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Grinding Tape Part III – NIU RB Chad Spann

0 Comments read Players, Running Back

In Part I of the Grinding Tape Series, Mid American Conference MVP Chad Spann explained the concepts behind plays that require a running back to understand blocking schemes, defensive tendencies, and reading keys.

In Part II, he revealed how quickly a runner needs to be able to process information to choose a hole, ball security protocol, and the importance of minimizing surface area to become a strong, after-contact runner.

This week, Spann discusses the difference in a runner’s pre-snap location in very similar-looking shotgun sets with very different blocking schemes, and what a back is looking at to determine the path of his run.

1st and 10, 10:00 1st QTR

Waldman: You do a nice job bouncing this run outside. You take the play behind your fullback’s lead block and get the left corner for a six-yard gain. Take us through the design and execution of this running play.

Spann: This play is once again our inside zone. The fullback is lining up on the right side, but this is not the way we normally run it. Our fullback is normally going to line up either back side or he’s going to start on the front side and come back to the backside when the ball is snapped. Every time, he’s going to cut this defensive end, which is going to give me a start at a cut back if there is one.

Waldman: This time he motions from the slot to a split position over the tight right tackle and tight end.

Pre snap look of inside zone play.

Waldman: As with the running plays we’ve looked at earlier in the game,  is the A-gap/one-technique DL the primary key for the blocking scheme?

Spann: Yes. On this particular play we’re going to double team again like we always do against that A-Gap player, the one-technique. That A-gap player is going to be double-teamed by the center and guard. Whoever had leverage is going to take over the block by himself and whoever can get free is going to come up and get the MIKE linebacker (No.32). The front side tackle has the defensive end and the tight end is going to take the stand up linebacker, which is the SAM (labeled as the OLB below).

Post snap blocking on inside zone.

Waldman: On this play the one-technique gets occupied rather quickly by the center, which allows the right guard to get into the defensive backfield and get his hands on the MIKE LB (No.32). What is the strategy for the DL lined up over the left guard – the three-technique?

Spann: That  guard and tackle on the backside are going against the three-technique and they double team him to the WILL linebacker (No.42). If the three-technique tries to cross the face of the guard, the backside tackle is going to come up and get No.42 and the fullback is going to come back and cut the defensive end to give me a lane. That’s not how we plan for it to happen, but that’s a possibility.

Waldman: So what is the primary hole for you on this play?

Spann: It is a B-gap play, which means we want it to hit the front side B-gap. We want the center and guard to mash that A-gap player down and have the center take over the block and the guard get up to the MIKE linebacker. And that’s where the hole should be (over right guard). That’s not always where it goes, because one thing that can kill zone plays is penetration and that’s what Toledo is trying to do – get gap penetration – and they did.

Toledo gets good gap penetration over center and right guard, which forces cutback.

Spann:  Their penetration jams up my holes a little bit and forces me to make this cutback, which normally I’ll get in trouble for making this big of a cutback…

Waldman: But you do a nice job of it (laughter). . .

Spann: . . . Yeah, I make a play out of it. And you see me again with the ball in the “wrong” hand, but initially this was supposed to be a front side play and by the time I make my decision with where I’m going to go I already have the ball in my right hand.

Waldman: But as you mentioned (see Part II of this analysis) earlier, you don’t want to change ball hands in traffic. At this point you do a nice job of accelerating past the Will LB (No.42) to get the corner.

Spann beating Will LB (No.42) to the corner on the cutback behind FB's block of DE.

Waldman: The key to this cutback from what I see is that the WILL LB (N0.42) took his initial steps towards the B-gap (right guard), which gave you room to get the corner on your cutback. The MIKE linebacker (No.32) had to free himself from the guard and get through the mesh. By the time he does, you have the corner just past the WILL.

Spann gains six yards after taking the backside corner.

Waldman: You turn the corner and stay inside the numbers to possibly work off the wide receiver’s block. The WILL does manage to run you down with the help of the MIKE and the free safety who delivers a head-on shot that you manage to meet with good pad level to deflect much of the blow.

1st and 10, 5:36 1st QTR

Waldman: This formation is a shotgun set with four receivers and no tight end or fullback. Three receivers are split to the right and a single receiver is wide left.

Zone-read play from shotgun, pre-snap.

Spann: In contrast to the last shotgun play where I was closer to the quarterback’s feet, this one is the zone-read play where I’m going to back up a little more.

Waldman: Why the difference with your pre-snap positioning in the formation?

Spann: It’s because this play doesn’t only to hit front side. It could hit backside. It could hit right up the middle.

So I’ve got be deep enough to read where this hole is going to be because we are doing true double teams unlike the last shotgun play, which was a full zone. I need a little more space to make these reads because my track  is going to be more downhill than it is going to be east and west.

The depth between me and the quarterback and my path is the huge difference between the last play and what I was trying to get across with the last shotgun play.  You’re going to see me come closer and downhill than going straight through the mesh.

Waldman: Before the snap, the outside receiver on the right motions to the hash to create a more conventional bunch look and this brings the strong safety into the box next to the MIKE linebacker. Tell us about the blocking scheme and of course, that A-gap defensive tackle who is almost directly over the center.

Zone-read blocking from shotgun set.

Spann: On this play we have the A-gap player front side, which means once again we’re going to double team him to the play side linebacker (the WILL). The tackle is going to be one-on-one with the defensive end back side because it is a zone read. Because the A-Gap player stays right where he’s at and he doesn’t try to shoot outside the guard, the guard is able to get up to the linebacker instead of the center doing it, which means the hole is going to be where the guard was.

Spann getting the ball and bouncing to left end.

Waldman: This play doesn’t windup going off the guard. You actually bounce this outside. I’ve always been curious what specifically a running back is viewing to determine the direction he takes on a run. Are you looking at the defense, your linemen, open space?

Spann: I’m not looking at the defensive linemen and where they are going. I’m looking at the helmet placements of my offensive linemen. That is what tells you which way to go. If your offensive lineman has his helmet on the right shoulder of the defensive lineman then your cut is going to be inside and to the right of that offensive lineman. Now if it’s to the left then you’re going to go inside because wherever his helmet is the opposite direction he’s trying to push him.

Waldman: To make sure I get it,  you’re following the helmets and wherever the helmet is. If the helmet is inside, you’re going inside. If the helmet is outside then you’re going outside.

Spann: Yep. On this play because of the helmets and the fact the  guard gets off clean to the linebacker, the play is supposed to be inside the guard.

Now that defensive end beats our tackle inside and that isn’t supposed to happen.  But because I have that extra depth in my initial stance I can read that and I see that happen as I try to hit that hole where the defensive end comes out.

I see it, I react to it, and I know I can get outside of it. So that’s my reading and reacting and I get around the corner for a seven-yard gain (see below).

Next week, we’ll discuss the art of the stiff arm, the pain of hip pointers, and the craft of pass protection.

Grinding Tape: NIU RB Chad Spann Part I

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Chad Spann began his career as a walk-on and ended it the MAC MVP.

This is the first in a series of posts will feature a film study session I had with former NIU RB Chad Spann, 2010’s Division-I leader in rushing TDs and the Mid-American Conference’s Most Valuable Player.

If you don’t know about Chad Spann, you’re probably not alone. He wasn’t drafted in April. However, that doesn’t make him an unworthy pro prospect. He’s a smart and tough runner who began his career practically begging for a shot from any Division-I team. He began the summer of his freshman year as the ninth RB on the NIU depth chart, but by the end of August he was the No.2 RB. After a strong college career, he’s once again in a similar situation as the underdog. If there is a player who is could follow a career trajectory similar to Priest Holmes, Spann has the skills to potentially do it.

I had the opportunity to interview Spann for the New York Times Fifth Down Blog last spring. In addition to the interview, Spann generously agreed to spend a couple of hours with me over the phone to break down one of his games. He chose  his three-touchdown performance against Toledo – a game where he played a significant part of the contest with a hip pointer – as the one for us to review. A few days before our meeting I emailed Spann a list of plays from the game that I wanted to discuss and when the time came, we sat in our respect homes and queued play after play.

If Spann shows the same kind of patience on the field in a training camp that he showed with me during our call, he’s going to be a find for an NFL team with enough foresight to give him a camp invite. Most impressive was the way in which Spann communicated his role, the responsibilities of his teammates, and the actions and reactions of the defense both pre- and post-snap. Spann was instructive, insightful, and his knowledge demonstrated a good counterpoint to the overstated generalization that the running back position is mostly instinctive. There are enough analytical requirements of a good runner that it is a fallacy to imply that the position doesn’t require thought or preparation.

The initial post is a Q&A discussion of two plays from the first series of the contest. Note Spann’s ability to describe his teammate’s assignments, what he’s trying to read from specific defenders, and what he’s doing very early in the run to set up his teammates so they can return the favor and set him up for a nice gain. This is something that will become more evident with future posts.

What this session reinforced for me is that few running plays ever work exactly as designed.

1st and 10 14:55 1st quarter – One-yard gain

Pre-snap look 14:55 1st quarter

Spann: This is our first play from offense. We have a two-receiver set with both receivers to the left in “21” personnel [2 backs, 1 tight end].

The fullback lines up on the wing almost as if he was an H-back. We’re running a zone play to the weak side (away from the tight end). This is actually a variation of our inside zone play. Instead of our fullback blocking back side he’s going to stay front side and he’s going to lead up on the ‘backer…

Waldman: This play didn’t work out as drawn up. Will you explain what was supposed to happen?

Spann: What is supposed to happen ideally is that we’re working a lot of double teams.  My pre-snap read is to look at what the A-gap defender is doing in terms of his technique. On this play he is play side. That is the first thing that I look at. Now I look at that because we’re going to double team him with the play side guard and center. We’re always going to double team the A-gap player. They are going to double team him to the middle linebacker (No.32) (below).

Now in this front where we have both receivers to our left the defense adjusted what they were doing and bumped the receivers over. Instead of going corners over they brought the corner down into the box as if he was a linebacker. What should happen is that our line should adjust and make the cornerback the backside linebacker (the FS drops before the snap), No.42 the MIKE linebacker and No.32 the play side backer – or the WILL.

That’s how it should happen, but we had a miscommunication upfront where No.42 – now the MIKE linebacker -was unblocked. That’s why the play wasn’t that big of a gain. The front side guard should have been double-teaming up to No.42…

[Author’s Note Instead, the guard stumbled out of his double-team and this freed the linebacker (No.42) to make the play on Spann who tried to hit the hole between center and right guard.]

Waldman: So at what point do you see that you’re going to have to make an adjustment? Is it at the point of the exchange or even before that with the cornerback moving into the box?

Spann:  What we’re taught is that we have an initial read and a primary read as we’re running zone. My initial read on this play is the front side defensive tackle, which in this case is the A-gap player – the one-technique. My primary read on inside zone plays is also the one-technique/A-gap player. So in this case, he’s both my initial and primary read and he’s going to tell me which way the play is going to go. If [this defensive tackle] tries to cross the guard’s face then the play is going to hit up the middle where the center is going to come off the tackle and get the MIKE linebacker (as diagrammed above).

If the defensive tackle says where he’s at the double team should push him back the other direction and I should be able to hit it play side B-gap where it is supposed to hit (below).

If one-technique (DT) doesn't cross the guard's face...

So that’s what I know going into the play and when I see [the defensive tackle/one-technique] at the beginning of the play. So when the ball is snapped, I’m reacting to either the one-technique going outside the B-Gap or staying where he’s at…that’s the first thing I’m looking at.

I already know what could happen so that gives me the ability to look at the next level a little bit earlier. Now I know exactly what is going to happen to that A-gap player so I keep the ball play side. But he drives back into the hole and I have to make the cut back.  Since we didn’t block it correctly…

Waldman: …The result is a short gain.

1st and 10 13:14 1st Quarter

Waldman: This is a run to right end from a two-TE Pistol formation where you follow your pulling guard to the flat.

12 personnel from the pistol - NIU's Bounce Play

Spann: This is “12” personnel (1 back, 2 tight ends). We’re in the pistol with two receivers to the right. This is our bounce play. It’s set up to look a lot like our power play. We run it mostly out of “12” or “21” personnel.

It’s supposed to look identical to Power except we’re either pulling a guard and a center or a tackle and the center. My steps on this play are identical to Power if we were just running Power Right, except I’m going to take two steps in and then I’m going to start rolling with the pulling tackle and center on this play (below).

Initial post-snap look with RB taking two steps towards line to bait LBs.

Waldman: Tell me about the importance of these first two steps to begin the play. I’d imagine it helps you set up a good distance to follow your pulling linemen, but does it also help set up the defense?

Spann: Absolutely. If you watch Nos. 32 and 42 – the two ‘backers on this play – the whole point of me taking those two steps is to bring them into the line of scrimmage as close as possible. So now when I make this cut – the cut outside on No.32 – he’s out of position to make that play (below).

After two steps towards line, Spann cuts outside and forces No.32 to chase.

Now he’s chasing me rather than being there to make the play. It’s supposed to suck them inside so they get caught up in line and they have to weave through the center and the guard to get to me. I’m going to follow this center’s block. Usually the tackle who is pulling is going to kick out and I’m supposed to follow the center who is pulling up field and usually that cut will be between the two. Sometimes the tackle will get up field and cut somebody inside and I can get to the outside. Normally both linemen split and I make that cut in between them.

Power as blocks develop outside.

Waldman: When the center makes a diving cut to the linebacker’s feet, you accelerate, charge forward to the line of scrimmage, and then leap over the linebacker’s diving attempt to hit you. For the defender it’s either dive at you or fall from the cut block. You land two yards ahead of the line of scrimmage with a backside defender wrapping your waist while quickly lowering your pads and ducking under the oncoming safety for one more yard (a gain of three).

Spann: We’ve run it better – watch the Minnesota highlights and we were hitting this play very well.

In Part II we study a zone read and a shotgun play that appears very similar presnap but for a small difference in the RB’s stance. We’ll also talk more about pressing the hole, the thought process behind ball security, and concepts behind gaining yards after contact – plus some love for RB Edgerrin James. 

Speed In Context

0 Comments read Matt Waldman

Jerry Rice is a perfect example of speed in the proper context. 

Speed (noun, verb, sped or speed·ed, speed·ing. –noun)

1. rapidity in moving, going, traveling, proceeding, or performing; swiftness; celerity: the speed of light;the speed of sound…

6. Slang . a stimulating drug, as caffeine, ephedrine, or especially methamphetamine or amphetamine.

Legendary NFL owner Al Davis coined the phrase Speed Kills. Because the long-term demise of the Oakland Raiders can be attributed in part of Davis’ addiction to speed over anything else, there’s no shortage of irony in his statement. However, Davis is just one of many in the NFL whose beliefs and actions indicate that they are intoxicated by speed. It has become the football equivalent of beer goggles.

I have been studying college and NFL games 60 hours a week, 8 months a year since 2005 and one of the things I have learned is that speed should not be regarded solely as a physical attribute. The NFL may be one of the most physical games in the world, but the strategic side of the game beyond the quarterback position is overlooked more often than it should.

NFL players have to be strong at processing information quickly. They have to understand the roles of their teammates, the tendencies of their opponents, and how to anticipate what is going to happen before the play even begins. They also have to have strong technique that they can execute without thinking about it. There is still a far greater variation physical talent in college football than in the NFL and this is why college teams can dominate with far simpler schemes. Pro football has very little variation in physical talent, which is why a back like Reggie Bush cannot make the same kinds of reversal of field runs with success with the Saints that he did at Southern Cal.

Because the strength, speed, and agility gap is so much narrower in the NFL, anticipation, precision, and consistency of technique becomes vital. Take an RB with 4.4 speed in a workout and put him in a situation where he doesn’t have the blocking scheme, offensive verbiage, audibles, or defensive tendencies under his fingers, and he’s going to hesitate because he’s thinking rather than reacting. You can reasonably add between 0.2-1 seconds of hesitation time to that 4.4 workout speed and what you get is a fast player who plays slow. The less knowledgeable and confident a player is with his role the more likely this hesitation time has a compounding effect on his quickness and accuracy of execution and the overall effectiveness of his teammates relying on him.

In contrast, a player with strong technique, knowledge of his role, and knowledge of his opponent has little to no hesitation in his execution. This is why there are numerous examples of RBs or WRs with 4.6 speed who can make big plays. NFL Quarterbacks talk about the game “slowing down” after they accumulate a better understanding of the demands of the position in the pros. However, the game doesn’t really slow down, their reaction time speeds up because the confusion with the playbook, technique, and defensive schemes are no longer creating hesitation. This is no different with any other position.

Speed is not just a number on a stopwatch. Imbibe those times with moderation.

Evaluating the Evaluator

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With its vast knowledge of strategy and technique and a wealth of  financial resources at their disposal, NFL organizations not only have the potential to discover if that linebacker prospect fits their scheme, but they can also find out what he did with that blue pencil sharpener in Mrs. Beam’s second grade social studies class. So why do they still have a huge opportunity to improve as evaluators of talent? The answer is in the process.

During his 2011 NFL Draft Confidential special that aired on ESPN,  Bill Parcells describes football as a “talent-acquisition” industry.  And during the show’s next 90 minutes, Parcells provides great insights into the scouting process, how it generates a draft board, and its economic impact on the game.

But what got my attention as a former operations manager and director of a service sector business is the issues that NFL teams face to do consistent, accurate, and quality work.

One of the things I took away from the show is that the NFL has a lot in common with other businesses – especially those in the service and manufacturing sectors.

As with other industries, the word tenure isn’t a common way to describe jobs in the NFL. General managers, coaches, and personnel feel tremendous pressure to win now, which can lead to a results-driven mentality.

This is perfectly natural. However during those long hours of work in an urgent quest to attain these results, it’s difficult for an organization to feel the same urgency to scrutinize its processes that are in use to reach its goals.

The Inexact Science of Evaluation

During the ESPN special, Parcells repeatedly described talent evaluation as an “inexact science.” Once again, this is no different than the service and manufacturing industries where statistics are essential to measure productivity.

But what makes talent evaluation an inexact science is the fact that statistics cannot provide a full or accurate measure of an individual’s performance. Nor can statistics alone gauge talent or project future performance.

Because measuring and projecting individual performance deals with both objective and subjective criteria, it is vitally important that there is a strong methodology in place to ensure that evaluators are consistent with their approach to the work. Many service and manufacturing businesses have figured this out by embracing an approach that I call “quality-driven processes.”

These processes not only generate results that are more accurate and productive, but the structure of the process itself also helps these businesses get better at what they do with each passing year while saving money.

Don’t Blame The Evaluators, Focus on The Process

Based on the processes Parcells explained in this show, as well as conversations I have had with former scouts, I believe that as knowledgeable as teams are about the game, they lack of a high-quality, well-defined evaluation process. The current process isn’t designed to help them continuously improve and I think it is a reason why NFL teams frequently contribute to their own scouting mistakes.

Exhibit one is the NFL’s grading system. Most teams use a grading system that inherently create a high level of variability. And when individual evaluators have a different understanding of how a system is supposed to work because the system isn’t well-defined, differences of opinion among evaluators can be avoided.

Here is the basic system that most NFL teams use. There will be differences in the range of numbers, but this is essentially it.

Typical NFL Prospect Grading Scale

  • 9.00 –  A player for the ages (Jim Brown).
  • 8.00-8.99 – A perennial All-Pro.
  • 7.50 – 7.99 – Future All-Pro.
  • 7.00-7.49 – Pro-Bowl-caliber potential.
  • 6.50-6.99 – First-round-caliber player with Pro Bowl potential.  
  • 6.00-6.49 – Potential to become a quality NFL starter.
  •  5.50-5.99 – Potential starter and likely first-day pick.
  • 5.10-5.49 – Potential to make an NFL roster and contribute.
  • 5.01-5.09 – Has a better than 50/50 chance to make a roster.
  • 5.00 – Has an even chance to make a roster.
  • 4.75–4.99 – Training camp player.
  • 4.50-4.74 – Potential invitee to an NFL training camp.
  • 4.00-4.49 – Needs developmental time in another league.

On the surface this might seem like a very clear scoring system, but it’s not clear at all.

After talking with former scouts with recent stints in the NFL within the past 10 years, all of them explained to me that the score is a “hard grade.” This means the scout watches the player, writes some notes, and then assigns an overall grade according to these type of general definitions.

The potential problem is that it appears that none of these grades explicitly define what NFL scouts should be considering when evaluating a player:

  • Athletic skills (speed, flexibility, strength, agility, etc.)
  • Position-specific techniques (pad level, routes, blocking, etc.)
  • Conceptual knowledge of the game (vision, pocket presence, etc.)

You might argue, of course scouts understand what to look for when evaluating a player – that’s their job!

However, look at any industry that hasn’t really examined its processes and there are frequent errors that occur among employees with regards to how they define the criteria they use to evaluate performance. This is especially the case in the NFL.

According to ex-scouts there is an unwritten truism called the 25/25 Rule, which describes the tendency for NFL organizations to fire veteran scouts and replace them with new scouts in their mid-twenties (25) at an annual salary of 25K. This practice often occurs when teams change leadership. It also keeps scout salaries low – a nice side benefit.

However, the 25/25 Rule also creates an environment where scouts are more reticent to stand up for their takes on players. Working for the NFL is a dream job for many and job security is already a tenuous thing.

Training for scouts also appears to be lacking with some teams. One former scout for a team in the AFC North explained to me that his team never had a defined training for the position. New scouts were put to work and given the option to attend position meetings at the team complex when not engaged in 90-hour work weeks.

He explained that the skills portion of his job interview was to watch film and write notes about what he saw, but he never knew exactly what he specifically did that separated him from the other candidates for the job. Obviously, he was doing something right, but imagine what kind of things he was doing wrong that were tacitly reinforced because he didn’t get any formalized training.

The dynamic this creates within a team’s scouting department is similar to any business where there is a group of individuals made up of  different ages, different levels of job experience, and different levels of knowledge about the job.

Think I’m wrong? Next time you’re at work, gather a group of your peers and ask them all to define in writing how a simple task: how the receptionist should answer the telephone.

Then pretend you’re the receptionist answering the phone while they grade your performance using this 1-5 scale:

  1. Poor
  2. Fair
  3. Meets Expectations
  4. Good
  5. Excellent

Unless your company has very clear guidelines for every process, you’ll not only find that each of your peers has a different answer how the receptionist should answer the phone, but they also will have a very different idea of how well/poorly the job was done. To compound the problem, ask them after the fact how they define each of these grades and you’ll likely get a different answer from each person.

The problem this example underscores is that a lack of clearly defined criteria increases variation among those assigned to judge performance.

Where one scout might define a player’s performance as Good, another may define it as Meets Expectations. The difference between these two scores in the NFL might be the difference between a player projected to become a starter and one projected only to make a roster.

Undefined Processes + Process Variation = Poor Results

Former 49ers, Rams, and Cardinals scout Dave Razzano’s account [as told to Yahoo! writer Michael Silver] of a much-publicized run-in with Rams GM Charlie Armey over his scouting report of Utah QB Alex Smith is a glaring example.

Razzano’s refusal to fall in line with the widespread belief that Smith was a big-time quarterback prospect led to a heated confrontation with Armey in a meeting at Rams headquarters a couple of weeks before the ’05 draft. Razzano’s report on the former Utah quarterback opined that Smith was “not as good as our backup, Jeff Smoker. Backup only for the Rams.”

Armey, who declined to discuss the incident after it was initially reported by Santa Rosa Press Democrat’s Matt Maiocco, solicited the input of other scouts and coaches who’d studied far less tape (if any) of Smith, who ended up being picked No. 1 overall by the 49ers.

“There were 12 guys around the table, and Charley had them rate him on every attribute – arm strength; accuracy short; accuracy long; judgment; game management; ad-lib ability under pressure. And he put a highlight tape on the projector. I mean, obviously, he’s gonna be 30 out of 30, and every throw’s a great pass … it’s a highlight tape!

“He said, ‘Are you gonna sit there and be stubborn? Why can’t you see what we see?’ I got heated. I said, ‘I’ve watched seven tapes, and I’m not changing my grade.’ He told one of our assistants, ‘Go get all seven tapes.’ I started screaming, ‘You’re gonna look at highlight tapes? That’s how Akili Smith got drafted!’ [Scout] Tom Marino had me in a bear hug. I just lost my mind.”

Not only did they differ on how to score the player’s overall performance, but also what type of criteria (highlights of preselected plays or actual game conditions) to use to arrive at that grade.

Another former scout of an AFC East team said he saw his peers paraphrase material from print and Internet publications to complete his scouting reports.

These examples aren’t meant to cast NFL teams in a bad light. These are common issues in any industry where its processes aren’t given the scrutiny they deserve.  These are symptoms of poor processes management and poor processes create variation that can have a negative impact on the team on the field as well as economically.

Overestimate a player’s skill level and a team could wind up overpaying a player who cannot start for them. Underestimate a player’s skill level and a team can miss on the opportunity to acquire him.

This is the kind of variation that can be corrected with a good process, which:

  1. Defines specifically in writing what the team values in players.
  2. Defines which settings scouts can use to grade players.
  3. Clearly defines a grading system.
  4. Uses a system that incorporates all skills and techniques that a team wants to see from its prospects into the grading system.
  5. Prioritizes the importance of those skills and techniques with a weighted score the contributes to the overall evaluation.
  6. Scores players as only meeting or not meeting expectations of those scoring criteria rather than using a highly subjective number system.

No evaluation process is perfect, but I believe NFL teams will see great improvement to its talent evaluation process – and bottom line – once it decides to explore best practices in process management.

Doing so will help them create an evaluation process that will help their scouts and management stay on the same page and prevent issues that they have control over. In addition, when they do have a vast difference in opinion the process should be structured so it will help address the larger problem and continuously refine what they are doing as the game evolves.

The Rookie Scouting Portfolio already does this because it adopts and customizes best-practice methodologies for its performance monitoring that Fortune 500 companies use in the service and manufacturing sectors. I believe if an NFL team, and its wealth of resources and vast knowledge about the game, applied similar best practices in process management they would produce an incredibly strong scouting department that could give them a huge edge over their competition and ultimately save their team money.

Although I came to the Rookie Scouting Portfolio lacking NFL-caliber knowledge or football experience, I possessed the knowledge to build a process that would help me use others’ knowledge of the game to successfully evaluate the skills of NFL prospects. Moreover, my process continues to help me refine my knowledge and end product.

I don’t think it will be long before teams explore this avenue to improve their scouting process. The Saints recently purchased a system to refine their tracking and management of data. This is a step in the right direction. However, the same could be said about the use of video tape to record games for scouting.

What NFL teams need to consider is that a system only works well if you have a strong process to incorporate that system to fulfill an overall objective.

Otherwise, it’s just expensive technology.