.

Maybe rookie receivers with the dimensions of Paul Richardson–or for that matter Jeremy Gallon or Odell Beckham–don’t become productive fantasy options or football players as often as bigger players based on correlating data. However, pointing to past history and scoffing at the wisdom of making an investment is like stating that it was a fact in the 15th century that dragons lie at the edge of the flat world we live in.

If you’re going to avoid investing in a player–or encourage others to do so–use good reasoning. Looking at the data is helpful, but the NFL isn’t a perfect data set. There are some data analysts writing about football that derive ideas reliant on a lot of highly fit equations that don’t work in a real world situation. However, they expect perfection and it’s not going to happen. They also behave as if data only tells the truth–and when that data lacks a fit, context, or proper application, it’s a little scary.

I want to see analytics succeed in the NFL, but like film study it’s not the answer. These two areas–when executed well–can contribute to the answer. However, the NFL–beyond some individual cases–hasn’t made significant advances in either area.

I suppose when you have a monopoly in the marketplace combined with a socialistic system for spreading the wealth owners don’t have significant motivation to become innovative with player evaluation. If they did, they’d be spending more money on making these processes rather than cycling through coaches and GMs every 3-5 years.

In case you’re new to the RSP blog, Chase Stuart runs the excellent blog Football Perspective. He also writes for Footballguys and Football Outsiders. I recommend you check out more of his work.

Chicago Bears RB Ka’Deem Carey: Substance Over Flash

0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Running Back

 Ka'Deem Carey IIMany draftniks are lukewarm about Ka’Deem Carey’s prospects, but it’s the little things he does that generate big plays that get me excited about his future.

A scout told me this spring that Ka’Deem Carey is the type of runner that scouts like and coaches love, but makes personnel executives squint their eyes.  Carey’s off-field domestic violence charge early in his college career is a viable reason for scrutiny, but it’s not the reason the scout I spoke with says that some big wigs in NFL front offices weren’t jumping on board with their staffs.

Carey is a punishing runner for a back that weighed less than 210 pounds at the combine. He also ran a 4.7-40, which is by no means a death knell for a running back, but the front office sees the smaller stature, the average speed, and a career built on volume and the risk management hat comes on.

However, coaches love the intensity that a player like Carey brings to the game and the Bears have the kind of offense where I believe the rookie can develop into a feature back when Matt Forte’s contract expires. Carey’s 21-carry, 138-yard night against USC that included 10 first downs, 11 broken tackles, and 6 catches for 36 yards offers some quality moments that illustrate why I hold this view of the Bears’ fourth-round pick.

A quick suggestion: Set the speed to “0.5” on YouTube’s playback settings “the cog” icon on the bottom right of  the video player before viewing each highlight.

Turning Losses Into Gains

Quickness and agility are more important than speed to a running back and vision to identify and avoid trouble trumps all three. This third-down run from a 2×2 receiver, 10 personnel shotgun set with 13:47 in the third quarter is a not against a packed box, but it’s still a good demonstration of what I’m talking about. Carey’s offensive line slants left and the runner intends to split the tackle and guard on that end to the flat.

However, USC ‘s tackle gets strong penetration up the middle to cut off this gap as Carey is taking the exchange with the quarterback. By the time Carey has the ball and a step past his quarterback, this tackle is two yards deep in the backfield and is blocking the widest gap at the line of scrimmage.

Carey has already identified the penetration and taking action. His first step is a hard plant and dip inside, but it’s not enough to avoid the tackle’s angle and he knows it. Some running backs will try to cut off the inside foot and lose balance.

Not Carey. He completes the second step with a turn, but it’s a quick step so he can plant harder with the outside leg to maintain balance and generate burst. It’s a minor adjustment that gets him inside the penetration and downhill with balanced pad level.

Now Carey can attack the defense in the middle of the field while avoiding the outside gap protection of the defensive back. He’s also in position to keep his knees high to run through the defensive back’s wrap.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=167]

He finishes the play backing his way to the Arizona 43 for a gain of eight on what could have been a loss of three. As I said, quickness and agility are more important than speed to a running back and vision to identify and avoid trouble trumps all three. Wash. Rinse. Repeat.

High Knees

This 39-yard gain highlights Carey’s average speed, but what I like is the finish. Once again this is a run where USC is expecting pass, but I love how Cary pressed to the inside shoulder of the left tackle to force the defensive tackle inside and then cuts to his blocker’s outside shoulder to hit the smaller crease between the left tackle and H-Back.

This press and cut not only sets up the initial hole, but it baits the middle linebacker to slide outside and give the left guard the angle he needs to seal the edge at the second level. This is fine inside running by Carey, because if he tries to beat the defensive tackle inside, the linebacker is already in position to end this play early. Instead, Carey sets up the smaller crease and in turn sets up guard’s block.

The reward is a first down and another 29 yards. As Carey gets 20 yards into the run, note how high he lifts his knees as he anticipates and runs through contact.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=201]

Carey gains another 14 yards in part to running with his knees high. The Bears’ new runner may not break long touchdown runs, but he’ll have a lot of runs of 15-25 yards that matter.

Integrating Both Skills From Above

This is another third-down run early in the fourth quarter where Carey essentially faces a five-man front with six at the line of scrimmage. Again, these are favorable numbers for the ground game, but not when a defensive tackle swims past the center and beats the right guard assigned to him. The defensive tackle is a yard deep int the backfield with a good angle before Carey even takes the exchange.

Carey plants hard as he takes the exchange and turns his hips away from the reach of the defender who is almost four yards into the backfield.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=233]

He then bursts down hill with high knees through the crease, earning the first down and carrying a defender for a 12-yard gain on what could have been a three-yard loss.

Reading the Field A Level Ahead

Finding running backs with the capability to read and set up defenders a level ahead of the ball carrier’s current position is not as common as one might think. Most running backs–even in the NFL–read one level of defenders at a time. This 1st and 10 run with 10:11 in the game is a good example of Carey reading a level ahead. It’s a play that I think is easy for some analysts to get wrong and characterize it as Carey “wasting movement.”

Carey flanks the left side of the quarterback in this pistol set with 2×2 receivers. USC plays off coverage on the receivers and both safeties are deep enough that the defense is expect pass, but the linebackers are still in good position to defend the run. As Carey takes the exchange from the quarterback, note linebackers No.10 (middle of field) and No.56 (accountable for the left flat in the short zone).

No.10 maintains good position to defend the inside and prevent a cutback to the middle. No.56 does a strong job of reacting tot he hole between left guard and left tackle, flying towards the gap after accounting for the slot receiver and verifying the exchange between the quarterback and runner. However, watch Carey read No.56, bounce the play three steps to the outside, and force No.56 to account for the edge.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=252]

I believe Carey knew exactly what he was doing on this run: He saw the hole and the linebacker’s reaction, baited the defender outside, and all the while was prepared to spin his way inside and back his way through the small crease for positive yards. This is a lot like a two-way go, but Carey knows he’s operating in a tight space and has to factor the two first-tier defenders into his movement.

One of the reasons I believe Carey knew what he was doing is his spin move. He doesn’t try to do a complete 360-degree turn. If he does, the tackle plants him behind the line of scrimmage. Only a runner that does not see or feel the tackle working down the line tries a full spin. It’s the type of 360 move that at one time Darren McFadden might have tried on a zone play and failed. Carey spins so his back is to the defender and he has leverage to drive through the hit and earn yards.

A three-yard gain doesn’t seem impressive in the box score, but this is a good example of process trumping the product. Carey makes a good decision and is fast enough to set up the move while factoring four defenders into his choice, gaining three yards instead of potentially bouncing outside or cutting back for a loss or executing a full spin for no gain.

Some scouts would examine this run and label it a good example of “feel” or “intuition.”

Plays Big In Tight Quarters

The previous play was an example of how Carey leveraged his size for maximum power in a situation where he could have been planted into the ground by a much bigger man. This reception and run for a first down on 3rd and 7 with 9:40 in the game is technically a “space play” based on the location, but the room Carey has to operate in the flat as he makes the catch and run is anything but.

Once again this is a 2×2 receiver, 10 personnel shotgun set with Carey flanking the quarterback’s left side. USC has one safety deep middle and the rest of the coverage on the receivers is six yards off the line of scrimmage. Six USC defenders pack the box pre-snap.  USC sends four–including two defenders towards the left edge, which leaves the flat open until the middle linebacker can sprint across to account for Carey swing from the backfield.

Arizona’s quarterback does a good job holding the defense in the middle of the field long enough for the linebacker to account for the crossing route moving under him left to right. This look-off paired with the shallow cross leaves Carey open in the flat and forces the defensive back to drive up field from the Arizona 45 towards Carey working towards the ball at the line of scrimmage at the 35.

Carey feels the presence of the defensive back over top and extends his arms to attack the ball at the 39. It’s a play that, if he misses, he might have been accused of alligator arms, but upon repeated viewings I think the ball was far enough and low enough that Carey had to extend the way he did to make the catch and the presence of the defensive back was a secondary factor, at best.

Once Carey makes the catch, he illustrates the awareness to spin, avoid the big hit, and force a wrap. Once achieved, Carey has pad level and leg drive to drag two players four yards. He crossed the first down marker and gains another three. Not a Lache Seastrunk display of disappearing in thin air and taking the ball another 40 yards, but also a play that Lache Seastrunk does not make 9 times out of 10 at his current level of skill.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=274]

Carey flashes the skill to concentrate on what he needs to do in the moment while anticipating what comes next. He’s also consistent and finishing strong. It’s easy to forget his weight is in the range of 207-210 pounds.  I think he’ll add weight and explosion within the next year and it will only accentuate these positives of his game.

Tight quarters isn’t just winning against multiple defenders on top of you; navigating a sideline is another example. Here’s a catch as a check-down option after the play breaks down. Carey works across the formation towards the edge defender, but the quarterback is forced to scramble to Carey’s side due to interior pressure and Carey loses position on the defender because of the quarterback’s roll out.

The runner knows that it’s now time to work open as a receiver and he sprints to the right flat. The quarterback makes the throw and Carey makes the catch on the run five yards behind the line of scrimmage, but with the sideline open to him.

The pursing defensive linemen has an angle as Carey crosses the line of scrimmage to the sideline and there’s a defensive back over top and charging up the sideline. Carey stutters to freeze the two defenders, set up a block on the lineman, and plays give-a-leg-take-a-leg on the cornerback at the sideline. Even with the move to avoid much of the corner’s hit, Carey still gets hit hard on the leg, five yards past the line of scrimmage, maintains his balance while straddling the boundary and gains another five yards for the first down before the linebacker pushes the runner out.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/pLUfSGnNAI4&start=313]

It’s a tough play that appears easy when Carey executes it. It’s something I could say about all of these examples. It’s probably why football players and coaches are excited about him, but writers are lukewarm.

For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio and the RSP Post-Draft. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download now. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

 

Teddy Bridgewater’s NFL Personality Assessment

0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Quarterback
Best Louisville prospect in this draft? Maybe, but don't give the short end of the stick to the Cardinals' safety Calvin Pryor. Photo by KYNGPAO
Teddy Bridgewater’s personality assessment flies in the face of statements about the QB’s personality-leadership-capability to learn . Photo by KYNGPAO

An NFL source confirmed to me that Teddy Bridgewater has scored exceptionally well on a league-used personality assessment. 

I know how some bloggers have develop some disdain for the anonymous source when it comes to football news.  If you’re one of them, this isn’t the post you want to read. If you don’t care, tonight I’ve been given the green light to share basics about Teddy Bridgewater’s personality assessment that at least two-thirds of the league uses for rookie prospects.

I know the scores, but I have been cautioned not to share the exact numbers. What the source has confirmed is that Bridgewater scored exceptionally well on his personality assessment-very close to the highest possible score. Bridgewater scored high in these categories:

  • Focus
  • Interpersonal skills
  • Dedication
  • Self Efficacy
  • Affective Commitment

This information–if accurate–calls into question the points we’ve been hearing in the media since the combine that Bridgewater is dull and lacks leadership skills. These results support what at least many have seen that opposes the statements to the media that Bridgewater doesn’t have “It”. It also pokes holes in the statements from anonymous executives through major media that Bridgewater can’t “be the face of the franchise” or lacks “CEO” qualities.

Based on what I’ve seen from Bridgewater in Jon Gruden’s QB Camp, Bridgewater was straight-forward, accountable, and engaging. Is he the classic personality type that charmed Jon Gruden like Aaron Murray? Not at all.

Neither was Joe Montana, Joe Flacco, or even Johnny Unitas. It’s been said that Mike Nolan and the 49ers preferred Alex Smith’s grounded personality to Aaron Rodgers, who came across as arrogant.

Where the Wonderlic assesses book smarts in a timed environment, this test–according to my source–uses fast-paced, jarring questions that can often be embarrassing and pointed in nature. Much of the NFL is apparently sold on this  interview-style test’s ability to assess leadership, emotions under pressure, how a player works with others, and behavior on and off the field.

Is it a good test? I have no idea. I’m sure folks with some expertise could find flaws with it just like the Wonderlic.

Does this assessment prove that the NFL is exhibiting some degree of bias? It’s a good indicator that at the very least, Bridgewater doesn’t fit the tried-and-true mold that the NFL prefers when it risks high draft picks on quarterbacks: big arm, big frame, and/or great mobility.

When it comes to precision passers with smarts but arms, athleticism, and frames that are “good enough,” but top-drawer, the NFL seems to balk at the idea of using a top-15 pick. On the other hand, they’ll err this high with good athletes possessing lesser football skills and football intelligence.

As my buddy Ryan Riddle says, “It means that teams have to determine if Bridgewater’s intelligence for the game is that much better than the norm and that’s a very hard thing to evaluate.”  Drew Brees is mobile, but not dynamically athletic and his arm strength was lacking for teams to feel he was a “can’t-miss” guy. However, San Diego GM John Butler was confident that he stole Brees at the top of the second round.

If me, Daniel Jeremiah, Kurt Warner, Josh Norris, Doug Farrar and the rest of Draft Twitter are correct, Bridgewater is going to be the best value among the quarterbacks in this class.

For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

Futures: My Expansion Franchise

0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft
Welcome to my lab where will I concoct a winning franchise. Photo by the state of Victoria.
Welcome to my lab where will I concoct a winning franchise. Photo by the state of Victoria.

You’ve just been awarded an NFL expansion team and must build your personnel department. Go.

Futures: My Expansion Franchise

By Matt Waldman

When the writer of Smartfootball.com suggests that, “you should storify that series of tweets,” it’s a take on a subject worth further exploration. The topic came courtesy of Luke Easterling (@NFLDraftReport) who, on Sunday night, posed the following scenario on Twitter: “You’ve just been awarded an NFL expansion team and must build your personnel department from Draft-Twitter. Go.”

I gave my list of NFL writers, former scouts, consultants, and analysts that I’d use to build my organization, but what was more compelling to Twitter was the way I structured the jobs. My vision for team-building a front office and scouting department got a lot of positive response.

More than anything, I believe the way the Twitter community responded to my approach has to do with the fact that a lot of my audience is football writers and diehard fans who are critical of the NFL’s approach to managing its own. They’re ready to welcome a different vision.

Some of my plans aren’t unique to the NFL. There are teams that at least have an aligned vision from its ownership to its coaching staff. However, the way I’d create and continuously strengthen that alignment is a departure from the league.

I believe in the merit of my ideas, but I’m not dreaming of the day I win multiple Powerballs or inherit billions. Unless an NFL owner is alright with me reporting to work in jeans and sporting my collection of hats and caps, the likelihood of me becoming a GM went from infinitesimally small to impossible.

Then again, there have been requests for my consultation on prospect evaluation that I didn’t intend when began the Rookie Scouting Portfolio in 2006, so you never really know. Maybe my buddy Sigmund Bloom manages to raise $50 from the 20 million NFL fans around the world on Kickstarter and we’re in business. Until then, let’s call this a (hopefully) entertaining football and management exercise.

First, a couple of assumptions we need to get out of the way. If I was awarded an NFL franchise I would have done three things—among others—before I even applied for the rights to an expansion team:

  • A 10, 15, and 20-year cost analysis of owning a team based on my vision.
  • Studied the details of the city of Green Bay’s ownership of the Packers and formulated a 15-year plan to transition the team to a non-profit corporation owned by its fans (one person can own no more than 200,000 shares of its stock).
  • Determined the efficacy of current personnel and front office roles within most NFL organizations

The next step is building an organizational structure. There are several things that I’d do that due to time and space limitations, I won’t get into, but here are the highlights of how I’d implement a vision to build a brain trust responsible for evaluating, acquiring, managing, and developing talent on and off the field.

Read the rest at Football Outsiders.

Rehabbing the Wonderlic

0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft
It's a better fit to assess football intelligence than a standardized test. See below. Photo by Brandon Velasco.
It’s a better fit to assess football intelligence than a standardized test. See below. Photo by Brandon Velasco.

The Wonderlic and the NFL’s misguided use of it continues to fascinate. I propose a solution.

If you’ve seen the Audible Podcast where I commented on the Wonderlic exam, then you know my suggested alternative to the Wonderlic.

This test was designed in 1936 and the military adopted it for measuring a pilot’s ability to think fast. One way of looking at the Wonderlic is that it’s an exam twice removed from its original purpose–if it ever had one besides one form of measuring the ever-elusive concept of intelligence.

But let’s talk about the Wonderlic’s use as a test for our nation’s airmen. While true that pilots face life or death situations, the physical stress of flying a plane is different from that of a football player.

Pilots have to be in great physical condition due to the altitude and G-Force of aerial maneuvers that cause fast changes to blood pressure, heart rates, and blood flow through the body–often resulting blackouts if a pilot isn’t in supreme condition.

The G-Force of flying a fighter jet also creates a sensation of carrying extra weight.  Combine these sensations with the need to maintain a sharp mind and precision movements to control the plane, and it’s understandable why the NFL might look at the cardiovascular demands and draw a parallel between a cockpit and a pocket.

It’s one thing to be out of breath and weighed down while making lightning-quick decisions; it’s another to be breathless and pummeled from a series of moderate car accidents while trying to execute an offense. Yet what really separates the pocket from the cockpit is the type of decisions a quarterback makes that differ from a pilot.

Operating a fighter jet requires excellent skills in mathematics: reading performance tables; gauging time, speed, and fuel; understanding the geometry for specific weaponry; and mastering the impact that certain angles will have on a plane with challenging navigational movements.

A quarterback doesn’t need to know a lick of math. He doesn’t need to read anything but a clock. And his plays are diagrams and words that he has memorized. The Wonderlic tests more for math and language skills than visual diagrams and executing strategy. Moreover, it doesn’t test for the combination of the strategic integrated with motor skills and physical-mental stamina.

So like most non-NFL people, I think the Wonderlic is a useless–and often a counterproductive–assessment tool. If the league wants to make it remotely worthwhile, here’s what I suggest:

  • Lead the prospect to a room for an interview, workout, or press conference–whatever ruse necessary to set up an ambush.
  • At the ambush point, have 3 or 4 of your defensive linemen or linebackers grab the prospect, put a bag over his head and beat on him for 45 minutes.
  • Remove the bag, lead the prospect to a table, and administer the Wonderlic.
  • If the prospect can answer any question correct in 15 minutes, he passes.
  • If the prospect can avoid the bag or ambush and has a stand-off with his attackers, he should be considered for the top half of the draft.
  • If the prospect aces the test after getting beaten up or avoids the ambush altogether, he’s a first-round pick.

Yes, I’m kidding. However, a  player asked to think quickly and make good decisions with accurate execution after a 45-minute mugging is closer to the reality of what you want to see than a book-smart suburban kid who scored well in controlled, standardized test environment.

If you ask me, the NFL would be better off if it put a player through an exhaustive workout and then ask him to execute physical-mental football concepts that are basic to most college players at their positions. If you want to up the stakes, add less familiar concepts that are a logical extension or advanced wrinkle of this knowledge base.

It will require more work for the league to develop, but isn’t it worth it to assess a player’s intelligence free from the socio-economic bias that comes with standardized tests? More important, isn’t it worth it to assess intelligence that’s appropriate to the environment?

But what do I know, I’m just a writer.

Reads Listens Views 4/18/2014

0 Comments read Reads Listens Views
Photo by Ashley Bovan. Solo by James Marshall Hendrix.
Photo by Ashley Bovan. Solo by James Marshall Hendrix.

Fran Duffy’s Scouting Notebooks, Voodoo Chile Trip, Trio of Doom, and Solar in the Dark

What is Reads Listens Views?

If you’re new to the Rookie Scouting Portfolio blog, welcome.  I post links on Friday to content I’m saving for later consumption. You may not like everything listed here, but you’re bound to like something.

Listens/Views

[youtube=http://youtu.be/MMGwTJ63jcA]

Love videos like this, although I’ve heard better Hendrix versions and I can’t talk about this song without sharing this version . . .

[youtube=http://youtu.be/OEJh2FFUUoU]

Download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio

Friday’s are also my chance to thank you for reading my work, encourage you to follow the RSP blog, and download the Rookie Scouting Portfolio publication.

The RSP is available every April 1 for download. This year’s RSP is nearly 300 pages in the draft guide section and filled with analysis of  164 skill position prospects that has earned a loyal following:

  • Rankings
  • Draft history analysis
  • Overrated/Underrated analysis
  • Multidimensional player comparisons
  • Individual skills analysis by position

You can learn more about the RSP here. If you want to see samples of the play-by-play notes I take to write the analysis, you can find them here. If you want to know what my readers say about it, look here. If you want a quick video tour, here it is:

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRsQwtyOCDM&feature=share]

If you don’t have time to look into details, know that once you look through the RSP, there will be no question in your mind that I do the work, that I have a plan about the work that I do, and that you get more than your money’s worth. It’s why more and more draftniks every spring can’t wait until April 1.

If you think that’s a ton, you ain’t seen nothing. When you purchase the RSP, you also get a free post-draft publication that’s available for download a week after the NFL Draft. Fantasy football owners tell me all the time that this alone is worth the price.

Best yet, 10 percent of each RSP sale is donated to Darkness to Light, a non-profit devoted to preventing and addressing sexual abuse through community training in schools, religious groups, and a variety of civic groups across the U.S.

Here is what the RSP donated to D2L this year. According to D2L, the RSP’s 2013 donation amount was enough to train 250 adults in communities across the country.

Pre-order the 2014 RSP and/or download past versions of the publication (2006-2012).

In Case You Missed It/Coming Soon

Reads (Football)

Listens

[youtube=http://youtu.be/zfFmTefVGg8]

 Reads (Life In General)

Listens

[youtube=http://youtu.be/Rf8m3Ww-Unk]

Futures: Alabama MLB C.J. Mosely

0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players

Mosely

Seeking an lesson in playing middle linebacker? C.J. Mosely’s game is instructive. 

Futures: Alabama MLB C.J. Mosely

By Matt Waldman

He can’t catch, he’s had numerous injuries, and a well-executed read-option keeper can trip him up. But if these are the only damning aspects to middle linebacker C.J. Mosely’s game, and his injuries don’t present a long-term concern, there aren’t 10 players in this class I want more.

Mosely’s game is instructive to playing middle linebacker:

  • Addressing run gaps to help teammates
  • Beating lead blockers and attacking the ball carrier
  • Strong pass coverage—man and zone
  • Making good pre-snap diagnosis
  • Finishing plays

He’s not the best middle linebacker you’ll ever see, but the Alabama defender should become a stalwart for an effective NFL unit. The more I study middle linebackers, the more I see the commonalities between them and their natural adversary the running back.

I have always ascribed multiple definitions for a running back’s vision:

  • The patience to allow the play to develop as close as possible to its design.
  • The skill to find and anticipate the creases as they open.
  • The ability to see and set up unblocked defenders at the other side of these creases.
  • The peripheral vision and/or understanding of the opponents’ tendencies to identify the cutback lanes and the timing to exploit them.
  • The judgment to know when to be patient and when to be decisive.
  • The maturity to understand when to resist the urge for the big play in lieu of the short, punishing play that moves the chains.

The last two are of monumental importance if a runner wants to succeed in the NFL. And in many ways, all of these points of vision apply to a good middle linebacker like Mosely. Read the rest at Football Outsiders.

A Game of Inches: The Talent Gap By the Numbers

0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Matt Waldman, RSP Publication

Based on these numbers, less than 1 percent of the seniors playing college football will ever earn a second contract in the NFL.

Greg Linton, an NFL agent, shared this on Twitter this morning. There’s another salient point embedded in this data that goes beyond the message of “get your education.” It’s how data displays the differences in execution. It is a great way to see the differences between “good” college football and “good” NFL football.

Only the top 6.5 percent of all high school players compete at the college level. It means they are in the 93.5 percentile of all high school players. Likewise, only the top 1.6 percent of all college players enter the NFL–the 98.4 percentile. And that second NFL contract–the seal of approval that you’re a good NFL player–is reserved for less than one percent of all college players; the 99.06 percentile.

Viewing the numbers in this fashion, it doesn’t look like a big difference between the 93.5 percentile, the 98.4 percentile, and the 99.06 percentile. You’d be mistaken.

This may be a stretch for some–and it certainly isn’t scientific–but for the sake of entertainment, let’s presume that these percentiles were a reflection of a player’s success rate executing plays on a per snap basis. I understand this is not exact, but I think there’s enough to this idea to suspend disbelief long enough to make an overall point that is worthwhile.

The table below shows the amount of errors–or bad plays–that a player would commit over the course of a million plays based these percentiles that represent their standing as a college (93.5 percentile), NFL prospect (98.4 percentile), or NFL vet earning a second contract (99.07 percentile).

Plays Percentile Good Plays Errors/Bad
1,000,000 0.935 935,000 65,000
1,000,000 0.984 98,4000 16,000
1,000,000 0.9906 99,0600 9,400

The difference between 65,000 errors and 16,000 errors is massive and that’s just the gap between a college player and NFL prospect who might last three years in the league. The NFL vet who earns a second deal commits 42.3 percent fewer errors than the prospect ad 86.6 fewer errors than the college player. And I’m talking about the average player on a team, which includes the best and the worst players on each squad–forget about the stars!

Even these numbers are a little harder to grasp, because we’re looking at a million plays. We won’t see any player execute that many over the course of a career–as hard as Brett Favre, George Blanda and Bruce Matthews tried.

So let’s break it down to plays in a season. Let’s estimate a player sees 40 plays a game for 16 games. I know this isn’t completely accurate for the college game or certain players in the NFL. However, it’s a more understandable sample size of plays for a season that equates to 640 plays.

Now look at the differences in errors/bad plays–it’s a lot easier to grasp.

Player Plays Percentile Good Plays Errors
College 640 0.935 598.4 41.6
NFL Prospect 640 0.984 629.76 10.24
NFL Vet 640 0.9906 633.984 6.016

The difference between 10 and 6 egregious errors per season per player is staggering–and that’s the difference between a young NFL player and a veteran. Those 41.6 errors per season for the average college player just doesn’t cut it for the pro game. This chart hints at why NFL athleticism is a difference maker in the college game even if the NFL skill and understanding of football isn’t always present.

In contrast, the gap between a prospect and vet is much smaller from an athletic standpoint, but the differences in errors is still large based on knowledge of technique, strategy, and consistency of execution. Again, this is hypothesizing that we’re discussing the average player at each level.

Now think about the top four players on each team–Pro-Bowl caliber players–that’s 128 players in the NFL. These players are in the 99.88 percentile in all of football–high school, college, and NFL. Using a sample of 640 plays in a 16-game season they would commit .75 egregious errors.

This seems hard to believe. In fact, you can see where this theory begins to crack at the seams because even All-Pros make mistakes multiple times in a season. However, how many of them are solely their fault and not something that can be explained by the error of a teammate? Not as many as you might think.

I wouldn’t throw out this examination because the numbers aren’t exactly right. The point is still a good one: The gap in talent is about consistency of execution and it requires knowledge, skill, and focus as the gap in athleticism narrows.

For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

Gray Matter: RBs Andre Williams and Anthony Dixon

0 Comments read 2014 NFL Draft, Players, Running Back
Anthony Dixon isn't the athlete Andrew Williams is, but he has shown more as a football player. Photo by Jeffery Beall.
Anthony Dixon isn’t the athlete Andre Williams is, but he has shown more as a football player. Photo by Jeffery Beall.

I see the good from Andre Williams, but will he show it often enough on the field? 

I’m often asked about my “misses.” Who were they? What did I learn?

The answers aren’t always as simple as the questions.  Sometimes the outcome is wrong, but the process is right.

Cincinnati running back Cedric Peerman hasn’t shown me anything contrary to my take on the rare occasions he gets to carry the football. The fact that Jay Gruden admitted that they didn’t know what they had in Peerman adds to my take that Peerman could have developed into a starter if given a true shot.

Sometimes the arriving at a decisive take on a player isn’t incredibly difficult–even with a defined methodology. There are prospects whose tape is enough of a mixed bag when it comes to pivotal components of their games that determine which examples should carry more weight is a tough call.

While it’s natural to worry about being “right” or “wrong” with the call, what I learn from the players who fall into the grey areas of my process helps me tighten it over time. These adjustments are more gradual than immediate, but the potential lessons of these difficult evaluations hold great value.

This isn’t what some people want to hear. They want immediate answers and instant adjustments.

I’m not into the fly-by-night; I’m an aspiring craftsman. I’m hoping there will be many years ahead of valuable lessons based on mistakes.

One of my not-so-simple misses is Anthony Dixon, one of my favorite backs in the 2010 NFL Draft. The runner from Mississippi State  is a bruiser with the footwork and agility of a runner 20 pounds lighter than his 6’0″, 233-lb. frame.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/RjPpHxlSThk]

A sixth-round pick of the 49ers, Dixon has hung onto a roster spot thanks to his special teams play. However, the 26-year-old Dixon is unlikely to earn significant time as an NFL starter after failing to push Frank Gore for time on the San Francisco depth chart early in his career. One of the reasons that Dixon didn’t earn more chances is that he did not display consistent maturity as a decision maker.

The coaching staff expected its young runner to lower the pads and work downhill, but Dixon either bounced too many runs outside or displayed too much hesitation on plays designed to go between the tackles. The early take on Dixon is that he lacked the balance of decision-making maturity and creativity to solidify a spot in the offensive rotation early in his career.

Dixon has been pegged as a special teams performer and fullback-running back `tweener. He was a solid fit for Jim Harbaugh’s gap-style ground game, which wasn’t the predominant system during the Mike Singletary era. On rare occasions, fans saw Dixon earning time in Harbaugh’s backfield as big-lead closer.

Because Joique Bell, Alfred Morris, Knowshon Moreno, and Pierre Thomas aren’t extraordinary physical talents and they’re still making an impact ahead of more touted prospects, I wouldn’t be surprised if there’s more to come with Dixon’s story than what I mentioned above.

Even so, there is something I should have taken into account in hindsight: the Mississippi State ground game. The Bulldogs incorporated a lot misdirection with its run game in a gap-style offense: shotgun draws, counter plays, and traps.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/zvHPZi7_apk]

Although Dixon communicated a sound understanding of his keys at the line of scrimmage when I talked with him about his favorite plays at Mississippi State, the Bulldogs offense didn’t require sophisticated decisions from its backs. Dixon had to show just enough patience for one set of blocks to develop and make that destination of the run work. In most cases, Dixon’s physical skills were enough to earn yards after contact if Mississippi State failed to open wide lanes for its back.

Recently I went back to watch some of Dixon’s tape. I didn’t have the same impression of Dixon during my post-mortem analysis. The athleticism, power, and agility are all still there. However, I now see how the Mississippi State offense inflated my take of Dixon’s vision.

Where I missed on Dixon was his decision-making coming out school. Where I still may hit is his athleticism, burst, and balance if the decision-making has improved.

Funny enough, I wrote  90 percent of this piece and banked it in my archives well before Dixon earned a contract with the Bills and Mike Mayock announced his love for Boston College running back Andre Williams.

Williams is a big back like Dixon, but his evaluation has some difficult moments. The 6’0″, 227-pound Williams stars in a gap style ground game that loves to run traps, counters, and power. Both runners have enough quickness to move the chains, but neither shows the NFL speed to defeat a good angle from a defender in pursuit.

What adds complexity to this comparison contrast is that Dixon displays better athleticism on the field than Williams despite the fact that the Boston College back had an impressive combine. Williams’ physical skills don’t show up with the frequency that I expect from the top prospects at the position.

The professional market is too saturated with running backs who show more on a consistent basis for me to have as positive of a take on Williams as Mayock.

Even so, I like to explore the grey matter of my evaluations. Here are three plays that reveal glimpses of Williams’ best.

Power

Pair Williams in a power running game and the Boston College starter can get the job done. Here’s a 13-yard gain from a 23 personnel I-formation run against nine defenders in the box. The Eagles pulls its left guard to the right side and leads Williams to the hole behind his fullback.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/1lafGKn45VA?start=105]

Williams demonstrates some press-and-cut ability on this play. Ideally, I’d want to see Williams approach the hole outside the guard’s shoulder and then cut inside the guard at the line of scrimmage to exploit the hole opening to the inside.

Instead, Williams is positioned in the middle of the guard’s back. Yet it’s still a good enough spot for him to press the lane with a jab step to the outside shoulder and cut to the inside.

WilliamsA1

This move compels the defender on the pulling guard to peek outside and a beat late as Williams enters the hole inside the guard.

WilliamsA2

Williams gains three yards untouched through the hole and has some momentum to face the safety coming down hill and poised to deliver a shot to the runner’s legs. Williams’ knee level is high enough to repel the contact, maintain his balance, and earn another six yards before finishing the play coming over top of the defensive back making the tackle.

This is one of the better runs I’ve seen from Williams against contact where he doesn’t have a massive down-hill head start. Unfortunately, there aren’t many of them–even this one play doesn’t tip the scales for me over the wealth of plays where he’s unable to bully in tight spaces.

Here’s another nice press and cut from Williams from a heavy I-formation set.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/1lafGKn45VA?start=137]

Note the direction of the defense’s helmets after he executes the press and cutback. If Williams can make these cuts with this level of patience, agility, and burst more often in the NFL than he did at Boston College it will force me to re-examine how a small sample of plays can carry more weight despite being the exception to the rule in a player’s portfolio.

WilliamsA3

Speed

Williams’ difficulty opening his stride to reach that extra gear he showed at the combine limits his upside in the NFL. Here’s a play that would be a much bigger gain if Williams had elite speed for the NFL game. However, it’s a good example of enough speed to produce as a starter in the league.

[youtube=http://youtu.be/1lafGKn45VA?start=49]

As Williams reaches the flat, the safety has a bead on the running back. In this situation, Williams opens his stride enough that the safety cannot reach the runner at the eight-yard mark of the run.

Williams out runs this angle of the defender and earns another 16 yards beyond that safety’s original target trajectory.  If  not for the cornerback, Williams is off to the races.

But at this point, I have to stick with my take that Williams in pads doesn’t match his exploits in shorts. If not for Mike Mayock’s take likely reflecting the tenor of the NFL, I would have expected the Boston College starter to get a call in April as a late draft pick.

In the hyper-competitive world of professional sports and the perception-fueled environment of bloggers and fans, my assessment doesn’t sound complimentary. However, I remind you that for a player with an excellent mental-emotional approach to his career, the NFL Draft is only the beginning.

If the Boston College runner can demonstrate these skills with greater consistency, I’ll be eating my words. Of course, lessons like these offer plenty of nutritional value and build stronger bones for evaluation processes.

 For analysis of skill players in this year’s draft class, download the 2014 Rookie Scouting Portfolio. Better yet, if you’re a fantasy owner the 56-page Post-Draft Add-on comes with the 2012 – 2014 RSPs at no additional charge and available for download within a week after the NFL Draft. Best, yet, 10 percent of every sale is donated to Darkness to Light to combat sexual abuse. You can purchase past editions of the Rookie Scouting Portfolio for just $9.95 apiece.

2013 RSP Post-Draft Video Tour

0 Comments read RSP Publication

“I first experienced the RSP last year and after reading several pages, you got me for only god knows how much time you’ll be doing it. I’d prepay this for the next ten years easily. I mean it in the most sincere way, this has become my most anticipated read of the year and once again, I know it will be awesome.” – Dom

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8f06wrsHVI&feature=share]

New to the RSP? Wondering what’s inside the RSP Post-Draft and how to use it? Take the video tour.

  • How the Pre-draft and Post-Draft work together.
  • Tour of the tiered cheat sheet. .
  • The use of ADP values and RSP values to help readers maximize dynasty draft value.

Download the RSP now and I’ll email you a week after the NFL Draft to let you know when the Post-Draft is ready for download. The publications are a package deal at $19.95.

I have readers tell me all the time that they would pay $19.95 just for the Post-Draft publication. I sell this as a package deal only because the pre-draft is just as important long-term as the post-draft. One feeds the other.